Curriculum Studies in South Africa
CURRICULUM STUDIES IN SOUTH AFRICA

INTELLECTUAL HISTORIES & PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES

Edited by

WILLIAM F. PINAR
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Series Editors’ Introduction

John N. Hawkins and W. James Jacob

Having contributed a long line of books and scholarly works on curriculum studies, it is a pleasure to add a volume by William F. Pinar to the International & Development Education Series. *Curriculum Studies in South Africa: Intellectual Histories & Present Circumstances* presents a case study of South Africa and its often controversial issues related to education. A historical overview is interwoven throughout the text as the senior contributors touch upon issues such as post-apartheid curriculum studies, critical incidence autoethnography, and the need for authentic teaching and learning.

In an orchestrated and historical dialogue, Pinar assigns each contributor with the charge to provide a critical review of the South African curriculum context. A focus on the “internationalization” rather than the “globalization” of the curriculum is a distinction the editor highlights in the preface. The internationalization dialogue extends beyond the contributors of the volume to include two international scholars, Hongyu Wang of China and Elizabeth Macedo of Brazil, who engage the six South African scholars with a series of questions and commentary, which is summarized by Pinar in chapter 7. A critical stance against colonial and neocolonial influences of curriculum meddling are addressed from a variety of historical and contemporary perspectives. How to pursue an effective international dialogue—by learning with and not necessarily from international examples—in curriculum studies while maintaining an education unique to the needs of South Africa is a challenge highlighted in this volume. With a population and economy that has been hit hard by the HIV and AIDS as well as the recent global economic crisis, South Africa is distinctive in theory and practice with respect to curriculum studies in the contemporary and post-Apartheid society. Home to the world’s largest number of AIDS orphans, South Africa is facing unique curricular issues inherited from previous South African generations and not necessarily
comparable to most other national contexts. Curriculum studies for South Africa remains at the forefront of sustained political, economic, and psychosocial change. Pinar and his colleagues address many of these issues in this compelling addition to the International & Development Education Series.
Abbreviations

ANC  African National Congress
APN  Academic Policy Network
BAGET Bachelor of General Education and Training
BPaed Bachelor of Paedagogy
CHE  Council on Higher Education
CNE  Christian National Education
COTEP Committee on Teacher Education Policy
CUMSA Curriculum Model for South Africa
C2005 Curriculum 2005
DAS  Development Appraisal System
DoE  Department of Education
EASA Education Association of South Africa
FET  Further Education and Training
FP   Fundamental Pedagogics
GET  General Education and Training Phase
HEQC Higher Education Quality Committee
HDE  Higher Diploma in Education
HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
IKS  Indigenous Knowledge System
INSET In-Service Education of Teachers
IQMS Integrated Quality Management System
IWC  Integrated World Capitalism
MEd  Master of Education
Natsoc Naturalist Society
NCS  National Curriculum Statements
NECC National Education Crisis Committee
NECC National Education Co-ordinating Committee
NEF  New Education Fellowship
NEPI National Education Policy Initiative
NQF National Qualification Framework
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Life Orientation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBE</td>
<td>Outcomes-Based Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>PBTA</td>
<td>Peninsula Biology Teachers’ Association</td>
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<td>PEI</td>
<td>President’s Educational Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PGCE</td>
<td>Postgraduate Certificate in Education</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDDA</td>
<td>Research, Develop, Disseminate and Adopt</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNCS</td>
<td>Revised National Curricular Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RPL</td>
<td>Recognition of Prior Learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADTU</td>
<td>South African Democratic Teachers’ Union</td>
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<td>SAJE</td>
<td>South African Journal of Education</td>
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<td>SAQA</td>
<td>South African Qualifications Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Student Representative Council</td>
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<td>TIMMS</td>
<td>Third International Mathematics and Science Study</td>
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<td>TP</td>
<td>Teaching Practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCT</td>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDW</td>
<td>University of Durban-Westville</td>
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<tr>
<td>UKZN</td>
<td>University of Kwa-Zulu Natal</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNISA</td>
<td>University of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>UWC</td>
<td>University of the Western Cape</td>
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<tr>
<td>VOC</td>
<td>Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie</td>
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<td>WITS</td>
<td>University of the Witwatersrand</td>
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<td>WSE</td>
<td>Whole School Evaluation</td>
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Introduction

William F. Pinar

But we all know that each generation has its own test.

Jane Addams (2002 [1902], 5)

While the internationalization of the academic field of curriculum studies has been under way in many countries for decades, its institutionalization—in the establishment of an international association (www.iaacs.org)—and its theorization (see Overly 2003; Pinar 2003; Trueit et al. 2003) are relatively recent. Internationalization can provide scholars with critical and intellectual distance from their own local cultures and from those standardizing processes of globalization against which numerous national cultures—and the school curricula designed to reproduce those national cultures—are now reacting so strongly. In this collection one discerns the promise of the internationalization of curriculum studies.1 It is a promise kept by the scholars whose work comprises this collection.

The history of internationalization undermines the present promise of dialogic encounter among colleagues working worldwide. The reality is often the uncritical importation of concepts from other countries: evidently the case of outcomes-based education in South Africa. The calling of curriculum studies is, in part, the comprehension of what is at work and at stake in such political maneuvers. Through study and dialogical encounter scholars can distance themselves from their own situations as they come to understand others’. The promise of internationalization is the intellectual advancement not only of nationally distinctive fields but of a worldwide
field of curriculum studies structured by knowledge of the national, the local. This is, I suggest, the test our generation must pass.

The problem with the project of internationalization is world history. Even in cosmopolitan projects, traces of imperialism and colonialism are discernible (Pinar 2009). Even in the present project I cannot but hear previous occasions when resources were removed from South Africa and converted into commodities exchangeable in a first-world economy. The fact that engagement in this project was voluntary updated but did not necessarily erase these historic echoes. It is the dilemma facing the internationalization of curriculum studies: how to engage in international conversation cognizant of world history and present injustices but not fated to reenact them. Certainly, I discerned that dilemma. What it meant was a continuing caution in my analytic efforts, an anxiety that any analysis risked neocolonial appropriation.

True, I reassured myself, I had built into this project protections against such appropriation. The “final word” went to the South African scholars. The “panel” posing questions to these scholars about their draft chapters comprised of two theorists whom I knew would be cognizant of such traces. I kept prominent before me (as if on the computer screen) my anxiety that theorization risked reinscribing historic traces. I was determined to engage in this work first and foremost as a colleague, animated by my professional obligation to understand another colleague’s work on its own terms. Given that individuality is rarely separable from that national (and/or regional) history and culture in which it takes form, the individuality of these colleagues was, for me, primary.

If individuality is paramount, why choose the nation as a unit of analysis? While the nation may be in “retreat” (Strange 1996)—relegated to reactive roles in economic globalization—it remains the imaginary and material site in which much of humanity experiences daily civic life. The nation remains the site in which political debates over school reform have occurred; that is clearly the case in South Africa. It has been the case in the United States (Pinar et al. 1995), and it is the case in Canada (Tomkins 2008 [1986]). Since the 1980s school reform has been increasingly cast in economic terms. As the chapters in this book show, in South Africa the racial and the economic became intertwined. National politics gets played out on the backs—and in the minds—of schoolchildren and those who teach them.

Given the primacy of the nation in curriculum reform, I have focused on “internationalization” rather than “globalization.” Not only does internationalization point to the national context in which global politics is enacted, but, for my purposes, the term underlines the promise of the next stage (our generational test, recalling Addams) in curriculum studies.
Internationalization denotes the possibility of nationally distinctive fields in complicated conversation with each other. In this collection we glimpse a “micro-enactment” of such internationalization in exchanges between South African scholars and two non–South African scholars, one a Brazilian scholar working in Rio de Janeiro and the other a Chinese national working in the United States. In Chapter 7 Professors Elizabeth Macedo (Brazil) and Hongyu Wang (United States) pose questions to and comment on the replies from the South African scholars: Professors Ursula Hoadley, Wayne Hugo, Lesley Le Grange, Labby Ramrathan, Crain Soudien, and Yusef Waghid. In these exchanges distinctions were drawn and comparisons were made—between Brazil and South Africa, between China and South Africa, between the United States and South Africa—but always in the service of understanding curriculum studies in South Africa. The emphasis here is not upon comparison but upon understanding the singularity of the nationally distinctive field through study of its intellectual history and analysis of its present circumstances, with each domain clarified in dialogue with colleagues working elsewhere.

Both Professor Macedo and Professor Hoadley characterize scholarly dialogue as relatively absent from the Brazilian and South African fields. Macedo wonders whether the focus upon an external “object”—foreign scholarship—distracts scholars from engaging each other directly and focusing on issues specific to the nationally distinctive field. Hoadley seems disinclined to cite this particular external object as the distracting element, focusing instead on the character of knowledge production within South Africa, and suggesting it is the nature of theory to proliferate its own separate languages that create a Babel discouraging dialogue. In contrast, empirical research focuses attention on the same observable and measurable object. I wonder whether what makes the object distracting (and silencing) is not its externality but its elusiveness. When elevated above “horizontal” relations (implying dialogue among equals) the object constructs a vertical slide (as it were) on which scholars necessarily slip as they climb toward the object (forever) just above them. Hoadley’s invocation of empiricism recalls science’s confidence that the characteristics and functions of external objects can be ascertained by protocols of observation and measurement, elevating investigators above the object. Is it, then, only when scholars are subjugated to the object on which they are focused that conversation among them is rendered less relevant, as they must devote themselves to what is above and beyond them? How would such a fundamental structure of relations become instantiated in a scholarly field?

In the South African instance, the obvious answer is colonization, replicated in a subjugated relation to foreign scholarship. A supplementary and perhaps less obvious answer is suggested by the structural relation
instantiated in the United States. The U.S. field was structured around school improvement, reaching its nadir during the George W. Bush Administration, when the capacity of schools (now construed as academic businesses with bottom lines, such as scores on standardized tests) for raising student test scores was traced back to education professors’ university classes. The Bush Administration demanded curricular alignment among its objectives, the content of university-based courses in teacher education, and outcomes in schools. Even a less fascistic structure nonetheless positions education faculties as a lever legislated by government to lift a massive institution (the school) in which society, history, culture, and family are personified in students. In the scramble to achieve the impossible, university-based faculties focus on the elusive external object (the school), not the articulation of its meaning in complicated conversation among themselves.

I invoke “internationalism” to suggest a solidarity beyond borders that a shared concern—our academic discipline devoted to understanding curriculum—might support. Wang recalls Kristeva’s conception of nation without nationalism; such a conception constitutes a prerequisite for internationalism among curriculum studies scholars. While reality requires us to retain the nation as a key category of analysis and even as a bulwark against the crushing standardization of globalization, we must not succumb to the nation’s political socialization. We are not representatives of our respective governments, condemned to reenact international conflicts, but independent scholars devoted to understanding our local situations through conversation with colleagues unfamiliar with them. The critical distance such conversation entails—which is one benefit of internationalization—enables understanding of both one’s own situation and the situations of one’s colleagues.

Proximity is a persistent problem in curriculum studies. In the United States, it was proximity to schools—including the expectation that university-based academic work should translate into specific institutional improvements—that slowed the pace of intellectual advancement during the Tylerian era (Pinar 2008a). During the Bush Administration, funded research was mandated to be quantitative and directed toward raising test scores, an ideological effort to muzzle scholars in schools of education, which had been historically caricatured (by U.S. conservatives) as sites of leftwing indoctrination. Proximity seems not to be a problem in Canadian curriculum studies, nor does it seem to be one in South Africa—at least not yet. While national agendas drive curriculum reform, South African scholars seem free to participate, critique, and even ignore these agendas.

In South Africa proximity would seem to be primarily a function of individual preference. Lesley Le Grange, for instance, replies to my question regarding this problem by writing: “my work is not simply shaped by
these agendas but has offered critical responses to societal events and government agenda.” As the post-Apartheid teacher education coordinator at what was then the University of Durban-Westville, Labby Ramrathan reports that he was not coerced into compliance with national directives to restructure offerings as “programs directed at satisfying national needs.” Wayne Hugo believes that “there was subtle pressure on academics to toe the governmental line.” And now, Ursula Hoadley reports, there is “more pressure for universities to work with ministries.” Rather than theoretical research, there is a press for “policy prescriptions.” There may be, then, a problem of proximity coming.

We achieve and maintain distance from governmental initiatives past and present by studying both, and by studying the scholarship of scholars working elsewhere. One opportunity the internationalization of curriculum studies presents is distance from the everyday reality of one’s own situation. While essential to understand on its own terms and for its own sake, the scholarship of colleagues working elsewhere also enables us to discern the specificity—even the arbitrariness—of the local. Specificity is scarcely limited to the national, of course, as nationalism itself has destroyed specificity, most prominently the indigenous. In the present volume the indigenous is referenced on more than one occasion, including in terms of efforts to Africanize school knowledge.

The personification of specificity is the individual; the “subject” is the lived site of remembrance and reconstruction. Understanding the subjectivity of the internationalization of curriculum studies accompanies my efforts to understand the field’s intellectual history and present circumstances, as the individual personifies that history and those circumstances. Before composing these chapters, the South African scholars consented to answer my questions concerning their intellectual life histories and present involvement in curriculum studies. With permission, I have drawn from their answers to introduce the South African scholars whose chapters comprise this collection. Concluding the collection is the “final word” of the South African scholars.

The South African Scholars

Crain Soudien labors to advance the humanist project beyond its historical character—and specifically its “white character.” Coming to this undertaking as a “politically oppressed but privileged person,” Soudien rejects the “ethnicization, racialization, and masculinization” that accompanied European domination. First influenced by Marxism (before he became...
disappointed by socialism’s “impatience with non-Western understandings of the world”), Soudien found that poststructuralism supported his skepticism about vanguardism, with “its authoritarian inclinations.” While it is informed by social events, Soudien’s ongoing project is by “no means a response” to them:

I am very aware of the way in which the conjuncture in which we find ourselves in the world today, as opposed to the specific manifestations the South African situation takes, as the defining problem that is guiding my work. This conjuncture, in some ways the triumph of a white and European appropriation of our now universal inheritance, is what I want to be able to say I am committed to challenging.

That challenge proceeds by “understanding the constitutive social character of communicating and learning across difference.” In particular, Soudien looks to anthropology and postcolonial theory to provide clues about where to go.

Soudien complains that curriculum history is underdeveloped in South Africa, a problem he helps correct in his essay (Chapter 1). For Soudien, social difference—not reform—drives curriculum development in South Africa. Such social difference is local and particular, but it is also global, rendering curriculum development processes tantamount to acts of “incorporation into the dominant ideological structures of the world.” Soudien links this incorporation to processes of internationalization, a term he associates not only with colonialism but also with early European efforts to deracialize the curriculum. Politically (and specifically for the ANC [African National Congress]), as Soudien shows, this racial “evisceration” mutates into rhetoric of “racial unity.”

The project of “whiteness” remains invisible to itself, Soudien suggests, so that even in post-Apartheid South Africa, education remains a black aspiration and a white reality. Curriculum reform becomes the management of racial integration, specifically of the “integration of black people into the hegemonic order,” and thereby “is perpetuating older forms of discrimination.” Such integration is recoded as the cultivation of rationality, underscoring “the extent to which subjectivity in South Africa is a raced, cultured, gendered, and classed experience.” As it did during Apartheid, such a conception of subject formation functions to “normalize identity in racial terms.”

Understood historically, then, curriculum development in South Africa has always been—since the arrival of the Dutch in the seventeenth century—an international phenomenon. By importing a curriculum model (from New Zealand and the United Kingdom) to structure post-Apartheid
reform, policymakers ignored history, proceeding as if “the social context” of South Africa were “empty.” In so doing, reformers reproduced both South Africa’s history and its social structure. Soudien’s analysis of curriculum studies’ present circumstances intersects with the global crisis. “The systemic nature of this crisis,” he points out,

manifesting itself at the individual level as a crisis of the self—identity, identification, and community-making—but at the community level as a crisis of sustainability, is at the forefront of my mind. The urgency of the message of climate change has simply confirmed for me the interconnectedness of the puzzle of being, at the individual and larger social level and the importance of education against this.

As a literal reality and a political metaphor, the crisis of climate change communicates the urgency of the situation in South Africa and of Soudien’s project.

Wayne Hugo provides a theoretical elaboration of how “hierarchical networks work.” He does so not only through analyses of major educational theorists—among them Piaget, Bloom, Bernstein, and Gagné—but historically, working his way from Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine through to the present, concluding with implications for the South African present (Chapter 2). As a high school teacher, Hugo experientially found that a “hierarchical organization and understanding of your subject at school level was vital to being able to teach creatively and knowing how to move freely through its structures.” Not only material conditions and social challenges have inspired Wayne Hugo; spiritual experience has been formative as well. He also acknowledges colleagues and friends (often intersecting categories for him) in his formation.

Curricular integration in post-Apartheid South Africa “went too far,” Hugo judges. Expecting underprepared and overworked teachers in poverty-stricken conditions to achieve predetermined outcomes without detailed curriculum content training amounted to leaving them in a “desert with only signposts for survival.” For him, however, and for other teachers he knew in Johannesburg, “nothing much changed in my classroom or those of my colleagues. We still taught our own lessons in our own way.” The experience left Hugo with “an allergic reaction to the romantic tradition of progressivism as it played out in South Africa,” a reaction nourished during graduate studies in the 1980s. Why?

Because it [progressivism] idealized the learner, idealized the teacher, idealized the classroom, set the whole vision up of creative paths discovered and scaffolded within different contexts getting to the same end point, obscuring the difficulty of the whole process, not recognizing that it was precisely
middle-class kids with a strong family pedagogy who would swim in this world while poor kids coming from impoverished homes (material and pedagogic) would have no background from which to work this obscure world of hidden expectations.

Moreover, “this romantic progressivism combined with a whole other language of explicit outcomes and skills delimited to the nth degree that played out in the National Qualifications Framework.” A rejection of South African progressivism would “later prove to be one of the crucial moves in post-Apartheid curriculum studies,” led specifically by Johan Muller and Jonathan Jansen, the foremost critics of the reform known as Curriculum 2005 (C2005). “Delving into the past,” Hugo acknowledges, “had strangely equipped me to intervene [in the present].” At one point Hugo uses the term “hiatus” to depict the sharpness of his “distantiation” from the current scene.

It has been an absence of distance that has impaired South African curriculum studies, Hugo implies, noting the “negative effect on proper research” that twenty years of “polarized positions” has wrought. Without a history of South African curriculum studies, Hugo suggests, theoretical trends from Europe and North America tended toward ideological rhetoric rather than translating into programs of research. His own response has been “to develop an educational language of description that gets beyond ideological battles and into the core of what an educational event is.” Given conditions of ideological overdetermination and polarization, intellectual distance and the original lines of research it supports can stimulate a field’s intellectual advancement.

Hugo’s work is, then, “fairly independent of institutional and larger political circumstances”—in part, he thinks (invoking Bernsteinian terminology), because “[e]ducation was so weakly classified that it allowed me enough freedom to pursue my own education.” Hugo reports that part of its attraction was “the possibility of an interior language of education,” a prospect parallel to my affirmation of curriculum studies as a discipline distinctive in education, severed from parent disciplines such as psychology, and focused on educational, including subjective, experience. “I am a purist,” Hugo writes, and “I have always been frustrated by the way much of educational studies seems to move away from education rather than toward it. My major aim is to get an interior language of education going.” Such a language would represent, in my view, a major intellectual breakthrough (Axelrod 1979) for us all.

Labby Ramrathan began his career administratively, working with prospective teachers: placing them in schools, developing assessment protocols, and conducting post–teaching practice surveys. This administrative
interest has remained, as Ramrathan is now head of the School of Education Studies at the University of KwaZulu-Natal. His “intellectual preoccupation” is teacher education; it started in the early 1980s, when he explored, through action research, the use of computers in the teaching mathematics (Chapter 3). Later he played a key role in developing the BAGET (Bachelor of General Education and Training) model of teacher development, in which the “theoretical study of education as a discipline” constituted a key element of teacher education, certainly an advance over the degradation of education as a discipline under the Bush Administration in the United States. In this model of South African teacher education, curriculum theory is to be taught (by university staff) in schools “within a theory-practice dialect.” This inclusion—even if weighted toward “practice”—also represents an advance over the situation in the United States, where “practice” has been reduced to raising public school student test scores.

Critical of “outcomes-based education” (because it assumed that the school could correct the ills of the past), Ramrathan acknowledges that “much of curriculum reconceptualization is precipitated through national agendas.” Teacher education programs have also been revised as a result of national agendas, such as “Norms and Standards for Educators” (2000). Even the number of students admitted to schools of education has been influenced by national policies and pressures. By following teacher graduates—discovering whether they found jobs, and if so, what they did in their teaching practice—Ramrathan developed a curriculum for teacher education that was responsive to theoretical developments in teacher education as well as to national priorities. He defines curriculum design, too, in terms of “responsiveness to a range of initiatives, some led by national agendas, some led by individuals, some led by institutions.” In the post-Apartheid period, “responding to national imperatives of portability, pace, and recognition of prior learning,” South African universities reorganized their curricula from year-long courses to modular units. In addition, universities were required to register their offerings within a newly developed national qualification framework (NQF), to seek approval from the Department of Education for funding, and to obtain accreditation from the Council for Higher Education.

Within this national agenda was the inclusion of HIV/AIDS education within teacher education. “My interest in HIV/AIDS in education,” Ramrathan reports, “was influenced through the international research project, through my doctoral study, as well as through the interest that HIV/AIDS research generated within South Africa.” He acknowledges that his research “is very much influenced by the need to respond to current issues that impact our education system.” Among these is an emphasis on “African scholarship,” enabling academic knowledge to influence the world.
“through local ways of knowing.” He concludes: “The above description of the genesis of my present preoccupations and research agenda integrates my individuality, my career life history and the sociopolitical context of teacher education and higher education within South Africa, driven by varying imperatives of transformation, democracy, and globalization.” From this outsider’s perspective, these seem to be a satisfying confluence indeed.

Issues of “change, transformation, and political contestation” have been paramount in Ursula Hoadley’s research, which is informed theoretically by “a critical curriculum tradition” associated with the “new sociology of education.” Hoadley judges post-Apartheid curriculum reform to be highly problematic, especially when “layered onto existing [especially working-class and black] teacher practices and understandings of teaching and learning.” That conclusion has led her to a focus on the significance of social context, and specifically the legacies of Apartheid in South African schooling. It became clear to her that progressive education—emphasizing curricular “relevance” and “learner-centeredness” in Curriculum 2005—was “a middle-class model” and, as such, reproduced class differences. The curriculum has had “disempowering effects” for teachers and, later, students, following, in part, from its “horizontal” (using Bernstein’s schema) blurring of disciplinary boundaries and lack of clear guidance to teachers as to what to teach and how to teach it. Curriculum 2005 has resulted in a somewhat “more highly specified” and “standardized” curriculum, a development also supported, Hoadley suggests, by “more vertical integration (sequencing of knowledge from one level to the next).” Content specification and an understanding of the appropriate sequencing of the knowledge content of subjects, however, remains a problem.

Apprenticed at the University of Cape Town by two experts in Bernsteinian theory, Hoadley enjoyed a “rigorous” theoretical education, “a rich resource for work in curriculum theory.” This theoretical sophistication has sometimes been judged to be “inaccessible and elitist,” a charge leveled at sophisticated theorists in the United States as well. While the elitist criticism is misplaced, Hoadley does take to heart the charge of inaccessibility, and she has recently attempted to write for a broader audience.

Through an informal network of Bernsteinian theorists, Hoadley has enjoyed “engagement” with scholars working in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Norway, and Portugal. She has noted that while the game is the same, scholars working in different nations play the game differently. “In South Africa,” Hoadley notes, “there is a strong concern with the boundary, not as pronounced in work from other countries. There is a temptation to think that this is somehow related to our history—a history of classifications—who we were (black, white, colored), where we could live, what jobs we could do, etc.” This association of theoretical
dispositions with national history and culture—stimulating self-conscious contemplation of scholarship’s function—seems to me to be one benefit of internationalization. A second benefit, as Hoadley reminds us, has been “the opportunity to build on work done elsewhere, to advance the theory as a collective in many ways, and also to consider how it required development in relation to the particular South African context.” A negative consequence of “internationalization” (as Crain Soudien also points out) is uncritical importation of reform proposals: “Outcomes-based education and a national qualifications framework are cultural imports that fit uneasily in the local setting.” In South Africa, then, Hoadley adds, “there is no doubt that the shifts in focus of research are set within global contexts and concerns.”

There is, in addition, a “push” toward “regional” (the nations comprising the Southern African region) comparative research. Hoadley is herself involved in a project that compares student outcomes, curricula, language issues, and pedagogical practices in South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, and Namibia. Such studies erode, she suggests, a sharp sense of South African “exceptionalism,” as they disclose that South African students perform “worse” than students in these other countries, despite the fact these countries have lower GDPs than South Africa. Accompanying such comparative research is the involvement of economists in studies of so-called school effectiveness, and she wonders whether they are asking the right questions. As for the present state of South African curriculum studies, Hoadley admits, it is unclear “where we stand right now…. There seem to be a number of different trajectories, with past ones enduring, in different forms, and new concerns emerging.” Despite the complexity of present circumstances (and a weak sense of disciplinary community), Hoadley provides a map (Chapter 4).

A student of geography and biology, Lesley Le Grange focuses on science—especially environmental—education (Chapter 5). He became a school teacher in the 1980s in response to the inequities he had witnessed. It was, then, a convergence of political commitment and love of his subject, mobilized by anti-Apartheid politics, that precipitated his entry into teaching. In the late 1980s, likeminded teachers began working together—it was, in Le Grange’s terms, “in-service education for teachers by teachers”—to share resources and reflect on practice. Le Grange worked with biology colleagues who were focused on environmental education informed by a “broader conception of environment that comprises interacting biophysical, economic, political, and social dimensions.” After Apartheid ended, Le Grange was invited to write a book on continuous assessment, a concept key to the new government’s reform initiatives. “In short,” Le Grange concludes, “many of my current academic interests have their origins in my lived experience as a school teacher during the transition
period from Apartheid to a democracy—my work at the time was responsive to challenges of the time.” Moreover, “as a black South African, having experienced racial discrimination firsthand, I have developed a sensitivity to issues of equity and social justice.”

Le Grange expresses this sensitivity through his commitment to including indigenous knowledge in school and university curricula and by participating in debates regarding an African philosophy of education. Each effort contributes to a decentering of European knowledge, including that knowledge associated with science. Affirming the reality of agency amidst hegemony, Le Grange incorporates concepts associated with postmodernism and poststructuralism into his most recent scholarship, as these enable him to articulate “how constructs, such as OBE [outcomes-based education] are territorialized, deterritorialized, and reterritorialized.” In addition, Le Grange is responsive to global concerns regarding sustainability, and his recent research reflects that theme. In his view, global initiatives provide opportunities for advancing social justice locally, including “caring for nonhuman nature.” Such a sophisticated appreciation of potential local uses of global initiatives is one key consequence of the internationalization of curriculum studies.

As a young man, Yusef Waghid witnessed protesting students being beaten by police. Asked to speak to the police on behalf of incarcerated students, Waghid felt intensely the necessity of making others understand. It was an imprinting event that became a pedagogical disposition, consolidated during his undergraduate years. “Not surprisingly,” Waghid observes, “today I am preoccupied intellectually with the use of philosophy of education, particularly with how deliberative democracy, citizenship, and friendship can potentially cultivate improved teaching and learning relationships.” Such relationships provide opportunities for decolonization and deracialization, and for challenging neoliberal education. The latter’s institutionalization in South Africa—as outcomes-based education—is, Waghid asserts, fated to fail, and among its casualties are creativity and other consequences unforeseen by policymakers or classroom teachers. “Education,” Waghid reminds us, “is an inconclusive process of dialogical activity, and its outcomes are sometimes unintended and unimagined.” For him, the cultivation of imaginative teaching and learning—not an obsession with outcomes—promises the realization of South African aspirations for a transformative education. For him, curriculum studies constitute one vehicle for transforming education from its Apartheid past toward the achievement of social justice, requiring the cultivation of “mutual care, deliberative engagement, and responsibility.”

Yusef Waghid’s autobiographical reflection underscores how imprinting historical—indeed, traumatic—events can be reconstructed subjectively
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into a pedagogical disposition toward social reparation. In occupying a space in between the students and the police, forced to build a bridge between two irreconcilable positions, the teacher renders understandable the point of view of the other to others, creatively fostering—through dialogical, deliberative engagement—a shared sense of mutual care and responsibility. Surely this is one potential civic consequence of curriculum enacted by the savvy, socially committed teacher.

To provide a moment of internationalization, I invited two scholars to pose questions concerning the chapters composed by these South African scholars. Prior knowledge of South African curriculum studies was not a consideration; after all, especially during the early phases of internationalization, prior knowledge of nationally distinctive fields (other than one’s own) will be minimal, even nonexistent, as the problem of proximity translates into parochialism. To engage in dialogical encounter with the South African scholars, I invited two individuals whose scholarship I admired, scholars likely to pose provocative questions compelling intriguing answers. I was not disappointed.

Professor Elizabeth Macedo of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil is a brilliant theoretician, having published several important books and articles, including (with Alice Casimiro Lopes, another important Brazilian scholar) a chapter on Brazilian curriculum studies (Lopes and Macedo 2003). Professor Hongyu Wang of Oklahoma State University in the United States is a brilliant theoretician as well. Among her remarkable publications is a book-length study of her intellectual journey from China to the United States through study of Confucius, Foucault, and Wang (2004).

Complicated Conversation

We come to every situation as individuals, but drag behind us a history, and whilst we as individuals may find great commonality, the histories are vastly different.

Ursula Hoadley (2007)

This sagacious sentence underscores how complicated conversation across national borders inevitably is. Concepts we have in common—outcomes-based education, for instance—convey different meanings in different nations. In the United States, for instance, it is a politically reactionary scheme espoused especially by conservatives to distract intellectually independent teachers by compelling them to focus on standardized test
preparation. In South Africa, it is a politically—specifically racially—
progressive initiative13 aimed at providing equitable educational results.

What I am describing as “discursive movements” (see Chapter 7) in the
exchanges between the panel and the South African scholars is not novel;
they characterize the complicated conversation that is teaching, for
instance. What justifies listing discursive movements here are tendencies at
international conferences to reside at one of two extremes: at the one
extreme, to report one’s own research without engaging with the research
conducted by colleagues in other countries (which occurs, in part, because
that research is not read across national borders, and in part because it
seems site specific) and, at the other extreme, to draw only comparisons
between issues or research in one’s own country and apparently associated
issues or research in other. The problem with the first extreme is that inter-
nationalization is initiated but not intellectually consummated, as con-
summation requires sustained engagement with scholarship outside one’s
country or region. The problem with the second extreme is that compar-
ison blurs the distinctiveness of local issues and research, specifically the
relations of those local issues and research to national history, culture, and
politics. Prerequisite to understanding curriculum internationally is,
I submit, the primacy of the particular case. Self-reference, rather than
comparison, may provide, at least during initial phases of internationaliza-
tion, more disclosure than quick comparisons.

Self-reference is only the beginning, however. As a worldwide phenom-
enon, the internationalization of curriculum studies is at its beginning.
While much has been written about South African education, now, for the
first time, we have in one collection crucial glimpses of South African cur-
riculum studies described from five distinctive points of view. Moreover,
we have a “micro-moment” of internationalization in which South African
scholars reply to questions raised by scholars working elsewhere. Knowing
what curriculum studies colleagues are thinking worldwide is the first step
in understanding curriculum internationally. Understanding the national
distinctiveness of curriculum studies enables us to underscore how national
history and culture influence our own research. If we can incorporate these
distinctive understandings into a lexicon understood by all, on some dis-
tant day our descendants may conclude that the internationalization of
curriculum studies has indeed occurred.

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Notes

1. I define the “internationalization of curriculum studies” as nationally distinctive academic fields in complicated conversation with each other. In this early phase of internationalization, I suggest that the conversation be focused on understanding that distinctiveness nationally or regionally by studying nationally distinctive curriculum studies fields’ intellectual histories and analyzing present circumstances. This volume is one example; it strengthens, I suggest (2007), the disciplinary structures of curriculum studies, namely its verticality (intellectual history) and horizontality (understanding of present circumstances). Through internationalization and disciplinarity intellectual advancement is possible. In a second and initially supplementary phase, I suggest that this international conversation may result in a common language worldwide, a vocabulary of curriculum concepts comprised of local ideas, a lexicon enabling understanding both of distinctive fields and of the global situation.

2. Individuality is a tough sell after structuralism (including the Marxist kind) and poststructuralism. Like the subject (Jay 2005), however, humanism has—due, in part, to Edward Said (2004)—reemerged in recent years (Radhakrishnan 2008, 6, 20, 139ff.), derived from “the complex and forbidding ‘new humanism’ of Frantz Fanon” (Gilroy 2005, 40). It is now time, I argue, to reconstruct a cosmopolitan humanism personified by heroic individuals.

3. The nation and the power of the state continue to play powerful roles not only in specific school reform initiatives but also in curriculum research. As Radhakrishnan (2008, 234) notes, “By now it is commonplace knowledge that the state will not wither away, neither under capitalism nor under international communism.” Research on globalization too often focuses exclusively on neoliberalism, thereby reenacting globalization’s erasure of the local, including the national. To the extent that it is loyal to its name, comparative education underscores what is common, not what is distinctive. In my definition, internationalization acknowledges the primacy of the particular.

4. Whether it is understood “simplistically” (Ellsworth 1997, 49) as a conversation among interlocutors “seeking mutual understanding” or as a theoretically driven transformation of social relations, Ellsworth (48) asserts that “dialogue as a form of pedagogy” is a “historically and cultural embedded practice.” Its historical embeddedness acknowledged, I think “mutual understanding” should be elevated from “simplistic” to “complicated.” Certainly I would gratefully settle for understanding. As readers will note, the dialogue documented
here involves discursive movements of comparison and distinction. Readers will note that both moves led to disagreements, most pointedly, perhaps, over Hugo’s endorsement of “hierarchy” as a basic curriculum concept (see Chapters 4 and 9).

5. In the United States, the field began in philosophy, but by the first decade of the twentieth century had betrayed its genesis in the humanities as it became a form of social science, and, specifically, social engineering. Philosophy’s decline in the U.S. academic field of education has been slow but almost complete, and it has been replaced by a vulgar instrumentalism that during the Bush Administration became focused obsessively on standardized test scores.

6. While social disaffiliation—even violence—accompanied colonization, subjugation does not inevitably mean passivity and silence. Note that in Professor Macedo’s question to Crain Soudien, she asks him to help her think about the question of “subaltern agency” in curriculum policy studies, which is not only key in decolonization theory (see, for instance, Pinar 2008b) but pertinent in thinking about the unequal global power relations in the internationalization of curriculum studies.

7. By this term I am suggesting that, rather than regard ourselves as emissaries of our various national governments, we position ourselves “horizontally” as colleagues aspiring to understand both our nationally distinctive situations and those of our colleagues. What enables “solidarity” is not only this shared professional aspiration but our vigilance over government intrusion into the education of children, now taking the form of neoliberal initiatives. Inspired by aspiration, mobilized by threat, such solidarity enables us to question and even disagree with each other over theoretical issues specific to curriculum studies, but not to reenact macropolitical disputes for which we are not responsible and which we lack the political capital to resolve.

8. In her reply to Ramrathan’s discussion of South Africa’s importation of outcomes-based education, Macedo notes that “although state power is strong, I always like to emphasize that in spite of it, people make use of the tools, changing them and sometimes subverting [the state’s] aims.” She emphasizes “daily practice” as “resistance,” and while acknowledging that “articulated resistances are necessary,” she wants to “recover” daily practice—teachers’ claims to not understand aspects of reform implementation agendas, for instance—as “making the same different.”

9. As Kögler (1999, 252) suggests:

   In critical interpretation, the reconstruction of the other and of her symbolic background serves as a critical foil from which to become, as it were, one’s own other. The insight thereby provided, to be sure, is never pure, context-free, or absolute. Yet if adequately developed, the perspective from the other’s point of view proves all the more valuable, because it sheds a specific light on ourselves that we could not have generated by ourselves.

In understanding the other, we understand ourselves. On occasion this self-understanding occurs through comparison and contrast with the other: in Macedo’s reply to Ramrathan’s discussion of teacher shortages in South Africa,
for instance, she notes there are also shortages of teachers in Brazil, especially teachers of mathematics, science, and geography. Rather than direct state intervention being the problem (as in South Africa), however, it is, in Brazil, low salaries that are to blame.

10. Internationalization offers opportunities for intellectual advancement to the extent that scholars employ participation in this conversation to strengthen the disciplinary structures of their nationally distinctive field, including its verticality (intellectual history) and horizontality (analyses of present circumstances). The two structures are intertwined (see Pinar 2007).

11. As noted, passages quoted (with permission) in this section derive from my interviews with the South African scholars.

12. In reply to my query concerning the influence of the English sociolinguist Basil Bernstein (1924–2000) in South Africa (where today he is perhaps more influential than in British curriculum studies), Ursula Hoadley reports: “Bernstein’s work has gained purchase in South Africa centrally by virtue of the micro—a network of scholars who had contact with him, and his students, who have inducted their own students into the theory.” Hoadley “finds Bernstein’s work extremely rich as a theoretical resource. But not for all problems, and probably not for all times.” Hugo’s comments on this topic echo Hoadley’s. (See Muller 2000; Young 2008).

13. Wayne Hugo reports: “In South Africa we were naïve in terms of OBE; the trade unions bought into the logic and became its main carrier, inadvertently keying into a neoliberal set of ideas and consequences that they are now beginning to wake up to . . . so there was this weird alliance between the most radical of unions and business on OBE in South Africa.”

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Chapter 1

“What to Teach the Natives”: A Historiography of the Curriculum Dilemma in South Africa
Crain Soudien

Introduction

Surprisingly, aside from a contribution made by Jansen (1999a) at the turn of the twentieth century, there has virtually been no debate on the historiography of the curriculum in South Africa. Although scholars such as Muller (1996) and Fataar (2006) have begun mapping out the intellectual terrain of the sociology of education and education policy, the history of the field of curriculum studies has not systematically been examined. We have not yet seen an accounting, much less a classification, even in Jansen’s work, of how the story of the curriculum and its making is told and what implications such narrations might have for issues of inclusion and exclusion (see, for example, Pinar et al. 1995; Pinar 2001).

This essay is an attempt at constituting a historiographical account of the curriculum-making process in South Africa and the southern African region. It is offered in juxtaposition to the proto-historiographies represented in the conservative White supremacy of Coetzee (1958), the liberalism of Malherbe (1925/1937), and the Marxism of Kallaway (1984; 2002). It is preliminary and limited in the sense that it is neither a full history of curriculum nor a full engagement with the history of the intellectual traditions and their representation in the country. What it attempts to do,
instead, toward staking out a different intellectual position to the proto-historiographies named above is lift out the issue of social difference—essentially race but also social class—as it has arisen at key periods in the making of the country’s curriculum over the past 350 years. The argument made here is that social difference, as opposed to, say, pedagogical reform, is the central question that drives curriculum development in South and southern Africa. The periods this section looks at—sometimes moments and sometimes decades—offer a window on to how this question of social difference is or is not addressed, particularly by those interlocutors who are themselves bearers of both political power and intellectual influence. I suggest, as Goldberg (2002) does, that understanding the instantiation of race into the interstices of power, through the making of the everyday and how the everyday is represented, is an important intellectual project. The racialization of power is important to study precisely because of its changing morphology. It begins, as we shall see, in that early capitalist environment of the so-called founding moment of South Africa, very much as it does in the United States, and moves through the ambivalences of these moments into an almost 200-year-long process in which modernity—in the image of high-status knowledge Europe, as opposed to its working-class and other subordinate versions—is universalized and becomes the template upon which schooling, everywhere, is managed. How questions of social difference and race in particular are addressed in education and the curriculum in this recomposing human landscape is important to comprehend.

Two initial points need to be made in relation to the discussion of social difference and power. I argue, first, that curriculum development processes in the southern African region and other colonial parts of the globe involve a forceful incorporation into the dominant ideological structures of the world. This incorporation is an insistently ambiguous process precipitating, to use Johannes Fabian’s (1998) term, moments of both oppression and freedom. This ambiguity is, of course, hardly framed in symmetry. The weight of colonial oppression cannot be equated with the small opportunity yielded by it, but its internal contradictions, inherent to it, are what we have to be alert to. The second is that this incorporation is a distinct manifestation of processes of internationalization. Though internationalization is not the primary focus of the essay, I attempt to show how it is present at each of the periods I highlight.

The essay begins with a discussion on colonialism and its significance for understanding the curriculum-making process. It then works with four key periods in which the issues of difference manifest themselves in particular kinds of ways, as a congealing, a loosening up, or being brought to a crisis.
Colonialism, Modernity, and the Curriculum

Questions of the curriculum—how it is conceptualized, designed, and delivered—take on a particular dynamic in social settings in which issues such as race, class, gender, language, and religion are matters of public contention. They are even more so in the generalized inequality of the colonial world. Characteristic of this generalized inequality are simultaneous and multiple tensions: the tensions within the metropole itself between various fractions of political opinion and classes; tensions between the metropole and its surrogates in the colonies; tensions between the metropole’s surrogates and the local people, and, finally the tensions within local groups themselves. Present too, and directly pertinent for the discussion of internationalization, are the tensions of the competing imperial powers, which seek to insert themselves into the newly colonized world, their versions of the world as they seek it to be. Out of these we see emerging a matrix of countervailing forces composed of complex alliances, hierarchies, and differentiations in which collective and individual interest take expression in multiple forms. I suggest, as a point of departure, that much of this complexity is not addressed in the commentary on the country’s educational history.

How might these developments be understood in the context of South Africa and southern Africa? This essay’s point of departure is that the long process of making and remaking the South African and southern African curriculum begins, and indeed continues to the present, as an important arena in which this multilayered politics is prosecuted. The dominant discussion of this experience, most emphatically represented by Majeke (1952), presents this experience in the determinist language of an oppression that happens to people. Interestingly, the insightful work of Molteno (1984) presents oppression as experience as that both subjects and also stimulates is not worked with for the complexity it offers. This essay is an exploratory attempt to develop the complexity introduced by Molteno. Shaped as Molteno’s insights are by a neo-Marxist analysis that is, in the context of the contradictions of capitalism, alert to the agency of the subordinate classes, my own attempt seeks to understand the curriculum-making process in relation to the larger political matrix, in which one might see these subordinate classes responding not only to the politics of capital but also other, sometimes more autonomous, politics.

Having made the point about the autonomous nature of local politics, I recognize the full weight of colonial politics in the making of the social, cultural, and economic character of the region. The question of where to turn to for making the curriculum, for example, and what resources to
draw on is, in these terms, relatively straightforward. At the point of the unveiling of the formal education project, there is only one script, and that is the Western one. But, as (1) the nature of South African society changes over the period of its colonial and modern history, and (2) the contradictions of education take effect, the epistemological and ontological possibilities and contradictions within this script of dominance considerably complicate this process. In relation to (1), the reality is that the character of the country’s basic social contradictions has been shifting profoundly over its 350-year-long history. Framed as this history is by capitalism, its initial dynamic, and it remains so for more than 200 years, is caught in the postmedieval struggle between modernity and tradition, those of both Europe and the colonized world. When the Dutch came to South Africa in the middle of the seventeenth century, for example, the process of separation of church and state was not yet complete. Dutch identity, never, of course, a homogenous entity, was still evolving into its classed nature. This conflict was constituted through the “us” and “them” terms that were complex. The other—“savage”—is even less than the “uncouth” lower classes. But as modernity deepens, it reconstitutes colonial society by giving it more class-like features. At the same time, illustrating conundrum (2) above, Enlightenment promises of human equality, always subvert the colonial project of the subordination of the local people. I elaborate on this below.

Education, as an ontological and epistemological question, was and still is, in the context of the evolving colonial landscape, a violent process involving the fundamental displacement of local knowledges and local identities. While these knowledges and identities never completely disappear and continue to manifest themselves right up to the present, the thrust of early colonialism is to deligitimate them (Altbach 1996). This process, critically, began with the displacement of traditional modes of socialization and initiation into adulthood. In their place, almost everywhere, was inserted a very particular understanding of how young people became adults. In it were particular understandings—in a complex ensemble of developments that are not the focus of this work—of childhood, learning, and social morality. The ethic of rescue was central. Children had to be rescued from their base instincts. In terms of the Piagetian developmental stages through which they went, it was important that certain structural relations define the form of their induction into adulthood. This was the beginning of mass education and it was constructed on the basis of, and in relation to, the ideas of the dominant classes in Europe which was going through the major movements of the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution (Hall 1992, 282). At the heart of these developments was humanism—a throwing off of the oppressive shackles of
feudalism and a liberation of the individual. To human beings was accorded the promise, after they turned their heads away from the idea of an omnipotent God, of a kind of perfectibility: “Man [sic] (was) endowed with the faculty and capacities to enquire into, investigate and unravel the mysteries of Nature; and the Enlightenment…freed (him) from dogma and intolerance…the whole of human history was laid out for understanding and mastery” (ibid.). From these developments came the great European paradox that will precede and characterize modernity.

When humanism was being developed in Europe, an anxiety that occupied the minds of a range of philosophers right up to World War II was whether all human beings did indeed have this capacity. An important discussion about the work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke (see Uzgalis 2002; Squadrito 2002), two of the most important founders of modern European thought, while showing that there is cause for caution in the ways in which these theorists have been characterized, particularly Locke, nonetheless, demonstrates how much of a challenge the “otherness” of people who did not conform to a known ideal of whiteness constituted for the Enlightenment mind. One saw in the ambiguities of the positions taken by Hobbes and Locke sufficient room for the explanation to take root that the subordination of “the other” was logically permissible. The work of Charles Darwin, promoting the idea of the survival of the fittest, gave impetus to a particular kind of “biologizing” of human identity. Reason was assumed to have a “basis in nature” (Hall 1992, 284).

Significantly, the ambiguities in these European discourses, and they come across as contradictions, never escaped the attention of “natives” across the globe. The message of equality in the education they receive is clear. Their treatment, however, locates them, they find, as lesser human beings. Why, they ask, are they denied this fulfilment that European civilization promises? Critically, as a consequence, by the time modernity has seized hold of the social landscape, it is no longer the contradiction between tradition and modernity that defines struggle. Essentially, the struggle becomes largely that of high-status knowledge—the canon—versus working-class knowledge or everyday knowledge. The “savage” is now in the orbit of modernity. “Native” identity, bearing, of course, the full weight of its history, including that delegitimized yoke of tradition, is now a completely different subject. What to teach the “natives” in these new conditions is a profoundly complex question. The dilemmas have changed. What arose as the problem in the early period is, in subsequent periods, now a completely different matter.

In the context of these changing dynamics possibilities for self-understanding and attaining equality for all human beings that lie inherent in the Western text, how is the curriculum to preserve the fantasy that
some people are superior to others? How then is the nation to be conceived and who is included within it? Prior to this, and necessary for its explanation, the ontological question is posed of who is sufficiently human to be included inside it? What kind of identity is to be cultivated for the people is not simply, as much of the direction education and politics discussions have tended to take, a question of “national character,” but a much more fundamental one involving notions, changing ones at that, of humanness. The entailments that issue out of this kind of politics are of somewhat broader scope than the language of inclusion and exclusion might suggest.

This essay opens in this way as part of an attempt to restate the terms of discussion around the internationalization of the curriculum in relation to particularly South Africa. It constitutes an engagement with the dominant documenters of and commentators on the curriculum. Internationalization is generally presented as a contemporary phenomenon. It is suggested here instead, much as Wallerstein (1983) has in attempting to describe globalization, as a force that one can trace back to mercantilism, that colonialism, as it happens in South Africa, configures the terms of this question in ways that require it to be appraised in new ways. Colonialism, in so far as it brings a range of Europeans into contact with Africans, Asians, Native Americans, Polynesians, and people elsewhere in the colonized world, is, certainly in the early period of European settlement, the necessary condition for internationalization to take place. Once the power of colonialism is in place, however, the ways in which the local and the global are articulated within it constitute the site of politics and particularly the politics of the curriculum in distinctive ways. This is most sharply expressed in the history of the educational development of the small southern African country of Lesotho. There, almost uniquely for the subcontinent, we see how competing international understandings of the curriculum—French Evangelical, Roman Catholic, and Anglican—come to pit the local people against each other. It is in the substantiation of these questions, I suggest, that one needs to understand and reconceptualize the process of internationalization in curriculum making. In thinking about these, some issues need to be emphasized. The first is to acknowledge the extent to which the process of curriculum making has almost always been managed within the framework of a form of internationalization. This internationalization, to define, is not the diffusive activity often associated with modernization theory, but fundamentally, an imposition of the values of the upper classes in the major imperial nations of the world, first Britain, Spain, Portugal, France, and the Netherlands, and later, the United States. Internationalization, in the context of modernization discourse, is presented as a relatively benign force, often crafted around the teleology and
indeed inevitability of science (see, for example, discussions of Marc-Antoine Jullien de Paris’ work in the early nineteenth century in any of a range of comparative education texts. Stone [1981, 8–9] provides a good example). This discourse of internationalization depends on rational choice theory. Internationalization is the end result of a deliberate and systematic process of scanning the environment and is described as “borrowing” for the purpose of obtaining the “goods” of progress. Implicit in this explanation is the assumption that rationality and “good sense” surround the making of this choice. This discussion attempts to reposition this process and the experiences surrounding it. It recognizes that while, on occasion, it is a process that involves choice, it is as often not. It is argued here that internationalization is embedded in relations of power, and that it is the nature of these relations that we need to understand.

The point made above is to situate our discussion of internationalism in a much wider framework. Internationalization is presented in comparative discussions as a development that kicks in once we are well into modernity under conditions of relative democracy. It assumes that there already exist distinct and local forms of education, even ones that might be indigenous, in relation to which, then, possibilities of borrowing—internationalization—arise. Internationalization is, understood thus, as a dimension of a reforming process. The reality is that it is present at its very beginning and that it takes shape in relation to the ambiguities that give modernity its character. In these terms it is a much more complex development.

How does this process unfold in the South African context?

The First Moments of Formal Education in South Africa

The introduction of formal education is an important period to focus on. It happens at a point when the first contact between important elements of the South African landscape of difference takes place—settler, slave, and indigene. This contact also, simultaneously, shapes the conditions for the country’s first experience of internationalization. We see in it an attempt to shape the Cape of Good Hope in the image of the dominant classes of Holland.

The first school that was established in April 1658 in South Africa was a slave school. It came into being as a managerial necessity. A slaver had been captured containing a large number of children. What should be done with them? A school was deemed to be the most effective vehicle for preparing the children for their future as property of the Dutch East India
Company or the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), the commercial enterprise that first formally settled down at the southern tip of Africa. The commander of the VOC, Jan van Riebeeck, the so-called father of modern South Africa, gave instructions for how the children were to be treated. They were in his eyes, identity-less subjects into whom everything that was necessary for their embodiment as slaves could be poured—a Christian God, VOC brandy and tobacco, and, ultimately, new Dutch Christian names.

It could be argued that this event represented a moment in which a kind of fundamental power was exercised. It is true that it did foreshadow elements of the world that was to emerge at the Cape, the imposed and degrading European slave names, the ritualized religiosity, and the humiliation of the self induced by drink, but it is important to emphasize, for the purposes of this discussion, how significantly this politics of the metropole, with all its conflicting understandings of the local people, there were priests, for example, who saw them as God’s people, comes to activate and key into the politics of the subordinate people themselves. Throughout the long period of VOC rule and that of the British period, from 1795 on, slaves and the indigenous Khoisan peoples virtually fall off the pages of South Africa’s history. The narrative of South Africa, building on an archive that almost deliberately effaces the “native,” is constructed as a European allegory of resilience and virtue in the face of savagery and abomination (see Coetzee 1958; Soudien et al. 2009). By contrast, the dispossessed are described as completely powerless people. Their domination is total. For the major chronicler of this period, Coetzee (1958), this domination is unquestionably deserved. While much of the work about this period is about the making of White identity, such as that of Malherbe (1925/1937), Coetzee’s work deliberately presents the education of the subordinate people in the Calvinist discursive frame as the historic burden of White people in Africa. Little of this work sees how, importantly, the politics of subordination, both of the Cape’s slaves and the Khoisan, yields an agency that the totalizing Dutch colonial curriculum itself—the paradox described above—ignites.

The nature of the curriculum that was first deployed at the slave school, with its emphasis on religiosity, provided the template that was to be used for the next 200 years for all the schools that were to be established. Important for this discussion is how limited education historians’ engagement with this curriculum is. Malherbe (1925/1937), the country’s preeminent educational historian, presents this experience entirely through the lenses of the White liberal colonial historiography that emerges at the beginning of the twentieth century (Theal 1987). Unlike Coetzee, he isn’t oblivious to its paternalisms and subtle racial conceits, but he doesn’t, predictably,
have the language to understand, much less explain them. One has, as a result, to read this experience anew. I suggest, in attempting this, that there are critical insights that a rereading of this experience has to take note of.

The instructions with which the sick-comforters, the first teachers, worked were well-grounded in over a century of VOC experience. The low social class of many of the VOC employees, themselves victims of the social confusion surrounding working-class identity in Europe at the time, required that they be assiduously controlled and policed. It was this curriculum, that of bringing a sense of righteousness through biblical injunction, that permeated the first schools in the country. It was clear to the Dutch that the slaves and the indigenous people should not be brought into the education system completely. While slaves and the occasional Khoisan child were sometimes permitted in the schools that evolved for White children, they were much more regularly kept out.

The effect of this was to order the Cape and the possibilities for subject formation in extremely limited terms. Who should teach, what should be taught, and the marking out of what a classroom ought to consist of were shaped directly by the Dutch experience. Significant about this Dutch experience was its postmedieval nature. Not fully modern yet, its education continued to be dominated by the church. In the colonial environment of the Cape, this was the only model available to it: “[e]ducation in those days was, like in Europe, chiefly an instrument for the perpetuation of a religious order” (Malherbe 1925/1937, 46, emphasis in original). It was chiefly rote learning to enable children to read the Bible. Malherbe makes the comment that “it is due to the strong (Calvinistic) influence that education often deteriorated into mere formalism” (47).

Out of this constriction, and despite it, emerged a number of important developments that demonstrate how this experience precipitates, counter-intuitively, profoundly interesting expressions of agency. Two incidents are described briefly here. The first relates to the Khoikhoi people and the second the Muslim community. The Khoikhoi, within less than a hundred years after the arrival of van Riebeeck, were disoriented and effectively disorganized by colonialism. Penn (2005), explains that while the VOC made half-hearted attempts to protect the Khoikhoi “against the more unacceptable instances of rapacious cruelty” visited upon them by the settlers, “the Company was itself responsible for the systematic despoliation of the Khoisan; by permitting settlers to occupy their land; by authorising official livestock ‘bartering’ expeditions… and by defending the colonists against the determined resistance [of the Khoikhoi]” (55). The upshot of Penn’s analysis is that they were effectively doomed.

What this narrative trajectory underplays are the ways in which the distinct conditions of colonialism facilitate the emergence of a complex agency,
that is, in the cracks of the totalizing project of the Dutch. A crack opens up, for example, in the events surrounding the establishment of a Khoikhoi mission station at Baviaan’s Kloof, approximately a 100 kilometres from Cape Town. Under the guidance of George Schmidt, a German missionary, the Khoikhoi gathered and established a settlement, which exists to this day and has recently celebrated its 270th anniversary. Schmidt encountered many challenges in going about his work. The administration at the Cape was suspicious of what he was doing and also outraged that, not being a member of the Dutch Reformed Church, he had baptized members of this community (Maurice 1941, 151). He was forced to abandon his mission in 1744. But he had brought, in the limited space he had been given, a sense of possibility in the community. Remarkably, and somewhat contrary to the commentary of Maurice, who said that he “did not accomplish much,” almost 50 years later, when the Moravians returned to the settlement in 1792, this time with the permission of the authorities, “they found Hottentots (Khoikhoi) at Genadendal (Baviaan’s Kloof) who were able to read the Dutch language and were Christians” (Maurice 1951, 151). The significance of this discovery, against the narrative thread in the archive and the literature on the period, has important implications for rethinking the terms of one’s historical engagement with this period. While there isn’t much to go on in terms of the archival resources at our disposal, what is clear is that elements in the community realize the importance of this limited education they are provided and use it, as others around them effectively lose their social cohesion, to keep their community intact.

The second example involves the intriguing experience of Muslim slaves at the Cape (Dangor 1994). The most popular stories in the Muslim repertoire of early religious life pivot on the life of Tuan Guru, Imam Abdullah ibn Kadi Abdus Salaam, who was born as a prince in Indonesia and exiled to the Cape in 1780 as a political prisoner (Mahida 1993, 6). Tuan Guru’s importance lies in the fact that he started the first madrassah (religious school) at the Cape in 1793. The school was a site of possibility for some slaves. It allowed conversion to Islam, at a time when they weren’t allowed to become full Christians because they would have to be freed had they become Christians. It taught people how to read and write the Arabic language, and we now know how significant this development was for the formalization of the new Afrikaans language itself (Mahida 1993, 6). Less well understood, however, in relation to this development, were the conditions within the slave community that made this development possible. We have some sense of what these might have been in the travel account of George Foster, in his A Voyage Round the World, published in 1770, which recounts, talking of the middle of the 1700s, that “a few slaves were meeting weekly in the house of a ‘free Mohammodan in order to read, or rather
chant, several prayers and chapters of the Qur’ān” (ibid.). A significant development from this, and demonstrating the complex politics, is that a propertied class emerges amongst the subordinate peoples with their own internal politics that has yet to be fully described.

Of importance for the argument I am attempting to make here is that we have in these experiences the glimpse of a world that is not constructed only along the lines of and only determined by subordination. We see, through and in the presence of the colonial curriculum, the development of a relative independence in the lives of the subordinate people. What this relative independence signifies most critically is a self-awareness that is not totally dependent on the dominant order and seeks to reconstitute itself on its own terms. The ability to read is a crucial skill in this experience. This skill is used in both the Baviaan’s Kloof and the madrassah examples as resources for the making of community in complex new ways. It puts power in the hands of people that allows them to imagine themselves to be independent. In the totalizing grip of the Dutch colonial experience, this power is an important one to recognize. We see here the paradox of the experience of this imposition. It is inherently violent, in the sense in which Bourdieu (1993, 121) might describe symbolic violence and a gateway to a “moment of freedom.” It is this emergence of agency that much of our educational history fails to recognize. The curriculum is projected in the binary frames of a White superiority and a Black subordination. There isn’t sufficient awareness of how the curriculum provides the tools for the deconstruction of the totalizing colonial project.

The Emerging Modern Period

The critique I develop above in relation to the first phase of South African education applies with even more force to the latter and the more modern period. Critically, the VOC reaches the decision to open the region in the late 1790s when its capacity to run the Cape virtually breaks down. The British, first of all, take over the Cape by 1806 and one sees the penetration deep into the region by a range of Europeans with a range of ideas about how to deal with the “natives.” This process came to a head with the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 that led to the partition of Africa. Out of this emerged the political entities of Basutoland (at times administered from the Cape Colony government), Bechuanaland, Swaziland (under the authority of the Transvaal Republic and the British at various times), all under various degrees of British control, and South West Africa, under the authority of Germany.
The fortunes of education during this period are closely tied to the economic drama that plays itself out in the northern parts of South Africa where diamonds are discovered in 1862 and gold in 1866. The fundamental economic changes that come in the wake of these discoveries constitute the second central feature to be highlighted in this historiographical overview. Out of these events one sees, on the one hand, acceleration in the region of the forces of modernization. Important social developments mark this acceleration: the rapid industrialization of the Witwatersrand, state formation with the emergence of new republics, and an increase in the rate of development of the classic social groupings of a modern capitalist economy, workers, middle-class groupings, and capitalists (Denoon and Nyeko 1987). This is the key to our understanding of the country that is to develop from this point on: postmedieval and early modernity give way to full blown modernity. On the other hand, accelerate as the modernization process does, there remains in place the basic elements of the alternative and now subordinate society, rooted in a range of African ways of seeing the world. This is particularly evident in parts of Zululand and Swaziland, where, for a variety of reasons, traditional authority continues to loom large in the making of the everyday and its imagination (Booth 2004). These ways of seeing the world are required to articulate with and engage with the conditions of the new social, economic, and cultural hegemony that capitalism has come to stand for. An explanation of this process is provided by John and Jean Comaroff (1991), in which one sees how the African people work with colonial culture in increasingly more adaptive ways. The significance of this period lies in the intensification of the complexity of the politics of colonialism. At the level of the state there emerges a distinct bifurcation between, on the one hand, the colonial authorities in the so-called motherland and the local European elites that come to see the region as their home, and, on the other, between these groupings and the missionaries. The period is ripe with contradiction. We see, coming to a head and brought to a conclusion, the conflict between modernity, represented by and in the form of the colonial authorities, religious conservatism represented by a largely rural located Afrikaner community and the local people, attempting to hold on to their own customs.

What is the significance of this for curriculum construction and its interpretation? It is in the context of these developments, I argue, that increasingly the education of the indigenous people becomes a question that can no longer be neglected. But now it is not the cultural erasure of “native” life that is the question, but their management as a kind of modern subject. We see, in this period, a persistent anxiety about the identity of the “native” and what to do with him/her educationally. Up until this period, the provision of education had been the responsibility of the church, following the
example of the British (Behr 1988, 88). The response of the colonial authorities to the industrial revolution is to take an essentially racial approach. It makes clear in virtually every country and most visibly in the Cape and Natal Colonies, the two basic entities it brings into being before the Union of South Africa in 1910, that the education of White children is a state responsibility and that of Black children the responsibility of the church. But, in this shifting climate in which “native” identity comes to be something that has to be managed, the state begins to shift some resources toward the church. It does so in a way that reflects its own puzzlement—it wants useful labor for the burgeoning economy but it is not convinced yet that the “savage” in the “native” has been quelled. So leave, meanwhile, the job to them. In this process, the question forcibly arises of what the “natives” should be taught. Fascinatingly, this anxiety is also present in the African community (see Soudien and Nekhwevha 2002), but they are practical about it. They make clear that they won’t simply take what is given them and will adapt modernity to make it their own.

A development in this period, against which to read the ambiguity of “what to teach the natives,” is the significant uncoupling of education and proselytization. This was a process that began in Europe reflecting the break there with the remnants of medieval social control and the domination of the modern state and the bureaucratic apparatus. The passage of the Forster Education Act in England in 1870 had a dramatic effect on what happened to White children in the colonies. The Act led to the establishment for White children and some children classified Coloured (seen as neither White nor Black) of state-established and state-maintained schools, the latter also known as Board Schools (Behr 1988, 89). Board Schools, significantly, were not bound by religious conditions and parents were allowed to withdraw their children from religious instruction. This marked the onset in the colony of an antipathy to the teaching of what was deemed to be religious dogma. Central to these developments, and reflecting the triumph of industry in the economy, was the emergence of the academic curriculum. This development, critically, did not go unnoticed in the mission school system. While the catechism retained a place to varying degrees in the church schools, depending on the denomination of the church, the curriculum everywhere in the region for African children was broadened to include reading and writing to reasonably high levels of proficiency. The colonial authorities, however, despite not placing significant resources at the disposal of African children, were suspicious of what the missionary curriculum was attempting. Both the colonial government and the missionaries thought very little of African culture. What the Africans needed, they thought, was to give up their barbarous ways and adopt the manners of civilized Britain. But the colonial authorities disliked the fact
that the missionaries, in their quest to save the souls of the Africans, were teaching them how to read and write. In Swaziland, for example, they tried hard to return the curriculum to that of simple conversion—“the Gospel alone can transform those poor Swazies [sic], and give them the right to go forward.” They feared that “many an honest plough-boy...[would be] turned into a pedantic pedagogue or city loafer” (Booth 2004, 27). Practical learning or industrial training was what Africans needed.

Internationalization steps up a level in the midst of this debate and precipitates in the region complex alignments and contestations. Experts are brought from a number of places to advise the South Africans and also the colonial authorities throughout the region. The Phelps-Stokes Fund that served the African American, Native American, and urban and rural poor in the United States and elsewhere in the world visits South Africa in 1921 during a fact-finding mission to Africa. This visit has major implications for the education debate and developments with respect to the curriculum in the region. In Lesotho, for example, F. M. Urling-Smith, who was the Director of Education for Northern Nigeria, was brought into the country in 1926 to review the entire system (Oliphant 2005). Significantly also, key White South Africans, reflecting the maturity of class formation processes in the country in the White community, were stepping on to the global stage as major interlocutors in the question of what to do with the education of the natives. An important example of this was Charles T. Loram who initiated the point of view that Africans should be educated to meet the needs of the colonial system (Loram 1917; Hunt Davis 1984). Loram came to be a major figure in the international Phelps-Stokes Fund. The view he developed was an adaptation of the Booker T. Washington approach in the United States: “I am taking advantage of my stay in this country (the United States) to attempt to convince my fellow whites in South Africa that the example of the United States proves that with proper training and education the negro can be made a valuable asset to any country” (Hunt Davis 1984, 110). This produces an essentially three-tiered approach to the education of the “natives,” a focus on simple conversion, Loram’s adaptation model, and an academic curriculum such as was offered in White schools.

Out of this, and this is the importance of a new perspective on internationalization and the making of the curriculum, emerges developments that are extremely contradictory. While the White politics of paternalism, a tension running between the metropole and the colony, bubble as competing ways of containing, and indeed telling the story of the “native” and his/her education, the “natives” themselves use what little education they get both against their conditions of oppression and simply to gain personal advantage.
Reflecting this contradictory state of affairs, a group came into being in the 1930s calling itself the New Education Fellowship (NEF). This modernist-minded group presents this period with its most significant intellectual instruments to make a break with the racializing trajectory that appears to be the country and the region’s destiny. Unlike most other stakeholders in the knowledge production community in South Africa at the time, it is fully aware of the promise of education. John Dewey, who had come to visit the group, was a powerful influence amongst them. Their primary aim was to provide leadership in education in a “world that is fast becoming a neighbourhood…demand(ing) mental attitudes which are capable of transcending the more limited needs of the small group” (Malherbe 1925/1937, v). Malherbe, writing the foreword to the proceedings of the major international conference convened by the NEF in 1934, presented the dilemma South Africa faced: “The conscious and unconscious motive behind education is to mould the individual into a type that he will be a member of the group and fit as perfectly as possible into the ways of that group…On the other hand, education must also provide for growth beyond the type.”

This moment is an important one around which to pause because it brings to the fore how closely the implementation and design of the curriculum is bound up with the narrations of this experience. The major interlocutors of this time, Loram (1917) and Malherbe (1925/1937) are also its major power-brokers in the world of policy. Both occupy leadership positions in government and the academy. The point about this, again requiring a great deal more research, is that the discursive frame in which the process of the curriculum is understood depends for its narration almost entirely on those with the most power. Power, however, is occluded. The leaders of this pregnant-with-possibility phase falter. Power presents itself in terms of the growing humanist and empiricist sensibility one sees in the social sciences. It cannot, however, escape the clutches of the unquestioned superiority of whiteness. In his foreword, for example, Malherbe (1925/1937, vii) asks, “Is the Native to be educated for a European society or for life in his own indigenous, primitive society which is rapidly disintegrating?” A key debate in the conference, expressing the emerging dilemma for Whites, took place around the educability of the “Bantu,” the word that had come to be used to describe African people. Fascinatingly, presentations were made in the debate, drawing on intelligence tests, a concept that was barely 10 years old, came down on both sides of the argument. R. F. Alfred Hoernlé, a major liberal, argued that there were no differences between White and Black children. A conservative Afrikaner psychologist, Dr. M. L. Fick, described the vastly inferior test scores of African children to those of their White peers but disclaimed: “I could not decide whether
this inability was due to low mentality or environmental influences” (449). Important informants in this debate included Dewey and B. Malinowski, both amongst the preeminent scholars in philosophy and anthropology. Critically, the latter, bringing the powerful role of internationalization into full perspective, comes to validate the dominant paternalist trend present in the country. In his talk, for example, terms such as “savage” and “primitive” abound in relation to Black people.

The response to this question, one that the framework Malherbe and Loram choose to work within is unable to recognize, is found not in policy but in what the “natives” do with education. Significantly, while the policymakers and the historians of the curriculum argue over what forms of education Black people should receive, they themselves demonstrate, illustrating Fabian’s “moments of freedom,” that they will use it in their own best interests. What these best interests are, importantly, relate directly to their own social locations in the nexus between modern colonial power and their own traditional power. In Botswana, for example, during the 1930s, and this is a phenomenon that was playing itself out in several parts of South Africa, local people were critical about several aspects of the new education, particularly the ways in which it denigrated their customs. Instead of rejecting it, however, they adapted it to suit their own systems of meaning. An interesting illustration of this arose when a particular chief in Botswana was accused by the missionaries of having executed a number of alleged witches. The chief, who was literate, responded in an article to Mafoko a Botswana, a local newspaper established by the missionaries, “quoting profusely from the Old Testament the mosaic [a reference to Moses] teachings of ‘a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye’” (Thema 1973, 9). Indeed, almost 50 years earlier, one saw the extraordinary insight a Nama leader, Jonker Afrikaner, in Namibia in the 1880s had to the implications of the arrival of the European settlers. He had been instrumental in soliciting the company of the missionaries and had even gone so far as to protect them on occasion. But, like his peers amongst the Damara and the Nama, who, equally sought the cooperation of the missionaries, he was not unaware of the connections between the European missionaries and the Boer refugees from the Cape. Jonker, demonstrating what one might describe as quite acute insight had, for instance, in a fit of pique described the missionaries as “landseekers who cannot get fed in their fatherland, traitors, preachers of lies, blasphemous twisters of the Gospel . . . . You are brought by others to tame us. You build a house and appear friendly and then the traders come . . . .” (Parsons 1982, 123). The gist of his attack, that which makes him attractive to postcolonial historians, is his ability to recognize the ideological nature of the brand of religion used by the missionaries and to call them to account in terms of the logic of their own
religion. His perspective on these questions is powerfully articulated by Z. K. Matthews, a prominent African professor at the University of Fort Hare in a review on African education:

Opposition has come in the main from African people themselves. They have pointed out that there was a danger of their children being given a form of education which might be more of a handicap to them than anything else. They have demanded for their children an education which takes due account of the fact that they are living in the modern world, in an environment which includes both Western and African elements linked together indissolubly. Their view has been that they will not tolerate any course which purports to prepare their children for a pure African environment when they know that such a thing no longer exists in South Africa. Without advocating a slavish following of the curricula requirements of European schools, they have insisted upon the necessity for constructing our curricula in such a way that all children can, in accordance with their varying talents, be led into the common heritage of man in all fields of human knowledge and skill. (Molteno 1984, 86)

The significance of these “native” responses, which the proto-historiography of conservatism and liberalism misses, is the alertness of the local people to what is going on around them. They use this new ideology in complex ways, sometimes to their personal advantage, as the Tswana chief does, sometimes in a procolonial way, but also to the cause of anticolonialism. Of course, and I have tried to keep this nuance present in this account, this politics from below is never determinative. It operates in the presence of, and in response to White hegemony. This hegemony takes a structural turn in the 1940s when the National Party comes to power in South Africa in 1948. This is the next key moment in the unfolding drama of southern Africa. It finally settles the question of the geopolitical map of the region. White supremacy as it takes shape in South Africa is unpalatable even to the British Colonial Office, which decides that the region no longer has a destiny as a single super South Africa and the process of independence of Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, and Namibia is set in motion.

Modernity in Full Cry

South Africa as it develops after 1950 and up to the end of the 1990s is profoundly shaped by the Apartheid government’s preoccupation with race. The significance of this period for our analysis is the degree to which social difference congeals around race. Race is inscribed onto the landscape
through laws such as the Group Areas Act. The Race Classification Act sorts people physically. Layered on top of these education is used to teach identity. Education as a process of subject formation, in contrast to the earlier period where it was clear that it was not a priority of the state, is central to its project.

The key instrument that put this approach in place was the Commission on Native Education (1949–1951) under the leadership of W. W. Eiselen. I highlight the Eiselen Commission here because it shows how in the context of contention a particular kind of “authority” around comes to settle the debate about “native education.” The purpose of the Commission had been “the formulation of the principles and aims of education for natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitude, and their needs under the ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration” (UG No 53/51, 7). The Commission prevaricated when it came down to deciding whether the African mind was innately inferior, but it determined that African culture, which formed that mind, limited the capacity for African children to perform on a level with White children (Soudien 2005). It was out of this that Bantu education was born, which effectively condemned African people to the status of “hewers of wood and drawers of water.”

Interesting about the Eiselen Commission is the way in which it comes to institutionalize the conditions of whiteness as those of superiority and blackness as inferiority. It does so through a mode of discoursing about African people that is significantly more sophisticated than the blunt kragdadigheid (authoritarianism) that is attributed to it. Central to this discoursing is an anthropological explanation of how life works rendered in the language of culture but continues to draw on deep racial ideas. It recruits science to empirically define and recognize the “original Bantu” who then becomes, as in racial science, systematically classifiable, and like any zoological species, available as an object of knowledge for inspection and analysis. What the Commission does is to appear to talk outside of racial biology but, in fact, to hold fast to its conceits. The curriculum of this way of understanding the world is then a curriculum that both in its content and in its mediation a curriculum of subordination—the rote learning of the script of inferiority.

The importance of the process around the Commission and the unfolding racialized education system built upon its findings is, as I suggested above, that it brings clarity to the racial debate. Obfuscate its methodology as the Commission does, its findings are unambiguous. Black is inferior. The value of this Apartheid posture is twofold: it forces other discourses around race, first, to clarify themselves and second, to show how dominant
discourse might be engaged. In this the outlines of a break are suggested. One sees, as a result, in this period, the emergence of a radical new discourse around race, alongside those of White supremacy and White liberalism.

The essence of these new interlocutors’ position was that race did not exist. This discourse makes itself visible in evidence that is given to the Eiselen Commission where prominent African and Coloured intellectuals challenged the notion of race. Mr. Ntantile, a teacher, exemplified their position. In response to the question about the racial characteristics of African people posed by the Commission, he remarked that there was only one human race (The Murray Papers Memorandum 52). The Teachers’ League of South Africa, an organization based largely in the so-called Coloured community, similarly rejected the racial overtones of the Commission: “[it represents] an attitude which cannot find any scientific support at all, but it is a manifestation of a mentality peculiar to Nazism and ‘thinking with one’s blood.’” A Mr. S. M. Mabude went even further. Writing to the Commission he said that he found the entire exercise of investigating the racial basis for a separate culture and education for Africans repugnant: “[the African had been made] a museum specimen, a fossil, a preserved animal for scientific experimentation. In short, the person in him has been killed” (The Murray Papers Memorandum 51).

These intellectuals, of course, were by no means people without a history. Members of radical political groups such as the Spartacus and Leninist Club in the 1930s and the Non-European Unity Movement, the Teachers’ League of South Africa and the Cape African Teachers’ Association in the 1940s and the 1950s, they had emerged out of the deeply significant internationalization of the socialist struggle. Beneficiaries of the teachings of Eastern Europeans, mainly Jews fleeing from Tsarist Russia, they became, in the period between the two world wars, the fiercest proponents of the idea and ideals of modernity (see Drew 1996). Inducted deeply into the Western canon, from literature to political theory, they demand nothing less than the recognition of all people as full human beings. The moment is a powerful one in both South African and world history, because one has emerging here, before the idea surfaces in scholarly circles elsewhere in the world and in the corridors of power, such as the United Nations, an argument made about the nonsense of race (see No Sizwe 1983). A great deal of work remains to be done in relation to this period to show the genealogical lines of this development. The ideas clearly had their origin amongst the European intellectuals circulating in these subordinate communities. Internationalization of a particular kind is evident here. But what these local groups do with these ideas is to develop them to a level of personal and social commitment such that one has, against the racializing tide of
South (and indeed southern) African history, the possibility of a break. Deeply significant about these people is that as teachers they introduce into their classrooms a nonracial curriculum (see Nasson 1990; Wieder 2003). Their entire project, as mediators of knowledge, is to disrupt the racist curriculum of Apartheid. They insist that the curriculum that their children should get should be nothing less than the full canon—Plato, Shakespeare, Mozart, Freud, Marx, and Picasso. Their children, as a consequence, emerge out of this experience as people with a deep engagement with the racial project of the state (Soudien 1996).

But what impact does this development have in the country? Important about this development is how much, apart from the work of Chisholm (2004), it is misrecognized in the mainstream of political and educational debate. The headway it makes is mixed. It offers a new language for race that for many subjects of the Apartheid experience is a break. A community emerges in the bowels of the Apartheid experience, which is profoundly “antirace” in its deportment and consciousness. But it is not a generalized break. The idea of nonracialism is ultimately adopted as a commitment to nonracialism by important organizations such as the African National Congress (ANC), but the substance of this commitment remains poorly understood. Even as the ANC commits its struggle to nonracialism, it is clear that the nonracialism it has in mind is instead a multicultural one. Race remains. What changes in its ideology is a commitment to racial unity but not to the evisceration of race. The Freedom Charter of the ANC, for example, continues to talk of South Africa’s four race groups: African, Whites, Coloureds, and Indians, without engaging with these concepts as social constructs. The reason for this is essentially that the political and intellectual discourse in even subordinate circles remains enmeshed in the hegemonic vocabulary of a race debate that framed work between conservatism and liberalism. In this, race is accepted as something that is fixed and immutable. Even though one sees in key moments how liberalism itself has moved and come to accept the nonracial principle, its major interlocutors, both Black and White, do so with the shadow of race hanging powerfully over them. This is evident in a significant article written by Ashley (1983, 379) in 1983 for a key conference on the curriculum in Apartheid. The article brings together some of the most progressive ideas circulating in White liberal circles at the time. He makes a powerful plea for a curriculum that will overcome “the limitations of . . . the context of an officially segregated school system” (386). This intervention makes little impact, however.

Why this situation is unable to make a turn, I suggest, is because the project of whiteness never becomes apparent unto itself. While there is a strong sense of inequality in debates, the history and constitution of this
inequality in its full complexity is seldom engaged. The power, for example, of the interlocutors themselves—as makers of meaning—and their role in defining the character of White discourse has difficulty in finding expression. They remain trapped within the dominant discourse. A second moment of possibility does arise in the period, in the middle of the 1980s, when Brother Neil McGurk, a member of the Marist Brothers order in Johannesburg, offers White liberal interlocutors an opportunity to engage the question of their complicity in the making of dominance. He sought to introduce an awareness amongst school people in the church of the problems of assimilation and what came to be known as enculturation of Black people in the White project. In a series of interventions he drew attention to the “mechanisms of protection of ‘this culture’ [of domination which] are mainly psychological, but (also) tied to power and privilege” (McGurk 1990, 24). At the core of McGurk’s argument were a number of propositions that sought to challenge the teleological inevitability of a modernity framed in the hegemony of the White experience. Arguing for a more inclusive approach to modernity he explained that “there (was) an urgent need to inculcate a sense of his or her (the White South African) participation in a common historical process based on the unity of the human family” (111). Crucial in this analysis was a critique of versions of Enlightenment and modernist conceptions of the individual as a subject, and specifically the investment in these conceptions of the infinite potential of the human subject—of the ability to take control of his or her environment and to make of it what he or she chose. Critically, the moment passes in the country’s history. While McGurk forms an alliance with key members of the non- and antiracial racial discussion described above, and with them embarks on a number of small but important projects, the potential in the moment is not realized and we don’t, in the end, see a systematic break. The chroniclers of the period, moreover, overlook the significance it constitutes. Nowhere in the work of the period is the importance of this development recognized. Instead, the period is painted in the reproductive language bestowed on it by Apartheid and the longer history of social difference in the country.

The failure in this period to work with this history has important implications, because it defines the terms by which South Africa enters its new post-Apartheid order. A particular form of “knowing” the “native,” as a result, issues from this approach, which essentially comes to provide the model for the integration process in South Africa. At its heart is the idea, still, significantly, informed by the understanding that race is a real phenomenon, that particular race groups have particular attributes and need to be treated in particular kinds of ways. The inflection, which this racist idea takes in South Africa, and indeed in many parts of the colonial world,
is to appropriate the notion of potential as a White preserve and to manage the integration of Black people into the hegemonic order.

A New Post-Apartheid South Africa?

The burden of the new government when it comes into power in 1994 is to break with the country’s apartheid past. The significance of this moment for my historiography is that it is formally and officially constituted as a new beginning.

The ANC enters the era of democracy on the back of a number of key policy pronouncements. These have been discussed fully by a number of scholars (see Jansen 1999a; Soudien 2007). The central document was the Constitution passed in 1996 (Republic of South Africa 1996). This Constitution is hailed by South Africans and scholars of constitutions as being one of the most progressive of its kind. The argument that is made here is more cautious. I suggest that apparently clear stipulations of the Constitution appear amenable to quite different and often contradictory interpretations, and, therefore, policy injunctions. While it is true that the intention of the Constitution is to be inclusive, the way in which it is constructed continues to make it possible for exclusion to take place. It and the derivative legislation based on it, it is contended here, often misrecognize the South African child sociologically. The break offered by 1994 is, as a consequence, at best, more correctly the promise of a break. This has become evident in recent attempts by a judge of the Constitutional Court to clarify how the Constitution could be interpreted with respect to its understanding of the notion of the “human being.” Judge Kate O’Regan (2002, 165), for example, in posing the ontological question of what the starting point of the Constitution is, replies that the human being envisaged in it is an “individual moral agent who (is) the bearer of both rights and responsibilities.” She carries on to say,

Of course, adopting a conception of human beings as responsible moral agents does not mean that they always are. There will always be times when people cannot be held responsible for their actions. Legal systems recognise such exceptions. And we know that agency lies constantly under the shadow of structure: a person’s ability to act is constrained by his or her circumstances in real ways. (Ibid.)

Prescient about her response to the question is her acknowledgment of the role of structure in agency. Troubling, however, about the line of
WHAT TO TEACH THE NATIVES

thinking is the juxtaposition and then accommodation of the “structure” argument within an exceptionalist framework—“legal systems recognise such exceptions.” While the broad contours of her argument are beyond reproach, particularly the proposition that human beings are responsible moral agents, it is suggested in this essay that the conception of the human being distilled in this approach, and indeed in most jurisprudential statements, is that of a rational human being. This human being is projected as a conscious and deliberative individual whose subjectivity is derived from his or her engagement with the world of meaning in a fully responsible way. While this projection is important as an ideal, and therefore, has important pedagogic implications for teaching South Africans about the kinds of citizens that they could be, it underplays the extent to which subjectivity in South Africa is a raced, cultured, gendered, and classed experience—in other words, using O’Regan’s turn of phrase, “under the shadow of structure.” It is this “shadow of structure,” it needs to be emphasized, that is the norm rather than the exception. South African’s daily lived experiences continue to be defined by deep racial and class forces. Important about policy is how aware it is of and speaks to this reality. Crucially, key reform initiatives that are derived from this understanding fail to engage with the sociological reality of the everyday and to suggest how it might change. This is especially the case with respect to the Curriculum 2005 (C2005) and its successor the National Curriculum Statements (NCS).

Curriculum 2005 was introduced in 1997, and revised (the Revised National Curricular Statements [RNCS]) in 2002. Based on an outcomes-based approach it sought to place emphasis on learner-centeredness in contrast to the Apartheid government’s rote learning approach. The purpose of these reforms was primarily to deal with the hierarchalizing and racial sorting objectives of the Apartheid era’s curriculum. In the Apartheid curriculum, Black people, as hewers of wood and drawers of water, did not need the full canon. How C2005 and the NCS understands subjectivity in this period is an important matter to resolve.

When this intervention explicitly projects itself as an instrument for mediating the emergence of a united and equal young South Africa, why do I say that it favors older forms of privilege and continues to discriminate against Black and poor children?

In terms of how it came into being, and the ideas underpinning it, C2005 is par excellence an example of internationalization. Borrowed from curricular developments in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, the policy came to South Africa as an example of what was thought to be “best-practice” elsewhere in the world. A relatively little known curriculum specialist from the United States of America, William Spady, who had developed elements of the curriculum’s outcomes-based character, came to
find, if not fortune, fame in South Africa (Jansen 1999a, 12). Spady was feted in meetings throughout the country by people who sought to hear from the guru himself how the curriculum ought to be managed. Guided by principles of outcomes-based education and learner-centered education and the critical outcomes of the country’s National Qualifications Framework, it defined specific outcomes and standards of achievement in eight learning areas. The critical and specific outcomes, together, represented major shifts in what was to be learned in schools, emphasizing competencies rather than particular knowledge. The specific outcomes delineated learning areas more broadly than in traditional “subjects,” building links from subject knowledge to social, economic, and personal dimensions of learning and the multicultural character of South African society.

Introduced into schools in 1998, C2005 quickly came up against a great deal of criticism and opposition. Chief amongst the critics, Jansen (1999b) pointed to the opaqueness of the policy and predicted that it would fail. An equally trenchant but unfortunately less well-known critique, and more pertinent for our purposes, was made by Harley and Parker (1999, 190). They saw in the document the praiseworthy imperative of inclusion premised on the ideal that all children could learn: “there are no pupil deficits . . .,” but, they demurred, “education is about the learner’s realization of innate potentialities that simply need the right environment to develop” (ibid. author’s emphasis). It is this “right environment” that calls for pause. In the South African context it has depended on the availability of knowledgeable teachers. These, Harley and Parker said, did not exist and it was in this essential flaw that the whole project of inclusivism stood imperilled. The teachers imagined in the policy, even those with strong professional histories in middle-class schools, did not correspond with the deprofessionalized corps operating in the schools. More critically, the pupils themselves were socially and culturally not the autonomous subjects imagined in the constructivist ideals of C2005. They were, especially those in the schools of the poor, children who had been denied opportunity in the past. Important to note is that even high-level policy administrators have begun to admit that perhaps C2005 was, socially, culturally, and in terms of class, an inappropriate policy for the country and that it could be responsible for the challenges that the country is currently going through.1

The nature of these problems is most poignantly captured in the hugely differential outcomes from several waves of attainment tests conducted throughout the country. These tests have shown how great the gulf is between children in the former White schools and the former Black schools of the education system. The Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMMS) and TIMSS-R studies provided the first shock.
Significantly there were few differences between the levels of attainment in mathematics between the first and second studies. While there was a drop in performance in the outcomes of the second study relative to the first, the difference was not statistically significant. South African pupils, however, performed poorly, coming last in the list of 39 countries with a mean score of 275 out of a possible total of 800 marks (Howie 2001, 18). This mark was considerably below the international mean of 487 and significantly below those of comparable countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Chile. Significantly, the best performing pupils in South Africa scored at the level of the mean of pupils in leading countries such as Singapore. Fewer than 0.5 percent of South Africa’s pupils featured in the international top 10 percent benchmark (19). The mean attainment for science was even lower with South African pupils scoring at the level of 243 (in relation to the international mean of 488) (22).

The point to note in this analysis is how comprehensively the new curriculum has catalyzed and even amplified the major vectors of discrimination inherited from the past. Instead of staunching discrimination, what it has done, and this brings into focus the presence of O’Regan’s shadow embodied in the new country’s new legislation, discussed above, is, effectively, to misread the South African social landscape and to address it as if it was already the society they wanted it to be, a largely middle-class one. What it has not done, as Harley and Parker make clear, is recognize it as it is, essentially poor and African, and, in those terms, the victims of a prior process of deep discrimination.

Significantly, in bringing this section of the discussion to a close is making the point about how at the macro level, the national curriculum is perpetuating older forms of discrimination. While this discrimination is no longer only racial, given the degree to which the Black middle class has entered former White schools (see Soudien 2004), the country’s racial experience continues to dog even this emerging class. This is evident, particularly, in the way this emergent middle-class community has struggled to shake off the older racial connotations attached to it. The author, for example, has argued elsewhere (ibid.) that the degree to which this new emergent middle-class performs like the poor as opposed to the established middle class, to which it is closest in income terms, is a function of the extent to which this past discrimination has not been attended to. The national curriculum, in tandem with other factors it is recognized, can thus be said to be a major influence in having given a macro-character to discrimination. The performance profiles described above manifest themselves across the nation.

It is here that the legacy surrounding the “native” problem brings the curriculum-making process to a crisis. Not having confronted the question
of its role in identity making—the making of whiteness and blackness—the new state, led largely by a new generation of Malherbe producer-intellectuals (see Jansen 1999b), is unable to see how important the issue of subject formation is. It is unable to see how this process of making the country’s identity landscape is the significant issue that has to be challenged. It cannot see that that which is being proposed in the new curriculum has baggage. Instead, what it does is talk to this sociology in the normative terms of where it wants the country to go. In the process it misrecognizes the subjects its curriculum is talking to. In constituting the new South African subject as an-already middle-class citizen, it misunderstands the constituting power of Apartheid. What Apartheid has done, I suggest, is normalize identity in racial terms. In the 46 years, whiteness, blackness, colouredness, and Indianness were all naturalized as self-referential and reproductive regimes. These regimes were embodied in legislation, physical space, and possibility. Norval’s (1996) work is powerful in showing how deliberately constructed this process was. Of course, many South Africans were aware of it and rejected it. But most didn’t. Race sits almost tangibly on the post-Apartheid landscape.

How might a post-Apartheid education be imagined in relation to this?

The answer is that the ahistoric nature of the new curriculum is the issue. This new curriculum speaks into the social context of South Africa as if it is empty. It comes from the uncontextualized and unrelated world of New Zealand and the United Kingdom and imposes itself onto the post-Apartheid imagination as if it itself is not the product of history. Thus, perhaps inadvertently, it presents itself, once more, as a racial project. The racial gloss surrounding it is the degree to which middle-classness and the identity properties invested in it have historically been appropriated, par excellence, as White virtues. Speaking to the new South Africa in the language of the desirable goods of the new universal subject—a subject able to operate at high levels of civility and social awareness, able to operate on the global level—the curriculum and its makers fail to see how much this construct is infected with images of South Africa’s immediate past.

Significant new developments in the identity formation processes taking place in the post-Apartheid schools of the country show the complexity of the situation. In interviews with young people talking about who they are in the new South Africa, I have heard, often, of young Black people in the townships who are wanting to succeed in this new environment described as “coconuts.” The point is profound. Success in the new school is being made, as in the United States, into a “White” thing. Not having problematized the production of whiteness and blackness, the leadership of
McGurk having been spurned, the process of simply imposing the new curriculum on the post-Apartheid nation has produced deeply controversial outcomes. On the horizon of the post-Apartheid state has been constructed the promise of a new identity. But this identity differs only slightly to that which was supposedly left behind by the Apartheid legacy.

Conclusion

A discussion such as this almost inevitably ends with the pontifical “what should have been done.” It is hardly clear though what might have to be done. Our historiographical archive, in so far as we see what an alternative might look like, is decidedly unhelpful. So is the international literature. The startling point is that our reality, even in situations in which issues of social difference have been reasonably well attended to—McGurk’s own school in Johannesburg is as good a model as one could find anywhere in the world—is now unquestionably framed in the legacy of the Enlightenment. Almost nowhere in the world has the formal school developed, epistemologically, in anything other than in the image of the Enlightenment. The modern school and the modern curriculum, their European origins notwithstanding, are now the birthright of every child. The problem remains, however, that it is a script that has to be worked with circumspection. Birthright is still double-edged. The promise of equality is lodged deep in its syntax. So is the hubris—the peril—that underpins its mediation. In the presence of other ways of understanding the world, this promise has available to itself only the mediational technologies of whiteness—its vocabularies, its histories, its authorizing images, its taken-for-granted conceits and forms of deportment. Significantly, key postcolonial theorists have been able to address these questions in the field of cultural studies. Sangari (1995, 145), for example, has spoken of how the so-called decentering and deconstructional tactics of postmodernism continue to raid “the inarticulateness” of the third world.

This kind of work has yet to be done in relation to the curriculum. It is here that the question has to be asked, in ways that don’t suggest themselves easily, what a curriculum of radical possibility might look like. I suggest that curricular strategies need to be investigated that uncouple whiteness from the ideal of equality. This is the first step in a complex process of invoking a range of new ways of resituating the subject in all its hierarchical locations—super- and subordinate in new spaces of vulnerability and even “inarticulateness” and releasing, through this, the search for new ways of seeing self and other.
Note

1. Comments made in a talk at a seminar in Cape Town, April 11, 2007, by a Department of Education official who had not given permission for his comments to be made public.

References


Chapter 2

Drawing the Line in Post-Apartheid Curriculum Studies

Wayne Hugo

There are extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions to curriculum studies (CS): the former places curriculum studies within a complex context; the latter provides a set of distinctions directly derived from the archetypal forms involved in the practice of systematically teaching and learning organized knowledge structures. Two primitive extrinsic distinctions are used to provide a multidimensional lattice that enables the placement, classification, analysis, and critique of Post-Apartheid Curriculum Studies (PACS). Two primitive intrinsic distinctions are used to develop a basic taxonomy of the types of systematically teaching and learning organized knowledge that allow us to draw out curriculum studies from within its own operating logics. How the extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions overlap is discussed in the final section.

The two extrinsic distinctions used are one\many and interior\exterior. Each line is laid over the next, building a multidimensional, open, flexible framework. To elaborate on the intrinsic dimensions of curriculum studies, I work with two lines and specific distinctions within them to produce a base description of the different curriculum experiences. The lines are distinctions between strong and weak classification and between strong and weak framing.

First Definitions

An intensional definition provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be a part of a set. It tries to get to the internal essence of
something that holds across shifting contexts and identities. An extensional definition provides a list of items that fall within a specified set. It points to the thing itself, or to good examples of the thing. It designates by showing, by externalizing, by tracing its appearances within time and space. Both are vital to curriculum studies; without the former we fall under the tyranny of the literal and can be blinded by its obviousness; without the latter, we risk empty scholasticism. Taking Socrates as my guide, I prioritize an intensional definition. When Socrates asked what “justice” was, he remarked that each ostensive definition given failed because it excluded other possibilities, pushing his interlocutor into elenchus and then forcing an intensional stance that looked for an abstract essence that held beyond particular examples. But we moderns do not have the solace of eternal essences Plato provided for Socrates; we live under the existential whip of historical consciousness and the peculiar search for essences always in process. An intensional definition is still needed as a starting point; otherwise it becomes very hard to identify what is being investigated and to explore family resemblances between various constructions of curriculum studies across time and space. To encourage, as both William Pinar and Noel Gough do, the
internationalization of curriculum studies by creating transnational spaces in which local knowledge traditions in curriculum inquiry can be performed together is a fine ambition, one this chapter is participating in. But it necessarily involves minimal criteria for curriculum studies as it is not a universal set. The definition should not be so wide as to include almost everything, nor should it be so obscure as to not clarify what is included or excluded within its ambit. That is simply dereliction of intellectual duty. What would a tight, but historically informed, intensional definition of curriculum studies look like? Here is my first take, and I elaborate on this in the rest of the chapter: Curriculum studies is the critical investigation of the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning.

Is there such a thing as curriculum studies in South Africa—do we critically investigate the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning? Yes we do, and the way the definition is framed speaks directly and specifically to current ongoing research concerns in South Africa. However we have come to this current path by a historical route that has given curriculum studies specific characteristics. To elucidate, during Apartheid there was out and out ideological war between various camps speaking very different languages, and everything within curriculum studies was colored by its use in struggle. The liberal and radical struggle was directed against the brutal repression and discrimination of Apartheid and its educational mouthpiece, fundamental pedagogics. Issues around the reproduction of inequality in education did not need sophisticated theorization and research as it did in America and England, where universal education for all hid something discriminatory under its liberal coat. In South Africa the discrimination was plain to see. The problem was that it left PACS with a highly limited set of historical experiences, theoretical “weaponry,” and research expertise. In the fight for education we lost focus on what education was. Actual research projects on teaching and learning in schools, curriculum, and governance structures were almost nonexistent. Concepts were grabbed at for oppositional reasons and not for their internal educational worth. Works of writers such as Marx and Gramsci were used because these showed us how to fight the war in the trenches. Good work by curriculum thinkers and practitioners under the aegis of fundamental pedagogics were engaged with as the enemy. There were exceptions. Wally Morrow (1990), for example, in Chains of Thought provided a careful, sympathetic, yet critical discussion of his fundamental pedagogic colleagues. But currently there is attempt to recuperate and build on the historical developments during the Apartheid era of curriculum studies. Fundamental pedagogics has been critiqued and silenced; but its ghostly presence is far
less benign than that of John Dewey in America (Doll and Gough 2004). A history of curriculum studies in South Africa that seriously engages with the powerful work done by Afrikaaner racists in a way that does not dismiss their contribution because of their “fascism” still has to be written during the post-Apartheid era. Peoples Education, the banner under which we fought against Apartheid education was exactly that—a banner—a motto used to unite those in the struggle. It had no substantial base but the enemy it opposed and a radical constructivist pedagogy uncritically taken from Paulo Freire. The complicity of fundamental pedagogics in Apartheid practice and the use of intellectual resources to combat Apartheid rather than build a coherent discipline of curriculum studies meant that those engaged in PACS had a seemingly open field before them. Rather than a delicate intrinsic understanding of curriculum studies there was a powerful understanding of the effects of discriminatory policy on education and the brutal nature of the reproduction of inequality. To see this clearly one can contrast the struggle within curriculum studies in America: between the instructional designers (with their explicit, linear, hierarchical models of curriculum studies) and the Dewey-based process school (which emphasized a more dynamic, internally driven, holistic approach). To critique and move beyond instructional design is to take a primitive, positivistic research science, incorporate many of its insights but point to how limited they are, and then transcend it with a more complex inclusive vision and set of practices. In this process the instructional designers do not stand still; they incorporate as best they can insights from the process school and constructivism and show how to externalize and formalize these subtle practices by using technology and the inevitable flow chart diagram. Each speaks to the other across the divide and builds on the conversation, antagonistic as these debates sometimes are. The point is that there is a serious and delicately nuanced internal debate going on within curriculum studies that specializes in the nature of organized forms of knowledge and how best to teach and learn them (as well as whether this definition and practice should be expanded to encompass all sorts of other political, economic, cultural, sexual, unconscious, aesthetic forces and insights from other traditions). This kind of specialized internal debate and research was almost completely absent in curriculum studies in South Africa. And here, all the reproduction theories, critiques of ideology, struggles against fundamental pedagogics, and mobilizations against the Apartheid government and its practices gave no guidance. This has left, to put it dramatically, a vacuum at the center of PACS that we are struggling to fill and the rush has resulted in peculiar formations that have taken root and spread very
quickly. But it has also meant immense possibilities scarcely conceivable in countries with a more established curriculum studies history. Those who were able to take the lead in PACS have been able to imprint the field with their own stamp, not only intellectually, but to see their ideas taken up within one of the boldest and radical curriculum reform processes the modern world has seen.

In terms of an emphasis on the value of intensional definitions within PACS, the work of Wally Morrow is exemplary. For example, he defines teaching in an abstract way as the “organization of systematic learning” (Morrow 2007) and sets this up against definitions of teaching tied to a specific context, like small classes with intense interactions. Morrow points to the clinging on to a material image of teaching and learning as the key factor behind the failure of the pedagogic imagination in South Africa. By hooking up good teaching and learning with a material state of small classes rather than an abstract concept that transcended contextual conditions, the extensional vision of teaching cut off from its scope all the variations not fitting its material conditions. Rather than holding an abstract idea of teaching and asking how it adapts and fits various contextual variations, one contextual set of conditions holds sway as the only possible option. By using a formal definition like “organization of systematic learning” Morrow does not limit teacher education to the contextual set of preservice primary and secondary schooling. Adult basic education, educare, healthcare, tertiary education, industrial training are only some of the other types of professional teaching that fit under the definition, as do our much neglected designers of learning programs for distance education. The concrete image should find its place within a higher concept that has moved beyond extensional context into intensional abstraction. Morrow acts in PACS as a kind of Socrates who sees through the pretensions of his peers and wields his intellect as a gadfly to critically sting them out of their material investments. And this certainly is needed, given how inflated teacher workloads have become in South Africa with increasing amounts of extensional detail demanded by one particular type of progressivist pedagogy. What with the expectation that teachers in South Africa design their own learning programs from scratch to suit their own learners and then obsessively assess them as they continuously perform to fuzzy outcomes achievable only in resource-rich, fortified schools, all this actually done by poorly trained teachers in dilapidated school buildings within drug- and gang-infested territories riven by HIV/AIDS. Morrow provides the disillusionment. He nails a fixation on material particulars by showing how they are hierarchically transcended by an abstraction that takes what is essential and articulates it as an essence beyond context.
The Basic Form of Curriculum Studies

The crudest, most fundamental operating logic of curriculum studies is hierarchy. The basic aim of a curriculum is to move a learner to a higher level within an organized knowledge structure, not just a different place within it. This higher level includes what happened below but transcends it by building something new that relies on what came before and then moves beyond it. This insight goes back to its archetypal articulation in Plato’s Cave and his Ladder of Beauty. The history of hierarchy as the informing principle behind the systematic learning of knowledge structures is deeply embedded in Western education (Hugo 2007). It is not about dry, repetitive ascent but involves working with the deepest, highest, and richest parts of what it is to be human in an educational way. It is about love, death, desire, sin, nonduality, transcendence, immersion—if any one text captures this in one vision it is Dante’s *Comedy*. It is a course to run, as the etymological root of curriculum points to, but this misses the spiraling dimensionality of the course, ascending upwards, much as Elijah did, when entering the heavens. The shift away from understanding curriculum as a noun, a given course, to a process (*currere*) of running is an important orienting move that engages with curriculum as an active practice, but it misses fundamentally what systematic learning within an organized knowledge structure is about—increasing levels of complexity with an underlying increase in automaticity. Rather than run, it is to climb (out of a cave) or ascend (a ladder) or if a “chariot race,” then Ezekiel or the *Phaedrus* should be carefully stitched into the account. Here the difficulties of growth and development are paramount, not a horizontal footrace.

After the collapse of Apartheid it was initially very difficult to call for a hierarchical understanding of curriculum studies. Democratization and integration became dominant themes, and this extended across the political, cultural, economic, and educational sectors of South African life. This was completely necessary in terms of the political, economic, cultural, and educational inequalities all South Africans lived with. But this logic of equality very quickly extended to domains where the primary logics were at least partly hierarchical, not because of political and economic exploitation, but because of epistemic necessity. The epistemic structure of powerful school subjects such as maths, science, and biology could not be democratized or integrated in the same way as the schools could. It was vital to integrate white with black learners and to integrate old Apartheid divisions that had different education departments for different “races.” But this logic carried through into the heart of curriculum organization.
The blueprint on the principles underlying Post-Apartheid Educational Reform (PAER) can be found in the Department of Education’s (DoE) *White Paper on Education and Training*, which clearly shows the radical nature of epistemic integration.

An integrated approach implies a view of learning which rejects a rigid division between “academic” and “applied,” “theory” and “practice,” “knowledge” and “skills,” “head” and “hand.” Such divisions have characterized the organization of curricula and the distribution of educational opportunity in many countries in the world, including South Africa. They have grown out of, and helped to reproduce, very old occupational and social class distinctions. In South Africa such distinctions in curriculum and career choice have also been closely associated in the past with the ethnic structure of economic opportunity and power. (DoE 1995, 15)

Notice the assumption that there is a need to link social, economic, and political integration with epistemic integration. The whole language of liberation extended itself into the epistemic domain.

South Africa has embarked on transformational OBE. This involves the most radical form of an integrated curriculum…. This… implies that not only are we integrating across disciplines into Learning Areas but we are integrating across all 8 Learning Areas in all Educational activities…. The outcome of this form of integration will be a profound transferability of knowledge in real life. (DoE 1997, 29)

An excellent example of how transferability worked can be found in the *National Curriculum Statement Assessment Guidelines for General Education and Training (Intermediate and Senior Phases)* under 4.5.1 What is the purpose of this assessment task? (see page 15):

Teachers need to have a bigger picture of why they are choosing a particular assessment task over others. The purpose of an assessment task will give rationale to why learners are being assessed. An assessment task should always be aimed at addressing community, national and international problems thereby equipping learners with lifelong skills that will help them to explore different options that will tackle societal problems. As a teacher one always wants to find out how your learners are progressing and how you could assist them to improve lifelong learning. It is therefore crucial to organise or design an assessment task such that it will eventually afford learners an opportunity to tackle current challenges that are daunting the world at large. For an example, an assessment task can be developed to address myths around HIV and AIDS, Corruption vs Poverty Alleviation, Social Integration, Gender Sensitivity, Economic Development, Tourism, Sports,
Now “integration,” like many of our most interesting words, has many distinct logics attached to it, three of which are relevant to the above discussion. The first logic is one that rejects a rigid division by breaking the boundary line between two distinct sets and then allows mixing through a process of incorporation where unrestricted and equal association is encouraged. It is a form of desegregation. The second logic of integration is one used within psychoanalysis where an individual, immersed and not yet differentiated from a situation, becomes organized and integrated as a unique unification of disconnected experiences. In the first we see a weakening of the boundary between sets, and in the second a strengthening of a boundary that allows a set to form. The first opens, the second closes and then builds something new above. Within PAER there was a strong tendency to emphasize a weakening of epistemic boundaries rather than a strengthening of them. This also entailed a blurring rather than a sharpening, an increase in ambiguity rather than a process of clarity. Here the third meaning of integration comes into play, this time from calculus where the logic is one of disambiguation, of finding a more precise value of something that is ambiguous. PAER overemphasized the logic of weakening epistemic boundaries when it should have been engaged in the process of increasing organization and coherence, strengthening boundaries, making them clearer, disambiguating them, and then building something new above it that included what was given below but in a novel synthetic whole. When hierarchical knowledge structures work with integration they take a number of propositions and synthesize them into a more general, inclusive, coherent set. This is a primal logic within curriculum studies that PAER initially obscured to the point of oblivion.

With clarity of boundaries and practice to the point of automaticity, integration in the weakened boundary sense becomes a viable strategy; however if the initial building blocks have not been provided then it is highly problematic to reject strategies that enable automaticity (like memorization, rote learning, repeating a similar task over again from different angles). Nor are practices of automaticity necessarily boring, as can be demonstrated by visits to an energetic class where children clap as they count. As we will see after sketching out the four basic quadrants of curriculum studies, there is a strong tendency for middle-class children to arrive at school with automaticity of numbers and letters already in place. An integrated form of education for these learners is both exciting and productive. But for learners who arrive without the required automaticities in place, a very different set of strategies are needed, one that asks, very
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seriously, what efficient learning for the poor is (Abadzi 2006), and does not just assume that progressivist pedagogy is necessarily a good thing, as its name suggests.

Hierarchical structures work from the foundational to the significant. As one moves up levels, what came before becomes increasingly foundational—it is increasingly assumed and relied upon in automatic ways, but if taken away the whole structure collapses. Significance comes from the heights as one includes more and more levels within a synthesis, enabling increasingly specialized processes to build on previous levels. What is significant at one point becomes foundational at a later point for further development.

Within PAER and PACS, this basic point is of vital importance. Get the foundational wrong or leave it weak and all that is significant within South African education as a whole comes under threat. One example will suffice at this point. If learners are not taught how to read, write, or use numbers in a fluent and increasingly automatic manner, then all the later attempts to teach them subject-specific content and skills will suffer. The cruel logic, at the heart of how hierarchy works from the foundational to the significant, is that middle-class children (using it in a broad loose sense) tend to come to school with the foundational already substantially in place, whereas the various historically discriminated against groups within South Africa have to rely on schools to both introduce and reinforce these basic skills. With 80 percent of schools in South Africa completely dysfunctional, this means that the already disadvantaged never get a chance to catch up or even systematically acquire basic skills, and they carry this through the whole system, never acquiring anything of significance as the foundational was never properly put in place. Even worse, if one then uses progressive techniques within the primary phase that do not make clear what the basic units are needed to be mastered or provide routes into automaticity, then for the sake of a romantic vision one sacrifices whole generations. In South Africa, we attempted to implement the most ambitious, overly sophisticated, progressivist curriculum without foregrounding in an explicit way what the foundational needs were or focusing most of our resources on primary education and care, ensuring basic reading, writing, and numeracy for all. We went for the grandiose vision when we should have focused on the foundational. Much as I accept that those engaged in the process of PAER did their best, the path they took PAER through must register as one of the most tragic moves in the history of curriculum reform worldwide.

The hierarchical line can be explicit or implicit. The clearer, more definite, more precise the steps needed to cross the line, the more explicit the hierarchy is (eH in figure 2.1), the more implied, unspoken, hidden,
embedded the steps are, the more implicit the hierarchy (iH). Note that pedagogic style and teaching strategies vary independently of knowledge structure. It is possible for a teacher to teach a knowledge structure that has an eH using an implicit pedagogy (iP), by using discovery techniques, for example. It is also possible to teach a knowledge structure that has an iH using an explicit pedagogy (eP), by using clearly defined sequencing and assessment criteria based on pedagogic outcomes or generic skills for the lesson. Explicit pedagogies increase visibility and tend to be regarded as conservative as they work with injunctions; implicit pedagogies decrease visibility and tend to be regarded as progressive as they allow learners to explore and find. Falling into this kind of Manichaeism is foolish and can be avoided by following the rule of thumb—establish what can be made explicit first and then decide to work either implicitly or explicitly depending on the structural and contextual demands. This rule of thumb combines with the shift from foundational to significant—in that what is more and more foundational as hierarchy builds is more and more explicit and standardized. The heights of a knowledge structure, where one cannot see the next step, are implicit and barely discernable; the foundations of a knowledge structure are well known, already traversed, come with clear strategies of what works, what does not, what paths are possible, what paths lead nowhere. The more vertical a knowledge structure, the more explicit the foundations, and the more their early principles have to be automatized to allow the freedom to focus on what is ahead. In no way does this mean that pedagogic techniques have to be rigid and forced. Once the teacher knows in the clearest manner what the various paths are to an outcome, she or he can flexibly work within this realm to achieve mastery.

Underpinning the distinction between explicit and implicit hierarchies in PACS is the central issue of social justice. Here, the key question is “How should we select, structure, and organize the study of organized knowledge structures designed for systematic learning in such a way that the most discriminated within our society benefit the most?” In some ways this is a restatement of John Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” that results in maximizing the benefits of the least well off. In South Africa, the answer to this question came via a whole new curriculum (C2005) and the principles that informed it—outcomes-based learning, learner-centered education, and integration. By making explicit what the outcomes of learning should be, but leaving implicit precisely what content should be selected and how it should be sequenced, it was hoped that different learners within different contexts would be able to use means and methods specifically adapted to their own situations to achieve the outcomes. There is much to recommend such a policy: both teachers and learners know what they are aiming at but can use techniques specifically adapted to their own particular
circumstance to achieve the outcome. In South Africa, with its enormous contextual differences between communities, a democracy of acquisition to achieve equality in given outcomes seemed a useful solution to the problem of difference. It allowed different paths to the same end point. This is an entirely sensible, and indeed desirable, principle in curriculum studies. It breaks the iron cage of one-dimensional technicist insistence on one set of content selected, one sequence of moving though it elaborated, one pace of getting through its steps demanded, and one way of assessing it dictated. But in South Africa, the attempt to develop a curriculum that had explicit ends and implicit means both in terms of content and pedagogy was a disaster of tragic proportions. If one makes the means of reaching the end implicit, one then relies on the teacher, the learner, and the school having the skills and resources to generate the various routes toward the goal. Apartheid had made very sure that schooling for nonwhites was impoverished, not only in the physical resources of the school, but in the education of its teachers and the structure of the curriculum. Teachers in these schools mostly did not know what the various means were toward the end, they had never been taken there themselves. Their subject knowledge and pedagogic knowledge were very weak. To expect these teachers to somehow negotiate the complex space between initial learner ignorance and a final outcome of specialized knowledge form on their own, based on a democratic notion of empowerment, was an injustice of astonishing proportions. To provide them with text books that favored resource-rich, activity-based lessons at the cost of specifying what the content and sequences were meant that impoverished teachers were stripped of the fundamental tools and paths they could use to help them, and the more vertical the knowledge structure, the more devastating the effect and blind the alleys reached. The romantic notion that somehow teachers and learners within the most impoverished communities would somehow grow naturally toward the light turned tragic very quickly as highly oversimplified understandings and applications of outcome-based education (OBE) took root.

C2005 was heavily criticized by a number of South African curriculum scholars, most prominent of which are Jonathan Jansen (1999a, 1999b), Johan Muller (2000), Nick Taylor and Penny Vinjevold (1999), Nick Taylor, Johan Muller and Penny Vinjevold (2003), Ken Harley and Volker Wedekind (2004), Allais (2006). Although Jansen’s “10 reasons why OBE will fail” was the most public (and prophetic), it was the work of Muller, Taylor, and Vinjevold that took center stage as it offered not only a substantial theoretical critique based on extensive empirical research but also a set of suggested remedies. One of their major insights was that a more explicit and hierarchical understanding of curriculum was necessary in South Africa. The explicating work of detailing content and its possible
sequences had been left to schools and teachers by C2005. Curriculum reform would have to make clearer what the contents of the various subjects were while providing clear sequences of progression for teachers and learners discriminated against through Apartheid and its legacy. Harley and Wedekind (2004) showed how well-trained and resourced teachers were able to adapt to and thrive on C2005, often by carrying on as they had done within their privileged, fortified sites, whereas poorly trained and under-resourced teachers were left to their own limited devices within their exposed sites.

These critiques were very difficult to both launch and sustain as the danger being pointed to was not the Apartheid state but precisely what had been righteously put in its place by a revolutionary government. Muller, for example, was accused of being a white conservative racist (Michelson 2004). To be a white male launching an attack on an anti-Apartheid, progressive educational reform process was a brave act. That Muller eventually won the day and that everyone has begun to see his critique actively change the process of PAER speak volumes to how the “new” South Africa can work. Equally brave was the work of Linda Chisholm, who, mandated with revising C2005, judiciously negotiated difficult political and educational waters to produce an amended curriculum that has become the center of our new curriculum (Chisholm 2005).

The more hierarchical steps needed to work through an organized knowledge structure, the more vertical (v) (in figure 2.1) its type is. The less hierarchical steps needed to work through an organized knowledge structure, the more horizontal (h) its type is. There is a noticeable correlation between high status subjects and verticality. This is partly because of the manner in which these subjects specialize the learner, providing a content and skill set above and beyond everyday understanding. This makes the educational process, as one moves up levels, less and less like the everyday world, and more and more engaged in “sacred” knowledge practices.

The more vertical a knowledge structure is, the larger its horizontal base becomes. This is because of each level upwards depending on a larger and larger set of backgrounded factors below it that need to have been systematically organized, integrated, learned, and practiced.

The implications for PAER of this simple rule are profound, especially in South Africa. Systematic planning of necessary components and how they articulate with each other and build up to higher order levels is a highly specialized and complex endeavor that only the expert and experienced practitioners within a knowledge field can accomplish. Key understandings and detailed outlines of what the major concepts and paths of development coupled with meticulous attention to the details of content are necessary. As one moves higher up a vertical knowledge structure, one
has to rely on the efforts put—over previous years, terms, months, weeks, days, hours—into the previous step in a given lesson. The higher one goes, the more removed one becomes from everyday understanding. This is the nature of specialization. There is still application to everyday, lived problems but the ability of an unspecialized consciousness to understand a point made at a high level within a vertical knowledge structure is necessarily very limited. What a learner uses to understand the next step on a vertical journey is not her everyday life experience but the previous specialized step she has learned, practiced, and applied to everyday life problems. What she has made a part of her new, schooled life becomes the stepping stone, not what she does in her leisure time.

The more vertical a knowledge structure, the more difficult it is to integrate it with other subjects into contextualized themes, especially as one climbs higher within its configurations, unless done on a superficial level. Muller (2006a) has seen the implications of this for PACS and PACR most clearly. With increased verticality comes the demand for increasingly specialized competences, and as these become more formalized so too does the autonomy of the knowledge structure increase. Here we see another paradox of curriculum studies—with increasing autonomy comes increasing automaticity at the lower levels. This makes genuine integration across vertical knowledge structures a highly specialized task as it entails mastery of at least two different fields and a discerning the connections between them. It comes from the few who are able to climb the mountains of different subjects and relate one to the other. The more horizontal the knowledge structure, the more possible it is to work in integrated themes as the units being combined are fairly independent. Because they do not overly depend on previous steps, they can flexibly work with other requirements. The key point is that integration has very specific rules for success, partly to do with what knowledge structures are being worked with, where one is located within these, and how many structures one has mastered. The awareness of how to use integration effectively in PAER was highly restricted, and it is only recently that a few academics have begun to point to what the rules of use of integration are (Muller 2006b).

The larger the base and more numerous the levels, the greater the importance of having a systematic learning of the basic levels carefully taught and learned, mostly to the point where these lower levels become unconscious and natural, so that the higher levels can both be reached and paid attention to without having to consciously hold previous steps in mind. The importance of clear textbooks, time on task, repetition of key elements, and knowledgeable teachers who are aware of the various paths upwards and how to get there cannot be overemphasized. To have, within PAER, underspecified what the content of textbooks should be, removed
time on task through unorganized group work based on everyday understandings, half organized by inexperienced teachers who were trying to work a whole new curriculum reform process without having fully qualified in the content of their own subjects is to look back at PAER with a tragic eye. We were the ones who inflicted this harm on ourselves, much as Oedipus did when tracking back the footsteps of the murderer of his father, and we are currently waking to the realization that it was us who committed the crime. Whether we reach some kind of redemption and enlightenment, as Oedipus at Colonus managed, is another question.

Organized knowledge structures can be combinations of explicit, implicit, vertical, and horizontal. An explicit, vertical knowledge structure has many hierarchical steps that are clearly articulated. An implicit, vertical knowledge structure has many hierarchical steps that are couched within implied understandings of what it means to move upwards. An explicit, horizontal knowledge structure has a chain-like structure where definite organizing links are made from one element to another, but the links themselves do not go on to form higher and higher levels. An implicit, horizontal knowledge structure has a chain-like structure where the organizing links are unspoken. Here each unit and its process appear almost independent.

PAER via C2005 tended to emphasize explicit themes that would integrate sections within and across subject disciplines and be of everyday relevance. A consequence of this was a lack in coherence. By coherence I mean the need for making clearer the content and concept sequences within a subject discipline through the grades in a progressive manner that eventually aligns with the hierarchical nature of the discipline from which the subject derives (Schmidt et al. 2005). Coherence enables clear recognition rules of what needs to be done for both teacher and learner within organized knowledge structures. This is vital for a country where Apartheid has gone out of its way to ensure a “despecialization” of nonwhite teachers and learners through epistemological impoverishment. To expect these teachers to develop their own insight and materials into the necessary forms of coherence at a content and conceptual level in the various subject disciplines at school level was problematic, to put it politely. Furthermore, as Maton (2006) has pointed out, it is vital to provide learners with access to the specialized knowledge structure of a discipline by ensuring that the school subject bears a resemblance to its parent discipline. Vital because these powerful subjects disciplines provide a measure of access to better life opportunities. Current initiatives by Dempster and myself (2006) within specific subject curricula are precisely focusing on coherence.

This does not mean, when asking the question of what curriculum structures best suit the disadvantaged, that everything must be driven by a
Drawing the Line

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template that is both vertical and explicit. This would be to overdose. Certain subjects, such as life orientation, for example, or sections within a subject, such as creative writing, can work effectively when both implicit and horizontal, providing a loosely structured space for discussion, interaction, and movement. Nor is verticality mere insistence on straight-jacketed ascent. It contains within itself the possibility of moving upwards, downwards, and horizontally across and from this all sorts of patterns can actualize. The more vertical a structure, the more possibilities there are for taking assorted paths within it, and the more clarity about which paths are worthwhile and which lead to dead ends. Nor does being both explicit and vertical mean that space is not provided for human growth and engagement. It is precisely in engaging with the difficult process of negotiating the ladder that what is most human comes out. It is in how learners engage and struggle with the requirements and how teachers work to help them that what is most human comes out, rather than in an endless talking about what is most human. In PAER there is a danger that social justice is more talked about than acted upon, or even worse, used for political, economic, or personal agendas. Acting upon the principles of social justice in curriculum studies means structuring a curriculum and the processes around it in such that the disadvantaged can both recognize its requirements and realize it in practice. Spencer Brown (1969) aptly draws an analogy to music: “The composer does not even attempt to describe the set of sounds he has in mind, much less the set of feelings occasioned through them, but writes down a set of commands which, if they are obeyed by the performer, can result in a reproduction, to the listener, of the composer’s original experience” (Brown 1969, 77). If the time spent describing social justice in PACS dominates following the injunctions of organized knowledge structures, the less actual social justice is produced in the process of describing it. Simply put, less talk, more action. This said, a clear curriculum on social justice issues along with pedagogic strategies that engage with highly charged issues should be an explicit part of the South African curriculum from primary through to tertiary education.

The definition of curriculum studies as the study of organized knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning contains two fundamental ways of working with hierarchy: epistemological hierarchies deal with the conceptual composition of “organized knowledge structures” and pedagogic hierarchies deal with how these have been “designed for systematic learning” through instructional sequences. These need to be kept distinct although they function together and have logics that resonate or conflict with each other. The intricate relationships between conceptual properties of organized knowledge structures do not necessarily provide the template of design for instructional sequences; nor does an establishment
of an instructional sequence resulting from a learning hierarchy provide a template for the conceptual organization of a knowledge structure. Each has its own set of logics, the structure of acquisition is different to the structure of the subject. Nor does either of these logics have to start at the bottom of a hierarchy and work inevitably upwards. There are grounds for starting in the middle and working outwards, or the top and working downwards, or combinations of the two. Nor is any one given hierarchy absolute. There are variations within variations that begin to form a complex network or mosaic. What is at the top of one hierarchy can be in the middle of another hierarchy; it depends on where one is standing and what one is doing. This does not remove responsibility of those engaged in curriculum institutionalization to explicitly specify what they take to be key paths through the complex network. But it does reveal the historically constituted and contested nature of the enterprise and the possibilities of play within the system. Once the content of a knowledge structure has been given an organized form, it can be rearranged in terms of familiarity, interest, or difficulty. Furthermore, its organized form could take on various types of knowledge representation, depending on the subject and the varieties of structuring available (Sowa 2000).

These kinds of distinctions, basic to the history of American curriculum studies (Posner and Strike 1976a, 1976b), are yet to establish themselves and be critiqued within PACS. The work of Robert Gagné, for example, on how to design learning hierarchies that work from the bottom up, was vital in establishing a tradition that made explicit the moves needed to take a learner from a lower set of skills to a higher set. It is precisely the critique of this position that enabled the recognition of variety and diversity. Gagné was too rigid in his specifications, but the process of making him more flexible entailed including his insights and moving beyond them. So when Bruner argued for a top-down approach that started from the structure of the discipline, with conceptual hierarchies embedded in, and developed from, the subject disciplines conceptual structure, he was making a move that not only critiqued Gagné, but also showed how to work hierarchical networks in the opposite direction within a different modality (not behavioral skills but subject concepts). It enriched the debate. In South Africa, where this approach has been taken seriously only recently (Dempster and Hugo 2006), it did not engage with an alternative hierarchical organization, but with the lack of it. Dempster and Hugo found that one of the central concepts that organized how biology was structured was very poorly provided for. They set about inquiring into the basic conceptual hierarchies that would enable an understanding of evolution and then suggested how biology could be organized as a subject around this central concept. This state of disorganization has its “advantages,” however. One
is not engaging with a knowledgeable other with a recognizable set of theoretical principles and research tradition. Rather one clashes publicly with the wrath of the Christian right and administratively with the gravity of a slow educational system that would prefer to continue with what it already has in place. Granted, in America, the Christian right is more problematic (we did not get death threats) and the schooling system equally conserving of its already acquired history, but the major debate in curriculum studies around alternative structuring of the curriculum was not an issue we had to deal with (there has been no postmodernist, abundance-based, or technicist critique, or, to put it historically, someone like David Ausubel or later Jerome Bruner who became disenchanted with the structure of the disciplines approach). E. R. Dempster was immediately asked by the deputy director general of education (Penny Vinjевold) to design a curriculum that had coherence with biology as a discipline and enabled the essential structure of biology (and with it, evolution) to be learned in a manner that suited South African conditions. Furthermore, textbook publishers have been in serious negotiations for the new textbooks to come out of the rearrangement. Such is academic life in South Africa if one gets actively involved in curriculum issues. The possibilities attached to PACS are still very wide and simple interventions can carry enormous weight. Working within a field that has had its history eviscerated by the Apartheid struggle means that intelligent new interventions can quickly take root. The danger is that without the historical tradition and alternative voices to critique the interventions one can land up with oversimplified interventions that have not learned from the mistakes of others, or stood on the shoulders of those who have previously succeeded. Here the rich articulation of curriculum as racial, gendered, aesthetic, political, phenomenological, humanist, postmodern, postcolonial, autobiographical can enable a vision of how limited the intervention is, help see the possible worlds its optional actualization spun out from, rather than being caught in the blindness of it seeming the only option.

Focusing on how knowledge structures differ in terms of verticality provides insight into its internal structuring and complexity. This must be combined with the question of how precisely knowledge structures work with the external empirical world, of how theoretical statement deals with empirical correlate (Bernstein 2000; Muller 2006a, 2006b). The more rigorous the empirical specification, the more able the knowledge structure is to move forward on the basis of recognizable, stable empirical evidence either confirming or falsifying the hypothesis. Curriculum studies, in its reconceptualist mode, is currently proliferating both internal and external languages of description, and these compete for intellectual space. Pinar et al. (1995) have presented the benefits of such proliferation. I can attest
to it myself, having been engaged in a similar project in my own intellec-
tual life. But for all its richness this proliferation makes difficult two
important ways a knowledge structure progresses—increasing integration
of propositions into higher, more general, more powerful orders of expla-
nation, and specific empirical falsification or conditional affirmation.
Ockham’s razor must combine with DeSade’s orgy. Put strongly from a
Bernsteinian perspective, the current form of the reconceptualist project
appears as an overabundance of horizontal knowledge structures, each
with its own modicum of verticality, but with rules of integration between
the languages very poorly articulated and empirical rules of falsification
loosely adhered to, effectively disenabling rigorous progress in exchange
for the riches of difference. The trick is to not fall for an either/or over here;
it is very definitely and\and\and (with one of the “ands” being integrative
where Alfred Whitehead’s maxim holds: the many become one and are
increased by one).

The most influential person in PACS and PAER making this move is
Joe Muller There are many other key figures who we can only briefly meet
in these pages: Pam Christie (2006), Jonathan Jansen (1999a, 1999b),
Wally Morrow (2007), Linda Chisholm (2005), Ken Harley and Volker
Wedekind (2004), Crain Soudien (2004), Nick Taylor and Penny Vinjevold
(1999), Paula Ensor and Jaamia Galant (2005), Ken Harley and Ben Parker
(1999), Heather Jacklin (2004), being some of the key older figures and
Aslam Fataar (2006), Ursula Hoadley (2005), Mignonette Breier (2004),
Volker Wedekind (2004), Matseleng Allais (2006), Cheryl Reeves (2005),
being some of the younger up and comings. But standing imperiously
above them is Joe Muller, precisely because he was insightful enough to see
into the rigorous demands of epistemological hierarchy as the paradoxical
key to PAER at a time when hierarchy in its economic, political, and social
forms was under sustained attack. The tale of how his ideas have success-
fully become a part of the revision of C2005 in terms of the key networks
he works within (most importantly Penny Vinjevold [the deputy director
general of education] and Nick Taylor [CEO of the Joint Education Trust],
a high profile private research organization) is well told by Fataar (2006).

Muller has taken the underdeveloped work of the late Basil Bernstein
on knowledge structures and elaborated on it in ways that speak directly to
PAER and PACS. The two key terms he works with are verticality and
grammaticality. The first describes the hierarchical levels of integration
within knowledge structures; the second the rigors of empirical falsifica-
tion. Levels of verticality vary in knowledge structures. Some knowledge
structures have high levels of hierarchical integration (like science), whereas
other knowledge structures branch out with varieties of analytical lan-
guages, each claiming its own particularity and identity often based on
some founding father. Curriculum studies is a classical illustration of this horizontal type of knowledge structure, with discursive communities staking out their own particular claims to relevance with their own particular identities and languages of description. Pinar’s major contribution has been to capture the complexity of curriculum studies’ horizontal knowledge structure within North America and then to expand this form radically outwards into the international arena. I would argue that this project needs to seriously take on board the idea (within this richness) that curriculum studies can have a more vertical structure and a stricter set of grammatical rules. This needs to be combined with a serious effort to identify and specify a delicate and nuanced intrinsic language of curriculum studies that has both a clearly articulated internal conceptual language and a rigorous external language of description that specifies how to empirically grasp specific CS foci. This has been specifically demonstrated within PACS, and I illustrate cases of this at the end of this chapter.

Out of the many types of hierarchy, two are basic to a general understanding of how hierarchy underpins curriculum studies. An intensional hierarchy works from the concrete to the abstract with its basic principle being one of increasing integration or abstraction. Increasingly terse formulations hold more and more concrete particularities under their sway, a classical formulation of this being Einstein’s formula \( E=MC^2 \). One abstraction holds all manifestations of physical energy under its control. Intensional hierarchies work with increasing levels of formalization. Extensional hierarchies work with ever-enlarging contexts that provide an environment for its smaller sets. A good example of how extensional hierarchy is used in educational thinking and research can be found in Bronfenbrenner’s (1979) ecological approach where human development is supported by systems at four nested levels: the microsystem (immediate social setting), the mesosystem (connections between various microsystems), the exosystem (the specific economic, political, educational, and cultural institutions and practices that directly affect the various microsystems), and the macrosystem (overarching traditions, beliefs, and values of the society). It is an order of scale. Note, however, that the macro system of Bronfenbrenner is actually an intensional set, dealing with ideas, values, and beliefs. He confuses the largest scale with most intensive form. In curriculum studies we have to be very clear about how two very different hierarchical principles intersect and interact—of how the macro intersects with the micro and with how the abstract intersects with the concrete. A sophisticated version of how this works in curriculum studies is found in Bernstein’s concept of the Pedagogic Device (PD). The PD tracks how knowledge structures are recontextualized into pedagogic forms. It is hierarchically structured, with the highest level being the actual creation, production, and distribution of
knowledge forms. These are then transformed by the PD into increasingly digestible forms that can be written in textbooks, understood by teachers, learned by students, and assessed in ways that ensure it has been correctly mastered. On the one hand, formalized abstract knowledge structures are becoming increasingly concrete and tangible (intensional hierarchy), and on the other, the spiraling downwards from international and national contexts into provincial, district, and finally classroom realization (extensional hierarchy). Figure 2.2 depicts the dual operation of hierarchy.

Paula Ensor (1999) has articulated how the Pedagogic Device functions within PAER and PACS, with other notable formulations coming from Joe Muller (2000). This has enabled a rigorous tracking of how a pedagogic message is carried and transformed all the way from its most developed formulations within research organizations to its simplified and pedagogyized variations in university, colleges, secondary, and primary schools. Carol Bertram is currently tracking how the Pedagogic Device functions within history, carefully tracing how at each hierarchical level of the PD the nature of what history is transforms itself into increasingly pedagogyized forms, stretching on the one hand from history as specialist discipline and knowledge structure to history as taught in a grade 10 classroom, and on the other hand from history policy as formulated by national policy to history as classroom practice (Bertram 2008).

One of the dangers of working fundamentally with hierarchy as the basic form of curriculum studies is that previous usages of the concept have often oversimplified and rigidified its logic—sometimes purposively, as with Benjamin Bloom’s model, even in its updated versions (Anderson et al. 2001). When alternatives (such as complexity theory) are presented, these seem to offer a far richer and more flexible resource. This is ironic, as complexity theory is an out and out hierarchical system, only it works with hierarchy in the most complex and dynamic of ways. This can be seen if we take one of its key categories, emergence. Emergence refers to novel but
coherent patterns arising through self-organization in complex systems that cannot be easily explained by the various material elements of the system. The building block picture of hierarchy with its locksteps upwards is challenged by emergence, but what is happening is that a higher level has supervened with downward causation, it is a hierarchical logic working downwards rather than upwards. Furthermore, emergence also describes the experience of shifting levels from an inner view, of what it is like to be within one set of operating logics and to suddenly emerge into another level. Older versions of hierarchy as used by Bloom and Gagné tended to work with an outer view, where an existing taxonomy or learning hierarchy is used with all the levels already predictably in place. However, there have been inner descriptions of how hierarchy works pedagogically for a long time, stretching from Plato’s Cave Metaphor to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* to Jean Piaget’s assimilation and accommodation. It is vital to develop and sustain an inner complex language of how hierarchy works.

Extrinsic Distinction between One and Many

Curriculum studies involves an awareness of the contexts that learning and teaching are located within. It shifts a student’s awareness from an individual and localized focus on their own experience to the powerful forces that partly structure and constrain their chosen profession. An attempt is made to enhance the students’ critical appreciation of how the individualized world of a teacher and a learner engaged in a learning process is located within a political, economic, social, and cultural world that directly influences teaching and learning. This does not mean that the individual level is not focused on, only that it is placed within a wider explanatory context. A fundamental distinction between the individual and the collective, the one and the many, informs this move. It is a fruitful tension between psychological and sociological dimensions of curriculum studies, between B. F. Skinner and Piaget on the one hand and Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim on the other. Obviously there are forms of psychology that move closer to the collective world of sociology, as in the work of cultural/social psychology. There are also forms of sociology that move closer to psychology, such as the work of the micro sociologists and symbolic interactionists, but in general the distinction between these two fields is clear: psychology focuses on the individual human being, sociology on the dynamics of us as a collective. Curriculum studies has good examples of attempts to think and practice curriculum either as a radical model of one on one or as many on one. In the first, an intense engagement of one
teacher to one learner is explored, each caught in the infinity of the other. Emmanuel Levinas captures this logic in the ethic of the face to face. Phenomenologists have tracked in intimate detail how the subtle energies of this dimension work. Some feminists have also radicalized curriculum into an immersive relationship where the call is to treat all learners as if they were your own child (Grumet 1988). Autobiography goes even further in its reduction to one and finding within the one all the complexity and richness of the historically lived world. The paradox here is that the more intense the engagement with one, the more one finds how implicated she is within networks of others. From inside the one, the whole world appears from that angle, as Leibniz pointed out 300 years ago. The radical emphasis on the collective dominating the individual is well expressed in early Marxist, reproductionist curriculum texts such as those of Bowles and Gintis where the capitalist logics spawned in the unequal relationship between classes in struggle translates downwards in a mimetic fashion all the way into schools and the (un)consciousness of individual learners and teachers. The recent history of curriculum studies has shown an increasing sophistication both in understanding the radical extremes of this duality and how each is formed by the other and the one becomes the other. So the question of how the many become one, or the exterior becomes interior (Durkheim’s question), is of particular interest.

Two basic points can be made about PACS in terms of the individual/collective line. The first is that we have historically favored an explanatory logic that emphasizes how the individual can be understood in terms of the collective social, cultural, and economic world they live within, mostly to the cost of understanding specific individual logics. The second is that we are still seduced by a model of teaching and learning that emphasizes the attention and care of individualized pedagogy over mass forms of curriculum delivery. Wally Morrow, the wise man of South African curriculum studies, has consistently pointed to our overenchantment with an individualized model of teaching and learning based on small classes, with all other forms taken as inferior options almost by definition. Very early on in Morrow’s teaching career he was nearly destroyed by this individualized vision and its almost infinite demands. As a young English teacher he found that the picture of teaching given to him in training “generated a suicidal project. The intense personal contact it demanded was exorbitant..., and the marking load took up many hours every night and most of the weekends. My personal life shrank to nil, and although I was young and healthy, my physical condition declined alarmingly” Morrow (2007, 14). Small classes and individualized attention—we might ask, why would one of South Africa’s key thinkers in education spend so much time critiquing an obsession with the obvious increase in quality provided by
individual attention. Surely the problem we have in South Africa is with big classes and how to reduce them. For Morrow this obsession is unhealthy and damaging. Rather than ask how to increase individual attention, Morrow’s own response is to ask how we could teach large classes better. Again, he draws on his own particular experiences, this time as a postgraduate student at University of London 40 years ago doing an academic diploma with 1,200 other students. The course successfully dealt with its large numbers through excellent organization and a carefully constructed reading program. As Morrow goes on to argue, the university had thought through the issue in a way that combined both formal and epistemological accesses to their course. It enabled large numbers to access the program, explicit guidance to its contents, and sustained feedback. In South Africa there was, and is, a tendency to see formal access as antagonistic to epistemological access. The post-Apartheid imperative to increase formal access to higher education, it was feared, would result in a reduction of epistemological access as more students meant larger classes and therefore inferior education. Morrow condemns this equation in the strongest of terms, pointing to how it has paralyzed our professional intelligence (19), cramming us into either\or options where we should be going and\and.

The explanatory power PACS has given the collective world of social, cultural, economic, and political forces over individual teachers and learners is overwhelming, partly because these forces are so extreme in our country.

Extrinsic distinction between interior and exterior

Curriculum studies does not only use the line between individual (singular) and collective (plural) to explore the study of organized knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning, it also draws a strong line between inner and outer dimensions. Skinner and Piaget, for example, stage a powerful debate that is of instructive use to curriculum studies as it highlights the difference between a type of behaviorist practice that focuses on an outer stimulus producing a measurable response and a developmentalist account of inner growth. It also captures the difference between types of curricula practices that focus on a performance-based pedagogy where external, measurable responses are looked for and those that prefer to work with a competence-based pedagogy where the inner development of the person is emphasized. A similar debate occurs within sociology between classical Marxists who prefer to focus on how the hard divisions in the economy based on physical location in the mode of
production explain curriculum developments and those who prefer to emphasize how the cultural world of language, ideology, and subjectification play key roles. In both these psychological and sociological debates we see a distinction between outer and inner playing a distinguishing role, with some preferring the solid world of physical reality and others the more intangible world of internal meaning-making.

These are two basic and primary distinctions that capture lines of antagonistic debate and competing explanatory frameworks within curriculum studies. One/Many and Interior/exterior point to a set of fundamental distinctions that can be used to think about PACS. If we combine these two basic distinctions, we get a simple matrix that is shown in figure 2.3.

The two distinctions when crossed over produce four quadrants: the interior world of an individual; the interior world of a collective group; the exterior world of the individual; and the exterior world of a collective group (Wilber 1995). We can attach representative names of influential educational thinkers at the heart of different basic curriculum models who are centered in one of the quadrants: a quick four tokens would be Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, Skinner, and Marx. A more precise way would be to ask what pure languages of description work these different quadrants in its own terms. I want to suggest four basic extrinsic (to curriculum studies) pure languages of description for curriculum use that are thrown up by this matrix in figure 2.3: phenomenology, hermeneutics, neuroscience, and structural functionalism.

Let us begin with the I world, the subjective world, the phenomenological world of interior states. Myth, disciplines of the self, religion, introspection, poetry, fiction, and psychoanalysis have given us tools to work its terrain. Phenomenology provides a good, modern example of how to access

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Figure 2.3  Four Quadrant Model
and describe interior states in their own terms through bracketing the question of outside reference and focusing on the interior world purely as it presents itself. It is a language of description of what is arising in consciousness without reference to the exterior world. It accepts the outside world as existing but is interested in the sense it exists for us. Phenomenology attends to what arises and falls in consciousness from within the field of consciousness itself (Husserl 1980). Often those within curriculum studies searching for the most intensely human of approaches turn to phenomenology, but it can also be a catchphrase for those who choose an interpretive qualitative focus on individual meaning-making in their research.

Use of phenomenology in PACS is hamstrung by two key difficulties. Phenomenology supposedly formed the philosophical heart of Apartheid’s fundamental pedagogics and provided ideological justification for its neutrality. After all, they bracketed human assumptions and reached beyond ideology into a pure phenomenon, clean and pure, and that phenomenon just so happened to be good education for clean and pure white people and separate education for different (read dirty and mixed) others. With this kind of abuse as a part of its history, phenomenology in PACS has conservative resonances. This ideological callousness also tarnished the sophisticated attempt by Afrikaaner intellectuals in Apartheid curriculum studies to think through what education was in its deepest human form. In losing this history we also lost the tradition of phenomenological curriculum studies in South Africa (which must now be recovered). It is one thing having to append a note decrying Martin Heidegger’s Nazi politics after using his phenomenology in curriculum studies the way American phenomenologists do; it is another when a whole era of curriculum studies in South Africa used phenomenology for the cruelllest forms of symbolic and concrete violence.

The second difficulty is partly as a result of the first. Phenomenology has become a catchphrase in educational research for qualitative study, which basically involves students researching their own practices and those of their colleagues in a descriptive fashion for a half master’s thesis. The absence of sophisticated phenomenological practice in PACS partly allows this. The institutionalization of phenomenology within Afrikaans universities has been systematically rooted out or at the very least backgrounded, and attempts to build up new forms of phenomenological research and practice in English universities (mainly Rhodes) are still new, and often are a code word for a qualitative, interpretive case study.

That said, the current work being done in PACS in phenomenology is very exciting. The PhD of Carol Thompson on how adult learners struggle with early levels of academic literacy is going to be the landmark text for phenomenology in PACS.
If phenomenology gives curriculum studies a language of the subjective
interior, of the first person I and its experiences from the first person’s per-
spective, then hermeneutics provides a similar inner language for the histor-
ically determined cultural world of meaning-making. If Edmund Husserl
foregrounded human consciousness, then Hans-Georg Gadamer, along
with Heidegger, emphasized language and how it manages to open out
within itself the nature of intersubjectivity. For Gadamer this involved a
shifting toward how we are in conversation and able to listen to each other,
of being within dialogue with others. It is a focusing in on how we are
immersed in conversation through our actions, our touches, our contact,
creating a world of solidarity out of our being with each other. He shifts
away from the actions of an individual subjectivity by placing it within the
process of historical tradition and culture (Gadamer 1989). Gadamer
describes from the inside of this intersubjective space how communication
begins in unspoken ritual and solidarity before hardening into its explicit
linguistic forms. He begins from linguisticicality, from inside the we and
shows how “the we” forms and moves, much like Husserl managed to do for
consciousness within its own terms. As Gadamer puts it, he is interested in
“what language is as language, and what comes to stand in language when
language is there as language in its fullness” (Palmer 2000, 389). Or again
“[a] conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is
conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to
‘emerge’ which henceforth exists” (Gadamer 1989, 383).

It has a practical rationality that comes from taking part in a living that
is larger than ones own self, a reason that is based on historical community
and a critical conversation within its familiar horizons, something we grow
into as we mature into an intersubjective commonality. Hermeneutics
gives curriculum studies an intense historical awareness of how its truths
are constructed, and this can result in the attempt to both historically
understand the construction of curriculum studies within one country and
to compare its genesis to that of other countries, with the intention of con-
structing a common language that enables an intersubjective conversation
across time and space. Tero Autio (Pinar 2006) takes hermeneutics into a
more postmodern zone when he argues that the internationalization of
curriculum studies needs the “inverse” of hermeneutics, a seeing anew of
one’s own discipline in the unfamiliar terms of another. The effect is not
one of building a bigger picture from historical and international contribu-
tions, but a seeing anew just how subjective and located one’s own disci-
plinary position is. Pinar describes this effect as one of exile and
estrangement, a third space that renders what was familiar and taken for
granted strange and under question. However, the recognition of the his-
torical genesis of knowledge production does not obliterate the truth claims
made by the knowledge form, otherwise we fall into the genetic fallacy. With historically intense forms of internationalization also comes the question of what within the project stands beyond history and difference, of what is immutably mobile, to use Latour’s term.

The most fundamental issue in terms of how we live in language is the high status and dominance of English over other languages in South Africa. This has resulted in learners with a “non-English” mother tongue attempting to replace it too soon with English, resulting in catastrophic losses in both learning and cultural richness. Research is clear that initial learning must take place in mother tongue and South Africa’s Language in Education Policy (LiEP) attempted to encourage this, but it did not stop both school management and parents from attempting to replace their home language with English as the medium of teaching and learning as soon as possible (Probyn 2006). This problem is compounded by the complex and irregular nature of English. It takes around two and a half years of literacy learning to master the recognition and decoding of familiar words in English. With languages that have simpler spelling and rules, this takes around a year (Abadzi 2006). This enables quicker learning of reading, and South Africa’s African languages do have a simpler, more phonetic structure. The rule is that instruction in the mother tongue is especially vital if the second language to be learned has complex and irregular spelling rules, doubly so if the mother tongue happens to be simply structured. The failure within PAER to insist on, and actively facilitate, mother tongue instruction until reading, writing, and numeracy had become automatic is particularly poignant. The decision was “democratically” left to the schools and their governing bodies to determine. With 80 percent dysfunctionality within schools already overburdened by the attempt to deal with C2005 and outcomes-based education, this was not democracy in action, it was a failure to govern, and it is not surprising that studies on the implementation of LiEP found it to be poorly understood and implemented (Probyn 2006). The result has been a double abyss, with many South African learners not able to read properly in their own languages or English. The strangeness they experience is not one that enables them to see their increasing specialization anew, it is a failure to specialize based on the loss of both home language reading proficiency and English proficiency. They don’t sing songs of experience in a new key, rather they chant phrases that have no meaning.

There has been a strong tendency in PACS to celebrate intersubjective difference and multiculturalism. Given the history of colonialism and Apartheid and how it abused “pluralism” by simplifying difference into inferior and superior racial categories, this celebration is understandable. Black consciousness movements, for example, responded to the racial
stereotyping by honoring black culture and finding within it rich reservoirs to uplift the oppressed. Wally Morrow (2007) points to how this results in what he calls a “politics of difference” where one function of PAER would be to restore to the oppressed a sense of their own particular worth and historical agency. Postmodernism and all its attendant languages provide the resources for this project (as does the work of Paulo Freire, someone I have not done enough justice to in this chapter). But, as Morrow points out, postmodernism comes after modernism with its Enlightenment project of equal opportunity and its “politics of equality.” The Enlightenment project within education is “difference blind”; it attempts to provide all children with equal education, no matter what their original cultural background or economic status. Critiquing the Enlightenment and emphasizing difference is a vital project if one has already come through its equalizing attempts—tasted its fruits as it were. Morrow puts this point strongly, based on the work of Charles Taylor: “The politics of difference is logically and historically parasitic on the politics of equal dignity” (Morrow 2007, 155). And, if one has not tasted the somewhat bitter fruits of the Enlightenment project, Morrow continues, a “politics of difference” might rip the fabric of a society apart, result in disintegration rather than differentiation. It is a simple hierarchical argument: celebrate difference on the back of equal dignity, and if equal dignity has not been established, then pay attention to it before attending to the varieties of difference. If the majority of South Africa’s schools are in disarray and there is an enormous struggle for the basics of survival and elementary learning, what purchase does multicultural education have on such a world? (156). What is needed is regeneration and social cohesion and the attendant emphasis on a politics of equal dignity as a prerequisite for celebrating difference. Crucially, this politics of equal dignity still comes with an understanding of difference and its own implication within structures of power—*it is a postmodern recognition of the importance of modernism*—such is the nature of the task in PACS.

Wenger’s “communities of practice” has also played a major role in PACS. Melanie Graven (2002) has focused on how teacher learning and identity within PAER is facilitated by a communities of practice model with a strong emphasis on active coparticipation. Her research pointed to a major contradiction in the principles underlying maths literacy education within PAER with the simultaneous demand that locally designed learner-centered maths lesson (a competency model) be implemented with national examinations based on rigorous explicit standards (a performance model). Local is combined with global with no clarity provided as to how these two very different models were to be negotiated and combined, resulting in confused identities and practices among teachers. Graven
worked with a communities of practice model to help teachers negotiate these complex official teacher identities and develop more integrated professional identities.

If Husserl speaks from the inside of consciousness and Gadamer from the inside of culture, then it is the cognitive neuroscientists and neuropsychologists who have begun to unravel what the language of us as an organism is. Brain science is beginning to work rigorously with human being as a living organism. They explore phenomena that are manifested in and through our biological being. As human beings we are firmly rooted in the individuality of our concrete biology, although we often choose to ignore this location. Through the mapping of our own genome we are quickly unraveling the language of our own genes and gaining an understanding of how learning happens in our hardware. Memory, consciousness, emotion, thinking are all being tracked in relation to brain structure.

The whole tradition of focusing on the physical aspect of our individual organism has been backgrounded in PACS. Explanation that takes as its primary focus either the interobjective world of class inequality or the intersubjective discrimination between cultures and language (and to a lesser extent the interior development of the individual) can lose the central logic of how we function as organism. Later on I am going to point to how we need to hold all four quadrants in focus together, but for now I want to point to how each has its own principles of operation that need to be understood and worked with. Otherwise there is a danger that the logic of one quadrant is used to override the specificity of the others. If curriculum studies is about the critical investigation of the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning, then one of the “processes” that engage is the physical organism of human being. There was a strong recognition within PAER of the need to address food deprivation. In South Africa, over half of our children suffer from nutritional deprivation. Nelson Mandela introduced the Primary School Feeding Scheme in 1994 with an initial budget of R472.8 million. By 2004, this had doubled to over 800 million, feeding around 5 million primary school children per year (Engelbrecht 2005). In the poorer schools that I have visited when doing teacher evaluation, these feeding schemes form a major part of the school day. Watching the children jovially sitting down with a solid pate of nutritious food designed to address both short-term and hidden (micronutrient) hunger is by far one of the happier experiences of school visits. One of the teachers told me how some of the children vomit up their food because they have eaten too much, this because it is the only food they get. There have been major problems with corruption and exploitation by some of the people running the feeding schemes, the latest being in the Eastern Cape where a R230 million feeding scheme project
has collapsed and is being probed for massive corruption. It had replaced another feeding scheme that had also collapsed because of corruption (see http://allafrica.com/stories/200708280353.html). But the direct question facing PACS is what forms of teaching and learning best suit those who have been and are malnourished. Malnutrition and poor health damages cognitive capacity and process, affects memory and attention, and makes for more antisocial and aggressive behavior (Abadzi 2006). We know that high-performing learners in both languages and maths tend to have efficient working memory and that poorly performing learners tend to have limited working memory (ibid.). We also know that accelerated, recuperative learning is possible (Skuy et al. 1998), but research on how to structure a curriculum taking into account probable poor working memory of disadvantaged learners is very thin on the ground, especially in relation to the teaching and learning of literacy and numeracy. Here again, the key role of automaticity must be emphasized. The more a learner can do automatically, the more free space within working memory allows for concentration on the actual task at hand, rather than its preconditions. Automaticity results in creativity. As in many of curriculum studies’ most basic principles of operation, a basic paradox reveals something profound underneath.

Neuroscience has to intersect with curriculum studies. The attempt to push curriculum studies into the humanities at the cost of the contribution of both the social and natural sciences is very dangerous, especially when older and stereotypical models of the natural sciences are held onto. The newer forms of science studies (like that of Latour) quickly reveal that the older critiques of the sciences being positivist need rapid updating, with these very traditions now able to contribute in sophisticated ways to curriculum studies, rather than providing the critiqued backdrop. It is a curious thing, for example, that older forms of computerized learning were highly regimented and crudely hierarchical whereas newer forms are strongly constructivist, able to work in highly sophisticated and individual ways with where learners are, facilitating both their moves in new directions and back over older ground in the most dynamic and engrossing of ways (Gee 2003). It is in these fields that we see most clearly what it means to both enter and move beyond hierarchy. Neuroscience not only provide us with some guidance as to what the effects of malnutrition are on the brain, but it also provides some insight into how we can structure teaching and learning to develop its higher functions in increasingly sophisticated ways.

Key as this intervention is and will increasingly come to be, it must be carefully employed. The risk is that insights into the structure and functioning of the brain are mimetically applied to curriculum studies, as if the one were a mirror of the other. A sophisticated understanding of how
different specialist disciplines and fields intersect with and within curriculum studies will help ensure that crass transpositions from one field to another without careful tracing of how it reconfigures will be avoided. A *mosaic* must be built: a combination of distinct commandments that weave into a complex network that seriously takes the intrinsic dimensions of curriculum studies as its guide.

We have so far worked with the inner descriptive languages of the singular I (phenomenology), the plural We (hermeneutics) and the singular It (neuroscience). This leaves the objective world of social and economic reality. We find such a language in the structural functionalism of Durkheim and Talcott Parsons. They work with revealing the structure and function of social systems, describing the social system as social system from within its own functioning as a social system, and what comes to stand in the social system when the social is there as system in its fullness. They provide us with a language of the social in its own terms. Education was analyzed not in terms of individual minds exchanging information but on the actual logic of social reproduction in its own right, of how it produces and maintains itself from within itself.

In PAER the most tangible form of oppression engaged with was collective discrimination based on the most overt of physical characteristics—the color of skin (although even this supposed clear line was continuously obscured by “coloreds” and other assorted “mixings”). The division of labor in modern South Africa always combined racial oppression with forms of class and gender oppression, and there are good attempts to think through how these key forms of systemic oppression intersect and overlap within PAER. Here the work of Crain Soudien and Yusuf Sayed (2004) and Nazir Carrim (2003) are exemplary. They point to how race and class interlock as the project of racial integration within South African schools gathers (rather slow) momentum. When integration is happening, the dominant model is assimilation, with the newly emerging black middle class being increasingly accommodated within historically white, fortified schools, while the poorer black classes remain either locked within dysfunctional schools or only able to enter barely functioning, vulnerable schools at a premium cost. Good descriptions of the complexity of this process in schools can be found in Dolby (2001).

Strongly noticeable within this quadrant is the continual emphasis on the demands of the modern economy on education. This theme has carried with it all the logics of globalization and has intersected with the post-Apartheid liberation project in the most peculiar and damaging of ways. Muller (2000) described this dangerous combination of liberation rhetoric with a globalizing imperative, the first about learners and the second about skills and the curious hybrid it has formed in PAER.
Muller picked up on Bernstein’s analysis on how different factions of the middle class in England fought over the organization and delivery of curriculum structures. Bernstein argued that the conflict between visible (explicit/separate) and invisible (implicit/integrated) forms of curriculum structure and pedagogy was an ideological conflict between different factions of the middle class, not simply a conflict between classes, or basic forms of mechanical and organic solidarity. He makes a distinction between people located in the field of production that carry out functions related to the economic base and those located in the field of symbolic control (education, social services, counseling agencies, religious and legal institutions, universities, research agencies, government agencies). Bernstein (2000) describes research showing that invisible pedagogy is likely to be advocated by those within the field of symbolic control, visible pedagogy by those within the field of production. Muller takes this up in terms of competence (invisible) and performance (visible) modes, showing how PAER is struggling with various hybrids of these two forms, based on alliances and struggles between different class and professional segments. Muller pointed to a dominant logic revealing itself in those countries conscious of their competitive position in the global economy—a swing toward performance models, toward a “concern with the universal entrepreneurial seller of infinitely modifiable labour power and away from the pastorally individualized citizenry of the competence Utopia” (Muller 2000, 108). In South Africa, with a powerful competence logic and its universal democracy of acquisition still entrenched in governmental circles along with the globalizing imperative to become more competitive, these two forms of curriculum organization have formed strange combinations, depending on the peculiar intersections of different social groupings and the demands of recontextualization as pedagogic ideals begin to work their way into practice.

Various moves are possible within this curriculum studies lattice. I name the most basic. The move of staying within one quadrant and attempting to delicately develop its internal logic in its own terms has already been discussed above. Phenomenology, hermeneutics, brain science and structural functionalism provide good examples of these inner languages of description.

A second possibility is working from inside one of the quadrants outwards to the others. By standing firm within one space there is an ability to both establish a standing reference point and explore, intersect, and relate to other dimensions. Each of these languages, when worked with delicately, starts from inside their respective terrains and works outwards. For example, when Pinar began working on autobiography he recognized the need to begin by going inwards into the interior world of an individual teacher. This in no way meant that he excluded the cultural, political, economic,
and bodily dimensions, but that he came to these dimensions from within the deepening account of one individual’s interior world, providing an integral vision for curriculum studies. There is, however, a massive difference between an integral understanding and a colonizing imperative where one-dimensional logics are used to dominate all others. Certain curriculum studies intellectuals take their particular specialty and make it dominate all others. Crude Marxist curriculum studies, for example, made of all the other quadrants a superstructure dependent on the structure of the mode of production (Bowles and Gintis 1978). Education, culture, mind, and body were all placed in a secondary and mimetic relationship to structural divisions in the economy. Skinner and the behaviorists provide a similar example, except they attempted to emphasize how stimulus\response on an individual level could explain mind, culture, and society. Radical constructivists, taking their lead from Piaget and the German Idealists, emphasize the individual mind over everything else. Lately we have seen a new colonialism, that of the postmoderns, who emphasize “discourse” and chase its logics through mind, body, and society where all become signifiers in a discursive field. The major intervention of the reconceptualist tradition within curriculum studies has been to break this colonizing tendency and to recognize both the specificity of the quadrants and their integral relationships. I do not want to claim that this structure (see figure 2.4) I am elaborating on

Figure 2.4  Four Theoretical Languages of the Quadrant Model
is the only or best way to understand curriculum studies, only that it provides a very useful and simple model that helps us see some of the primitive operating rules for our discipline.

A third possibility is working holistically with all four dimensions. To develop an integral picture of curriculum studies, some intellectuals work in an all embracing way with subjectivity, intersubjectivity, the nature of us as an organism, and the interobjective functioning of social systems when exploring the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning. Jürgen Habermas provides us with the outstanding modern attempt to both distinguish between different languages of description and show how they work together in his early work on human interests and the social sciences (Habermas 1972) and his later theory of communicative action (Habermas 1979), and his is the most systematic of many rich and creative attempts. Jacques Lacan’s Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real (I, We/Its, It), Foucault’s great description of how power works on the body, the social, the cultural, and the self, Sigmund Freud’s shifting from the ego and the Id to civilization and its discontents (although he had strong colonizing tendencies). Talcott Parsons carefully describes three domains in his early work—the social system, the personality, and the cultural system—and adds a fourth in his later work, the behavioral organism (Parsons 1977). He synthesized these four domains into a general action system of which social systems was only a component. So not only do we need to understand what the different languages of description are, we also need to be able to work with them analytically and synthetically, depending on the focus at hand.

Two interesting modalities of holistically working with curriculum studies come with inner and outer syntheses. One tries to develop a formal, complex, conceptual, typological network that can be thrown over something like an analytical web. Habermas and Parsons are two good examples of this style with Bernstein being the obvious example in curriculum studies. Others work in a more “inner” way, trying to hold all the quadrants open to each other at the same time, while keeping their particularity intact. Some of the great feminists have shown how this is possible, an outstanding example in curriculum studies being Madeleine Grumet’s *Bitter Milk* and a more recent example being *A Curriculum of Difficulty* by Leah Fowler. The reconceptualist project within curriculum studies as a whole has a similar project of holding open these various dimensions in a way that does not lose their respective inner delicacies.

Another move is to synthetically work at the various kinds of languages possible within a specific quadrant. Taking the interior languages of the individual, for example, there are rich traditions that work this field apart from phenomenology, traditions that range from spirituality, poetics,
psychoanalysis, autobiography, fiction. Another move from within a specific language is to work on its internal theoretical subtlety, improving the delicacy of its lexis. There is also the need to develop external languages of description that rigorously ask what the conditions are for transforming theoretical concepts into workable instruments that strictly specify, and have purchase on, data. Finally, there is the need to develop an inner language, one that takes the internal theoretical languages of description and distills them into pure languages of the particular field in its own terms, of the field as described purely from within the field and enacted as such. This is most difficult, but when demonstrated are very clear, like for example, the work of Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, or Heidegger.

With the drawing of lines and making of distinctions comes the possibility of its deconstruction: of how one side is privileged over the other; contains the other, subverts the other. The inner is found in the outer, the many in the one, heterarchy is used to subvert hierarchy, and so the moves could continue. It is a vital dimension of curriculum studies not only because it attends to power dynamics and crude oversimplifications, but because it continually spills life into ossified structures that have stiffened with use or shatters those unable to adapt. Varieties of this project are found under the peculiar set of postmodern, post-structuralist critiques. Peculiar because those who make up the set are precisely against being captured in a set, and that is what puts them in one.

Finally, there is a clear focus on how the one side of the boundary becomes the other. Here the question is of how the exterior world becomes the interior world, of how the collective world becomes the individual world; or of how the interior world manifests in exterior action, or how the individual world becomes a part of the collective world.

But one has to combine these languages with the various languages of description for curriculum studies in its own terms. It is precisely at this point that we notice a weakness within curriculum studies. So long as one places curriculum studies within existing languages of description, whether these be individual or collective, interior or exterior, internal or external, inner or outer, or some kind of combination, one has an astonishing richness that can take a whole life to master, but ask what these languages are specifically in terms of curriculum studies and an immediate hesitancy presents itself. All of these languages are extrinsic to curriculum studies. No matter how deep into the interior one goes with an internal language that enacts itself in the most inner of ways, this in no way qualifies the language as an intrinsic language within curriculum studies. It provides all sorts of languages in relation to curriculum studies. What the intrinsic languages of curriculum studies are, along with its internal and external languages of description and its inner and outer expressions, is now where we turn. One
person who began to develop an intrinsic and comprehensive lexis and lattice for curriculum studies is Bernstein, and it is here that all the work across historical time and international space in curriculum studies must come to rest for a while, at least within the PACS networks I am personally involved in. It is a foundational moment in PACS, much like what Durkheim did for sociology, and Freud for psychoanalysis. Rather than providing an inverse hermeneutics, it provides a “converse,” a new language of distinctions, usable across time and space and intrinsic to curriculum studies as a discipline in its own right, not as a field, which as William Shakespeare complained about his dark mistress, all could plough.

The great danger in South Africa at this moment is the forgetting of curriculum studies as a historical field in the face of Bernstein’s incisive contribution. To put it imagistically, rather than standing on the shoulders of giants in an integrating fashion, as Joe Muller suggests we should begin to do in sociology, we choose rather to stand on Bernstein’s shoulders and those he stood on (like Durkheim, Ernst Cassirer, and more recently Michael Halliday). All this does is repeat what Bernstein accused sociology of doing, developing yet another language of description with its own identities against other competing languages in the field. In other words the Bernsteinian network risks becoming one of the many languages currently fighting for some space in the intellectual world of curriculum studies. One can see this very clearly in the research sketched out further on about the preferred modalities of pedagogy for working-class learners. Not only did Bloom come out with very similar recommendations over 40 years ago, but these were empirically researched and refined in rigorous ways across the world (Bloom et al. 1965). There is no sustained indication in the work of the Bernsteinians that what they are currently engaged in has any tradition and development beyond their own articulation of the field and the limited “giants” they have chosen to view through a Bernsteinian lens. So for example, when dealing with issues of sequencing in pedagogy, the Bernsteinians work with it as an element of framing: who is in control of the sequencing, the teacher or the learner? This is a very limited take on the complexity of sequencing and the richness of debate in the field on this issue. The work of Posner and Strike (1976a, 1976b) provides a good early summary of intelligent thinking and research in this domain. Even when Bernsteinians do try to move into these issues, they rely on those who fall within their own ambit. So, for example, with the recognition that Bernstein does not provide a sophisticated lexis for the structure of knowledge in its own terms, they turn either backwards to Cassirer or forwards to Bernstein’s student, Dowling. Granted that Cassirer provides a complex and much underestimated account of symbolic forms, my point is that the actual work within curriculum studies itself is underestimated, neglected,
and thus repeated, often in inferior form. It is precisely here that the reconceptualist emphasis on the history of their own tradition speaks powerfully to Bernsteinian networks, just as the Bernsteinian emphasis on verticality, grammaticality, and an intrinsic language of education speaks to the reconceptualists.

An intrinsic language of description for CS: There a number of routes possible at this point, one would be to provide a summary of Bernstein’s key distinctions. I would prefer to demonstrate what happens when one works intrinsically with curriculum studies and how specific distinctions produce “varieties of Curriculum Studies.” I take two of the most basic distinctions in Bernstein’s work, that of Classification and Frame, make three key internal variables of each clear, and then combine this with the possibility of each one of these 6 variables being either strong or weak independently of each other (2 to the power of 6). This produces 64 intrinsic variations that describe some of the basic forms involved in the processes of engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning. When combined with the elementary hierarchical functioning of curriculum studies, a new, intrinsic, language of curriculum studies emerges, one that has powerful implications for both PACS and PAER. To make it easily digestible, I have used the “logic” of the I Ching and its symbols to set it up. In the process I have fairly selective in what I work with from Bernstein and how I use it.

Classification is a term that describes the boundary relationship between different knowledge structures within a curriculum. If the boundary is strong, then the various subjects are clearly demarcated from each other. These separate subjects are then “collected” together. If the boundary is weak, then the various subjects are partially “integrated” into each other. This gives Bernstein two very basic kinds of curriculum structures based on a collection code working on strong classification that makes the boundaries explicit and visible, and an integrated code working on weak classification that makes the boundaries implicit. In table 2.1 that follows we symbolize strong classification with an unbroken line and weak classification with a broken line. With the distinction clear, it is possible to move onto the subsets of classification. The most basic classification line works between everyday knowledge and academic knowledge (interdiscursive variable, C1); then the line working between different subjects (interdisciplinary variable, C2); and finally the distinctions within a discipline (intra-disciplinary variable, C3). There is increasing specificity and focus from the broadest of distinctions between the everyday and the academic, into different forms of the academic, and finally to distinctions within each specific discipline of the academic. Each of these variables has strong or weak classification possibilities independent of each other.
We then do something very similar for framing. Framing focuses on how much control the teacher gives the learner within the transmission of a pedagogic message. Strong framing means that the teacher keeps control and direction of the lesson herself; weak framing means that the teacher structures the lesson in a way that allows the learners to take control. The lesson is then learner centered and weakly framed. Note that weakly framed does not mean deficiently framed, it means that the teacher has taken time to design a lesson that gives the learners space to explore their own options. Just as the I Ching does not see Yang as good and Yin as bad, it all depends on the context, so too with weak and strong classification and framing relationships—it depends on what is actually happening at the time, who is involved, with what knowledge form, and in what context.

There are various ways of dividing up the variables of framing. I work from key bits of research done by Morais and Neves (2001) and Hoadley (2005) and some insightful suggestions from Joe Muller. The most primary framing relation (F1) deals with the regulative relationship between teacher and learner and how they are positioned in relation to each other (what I call a control hierarchy but in Bernsteinian terms is called the hierarchical rule). Strong framing at this level means that the teacher is clearly in positional control; weak framing refers to a more personal kind of relationship between teacher and learner. Embedded within this are the distributive rules of framing (F2) that refer to who has control over the instructional practices of sequencing and pacing events in the lesson. Strong distributive framing refers to the teacher having explicit control over the sequencing and pacing of events in the lesson. If the teacher allows the learners room to sequence and pace the lesson, then it is weakly framed. Finally there is the key framing variable of evaluation (F3) that refers to the selection of what is to be done and the criteria for specifying whether this has been both understood and adequately answered. Strong framing at this level means explicit selection by the teacher and clear evaluation criteria; weak framing refers to learners having some control both over what is taught and how it is evaluated.

Classification deals first with the recognition of boundaries within knowledge structures; framing deals with its realization in practice. Hence I place classification at the bottom and framing at the top. This gives us a basic ideogram that works from classification up to framing, and from interdiscursive through to interdisciplinary and intradisciplinary, and then from hierarchical rules into discursive and evaluative rules.

To see how table 2.1 works, here are two of the most basic variations. The variables for classification are: (C1) interdiscursive; (C2) interdisciplinary; and (C3) intradisciplinary. The variables for framing are: (F1) hierarchical; (F2) distributive; and (F3) evaluative. To give two obvious
examples before moving on to the details, we can work with very strongly classified and framed pedagogies on the one hand, and very weakly classified and framed pedagogies on the other. The first would typify a strongly teacher centered, explicit curriculum where the subject was intensely focused on in a specialized manner. The second would typify a more learner-centered integrated kind of pedagogy. These would exemplify the two extremes of the pedagogic continuum.

In table 2.2 we have two examples of exceptionally strong or weak C\F relations. The first (1) is a collection code with visible, explicit pedagogy; the second (64) an integrated code with invisible, implicit pedagogy. But finer attention to the combinations produces 64 variations using this format. Table 2.3 shows what the possibilities are. The numbers are ordered such that 1 = the strongest possible version of C\F relationships; 64 = the weakest possible version of C\F relationships. How we order those in between is, of course, where the debate lies. On the vertical axis I place the eight variations possible in classification if one takes three variables and give them either a weak or strong value, and I do the same but on the horizontal axis for framing.

We can use the basic organizing pattern of the I Ching to begin to think through the variations. As I have mentioned, this is only a device to see the beginnings of variation. Anyone familiar with the I Ching will

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<th>Table 2.1 Basic Classification and Framing Variables</th>
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<td>Evaluation rule</td>
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<td>Hierarchical rule</td>
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<th>Table 2.2 Strong and Weak Classification and Framing Relations</th>
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<td>STRONG C\F WEAK C\F</td>
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know what a complex world it opens up from inside its own possibilities (and likewise with Bernstein). All I want to do here is point to the same possibility with an intrinsic language of curriculum studies. Here we have 64 intrinsic possibilities produced by how the pedagogic message is classified and framed. (Note that the IChing works with static and moving lines that produce movement from one configuration to another).

Currently a number of attempts are being made to unravel how these variations work in relation to issues of social justice and the reproduction of inequality. For example, which of the above intrinsic combinations of classification and framing work better for those who come from disadvantaged backgrounds? Obviously there are all sorts of possibilities that vary depending on the context, level, subject, age, etc. But there has been research done by Morais and Neves (2001) and Hoadley (2007) that points
to a couple of starter ideograms in terms of pedagogy for the poor, specifically in terms of early specialization within science or maths at primary school level. See, for example, figure 2.5.

In figure 2.5, three variables are strong: the interdiscursive relation between everyday knowledge and school knowledge; the interdisciplinary relation between subjects; and the evaluation rule. Three variables are weak: intradisciplinary classification, hierarchical framing rule, and the distributive rule. The first point to note, before I go into the reasons behind this ideogram being a preferred type of pedagogy for the poor, is that it is a mixed mode pedagogy that combines the variables in nonsimplistic and
flexible ways. There is no Manichean pedagogic universe here where strong classification and framing is necessarily bad and weak classification and framing necessarily good. Hybridity in the face of contextual and conceptual complexity is the key. The second point is that the reasons why this specific intrinsic combination of pedagogic variables is generated has to do with the way it intersects with extrinsic variables of social class, language code, forms of physical, emotional, and conceptual malnutrition. Of key importance in this specific instance is the semantic orientation of working-class pupils tending toward context specific, localized, communalized forms, and the intersection of this semantic orientation with the decontextualized, abstract, specializing semantic orientation of school discourses (Muller and Gamble 2007). In this case, which of the variables should be made weak or strong? Both Morais et al. (1999) in Portugal and Hoadley (2005; 2007) in South Africa have had similar results in terms of primary school children from disadvantaged backgrounds being introduced to vertical subjects such as maths and science. Muller and Gamble (2007) summarize the research well in the *International Encyclopedia of Education*. Strong framing for learners with a localized semantic orientation is vital in terms of evaluation (F3), both in terms of clarity over what is to be evaluated and what the criteria are for demonstrating success. This combines with strong classification between everyday knowledge and school knowledge (C1). Effectively what this points to are very clear lines in terms of both recognizing what is to be learned and realizing it in practice. But this combines with weak framing rules, both in terms of hierarchical control (F1) and how meaning is distributed (F2). The teacher allows the learners time to grapple with unfamiliar expectations and is flexible about the order in which it is done (F2) and he/she works with the learners in a personal way (F1). This combines effectively with weak classification within the subject (C3), as it allows for connectivity and meaning within a strongly bounded specializing focus that makes clear what the boundaries are between different types of specialization (C2). This is the most primitive of moves in terms of the intrinsic possibilities, but points to how the process begins to work its logic away from the extremes and into the nuances. At different times, with different learners, in different subjects, different combinations become useful, the skill is in being able to play the whole range. So a more horizontally structured subject at around a grade four level for middle-class children would produce a very different possible set, and so we could go on, running various variables through the options. This sits at the very heart of a case study approach that works with explicit intrinsic and extrinsic variables of curriculum studies to see how it ebbs and flows depending on what the case is. In my opinion this is where the heart of curriculum studies lies, and it also happens to be where specific
South African intellectuals in curriculum studies are pushing toward (Joe Muller and J. Gamble [2007], Pam Christie [2006], Paula Ensor [1999], Ursula Hoadley [2007], Zain Davis [2005], Jill Adler and Zane Davis [2006], Cheryl Reeves [2005] and Mignonne Breier [2003]).

It is partly here that PACS provides something more than a contextual nicety enabling other nationalities to return to their own worlds with a sense of difference. It makes the claim to break with its contextual circumstance and to be engaged in the process of building something beyond context, something that stands on the shoulders of giants and builds a positive, intrinsic discipline of curriculum studies in its own terms, one that unashamedly takes Basil Bernstein as the father to both revere and murder (and eat him, we will). This intrinsic project of curriculum studies is then intensely tied up to extrinsic issues of social class, gender, race, cultural identity, language, interior development, physical health, and well-being in a way that takes seriously both issues of social justice and the specificity of case. I have pointed to aspects of this throughout in my commentary. What I would like to do as a concluding move is to take one exemplary PACS publication, and show how the whole curriculum studies lattice takes a located shape and illuminates many of the moves described throughout this chapter. Effectively we are looking for projects that work carefully with both extrinsic and intrinsic dimensions of curriculum studies in a manner that has both an internal and external language of description as well as a focus on how the collective divisions of society have an impact both on individual voice and on cultural capital. Is such a creature possible? Curiously there are currently a number of studies in PACS that demonstrate precisely this facility. There is currently one book in PACS that holds major elements of the curriculum studies lattice together in a coherent and incisive whole: Joe Muller’s *Reclaiming Knowledge*. Then there are a number of PhD studies that also display this range: Paula Ensor (1999), Ursula Hoadley (2005), Zain Davis (2005), Cheryl Reeves (2005), Heather Jacklin (2004), Mignonne Breier (2003), to name the ones I am to some extent familiar with. It should be noted that PhDs in PACS provide the richest seam of quality work and that a survey of just this set would produce the most valuable of insights.

Ursula Hoadley’s PhD, Social Class, Pedagogy and the Specialization of Voice in Four South African Primary Schools, is an excellent example of taking a stand within social class divisions and the reproduction of inequality in South Africa, and systematically working through issues of language orientation and teacher specialization of voice and identity, all the while keeping at the forefront the critical investigation of the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning using intrinsic concepts directly hooked into the structuring of
curriculum and how it is learned. It is a long thesis, so I want to work metonymically with a telling episode from her research. Half way through the thesis she replicates a key experiment done by Holland (1981). It is a simple but telling experiment where 80 ten-year-olds were asked to group in ways of their choosing a whole variety (20) of foodstuffs presented in picture card form. The reasons for their choices were then coded according to whether they are context independent or dependent. Examples of context dependence were: “You cook these for one meal” (peas, rice, cabbage, butternut, chop); “I eat them in the morning” (butter, bread, egg); “I like them” (spaghetti, chop, bacon); “My granny eats them” (cabbage, onion, spaghetti, rice). Examples of context independence were: “They are both made from wheat” (bread, biscuits); “These all come from living creatures” (bacon, chop, chicken, boerewors); “They’re all starch” (rice, maize meal); “Dairy products” (cheese, milk, butter). There was a very strong correlation between underprivileged working-class children using context-dependent justification and middle-class children using context-independent justification. When middle-class children did use context-dependent reasoning they tended to vary their classifications across a wide range of contexts (the attributes of the food such as taste, texture, fattening, healthy; perceptual features such as color, shape, size; and everyday use) as well as using more generalized and abstract ordering devices. When the learners were asked to perform the same experiment a second time, the working-class learners kept to the same patterns, repeating context-dependent categorization that relied on everyday use. Middle-class learners, however, were able to shift their justificatory strategies, and they showed in their second ordering a shift away from context independence to increased variation in context-dependent reasoning. They were able to work both and play with the alternatives between.

A third sorting task was then given in which the researchers presented the learners with pre-set context-independent selections such as potatoes\ cabbage\ butternut\ onions and chop\ boerewors\ fish\ chicken\ and milk\ butter\cheese to see whether the learners could recognize the categories “vegetable,” “animal product,” “diary”—a kind of “guess what the teacher is thinking” game. The working-class learners still responded with context-dependent everyday use reasoning, providing justifications like “I eat them often” or “I like them,” even though the context demanded an attempt to guess the researcher’s categorizations. The middle-class learners were easily able to recognize the context-independent categorizations used by the researchers. They were able to recognize that the context of the question asked for context-independent judgments. A further disturbing feature was noted when a similar experiment was done in terms of numeracy with the same group of learners. Working-class learners tended to use
as an answer one of the numbers of the question already on the page and then look to the teacher/researcher for approval, referring either to the literal context in front of them or to an authority figure for support rather than what the field of mathematics itself demanded. They also drew whole pages of counters to work out addition and subtraction questions (see figure 2.6). Middle-class students tended to use highly formalized strategies that were homogenous (see figure 2.7).

Figure 2.6  Using Counters to Do Basic Maths

Figure 2.7  Formalized Strategies for Subtraction
These are just examples and currently it is difficult to make causal claims based on these exploratory studies, but I want to use them as an illustrative case for the lattice I have developed.

First we note a complex interplay of social class, language orientation, thinking styles, and levels within the experimental context. But the most notable feature is the weakness of working-class learners dealing with epistemological hierarchies (the abstract structure or specialization of the issue at hand) and their reliance on control hierarchies (a person in control), or their family/community context, or a highly concrete and literal set of working principles. If the subject does not provide the boundary lines between what is right and wrong (subject discipline), then the teacher has to, and if the teacher does not know what the epistemological hierarchy of the subject demands, then s/he will have nothing to fall back on but a control hierarchy, the everyday context, or rote learning. This makes for a very poor substitute when dealing with the increasing levels of complexity and abstraction as a learner moves up the grades of schooling. Positional authority might have all sorts of variations ranging from the most personal to impersonal forms, but it can never replace the epistemological demands of a subject, no matter how friendly or strict a teacher is or how much everyday engagement there is.

Put strongly, middle-class learners in Hoadley’s study showed an ability to work within epistemological hierarchies and all their variations, whereas working-class learners were bound to its lowest level, or use other, less suitable, hierarchical forms. Not only were middle-class learners able to shift up the experiment’s epistemological hierarchy (from concrete to abstract) but they were also able to shift down again into the particular. Furthermore they showed an ability to work across a certain level with variations. When working with context-bound classifications, they used attributes, perceptual qualities, and everyday use of food. Even within this level there is discrimination between what is closer to abstraction or concrete manifestation (attributes, then perceptual, then everyday use) Working-class learners continually responded with the same categorical imperative of everyday use, hardly even using attributes or perceptual similarities, flattening out their responses to variations within a highly limited range of what they had actually experienced.6

We see the same logic operating in the numeracy examples where the working-class learners did not have access to the hierarchical level necessary to perform the function and therefore had to rely on techniques relevant to a lower level, resulting in a proliferation of repetition rather than a simplification onto a higher level. Without access to the epistemological hierarchical functioning of a subject, learners are trapped within its lower levels, much like how Plato described his prisoners within the cave. Here
we can see how the demands of a curriculum are to spiral upwards, not just run a course.

A teacher able to operate with the epistemological hierarchies of her subject discipline will tend to find that middle-class learners both desire her epistemological moves more deeply and are able to follow her more adeptly into its higher reaches. A teacher can land up assuming that it just happens to be that the kids who most love her subject are the brightest and best, not those whose mothers worked their little darlings into epistemological hierarchies from the moment of painting the nursery room. Hierarchical facility is intimately tied up in relationships of love, care, competition, and the reproduction of inequality. Currently, within the reform process of South African education the danger we face is undermining the importance of epistemological hierarchies in their own terms because they are so intimately implicated in the reproduction of inequality. To accept the everyday reasoning of working-class learners working with food stuffs as equally valid to middle-class learners playing with epistemological hierarchies because these derive from social class positioning is to replace intensional hierarchies with extensional equivalents, and this again is educational suicide, for knowledge within education is mostly internally structured in an intensional hierarchical manner, and this has to do with the way education functions as knowledge. Context and concept are two very differing ordering procedures. There are reasons internal to the manner in which working-class learners work with the hierarchical matrix that makes their responses less worthwhile in terms of how knowledge works. It is not because they somehow fail to recognize the demands of the test situation, and think the experiment demands a contextual knowledge of them; it is that both their family background and dysfunctional schooling have failed to provide them with the beginnings of how school knowledge works. Nor is the school knowledge arbitrarily structured in a vertical manner—this is its key feature, it is why learners work in grades where they either pass or fail. In no way does this deny the rich variety of everyday life happening within and outside of school, or the enormous multiplicity of demands—emotional, social, cultural, fashionable; it only locates what is of most import to organized knowledge. We all work in a personalized contextual world and schools are replete with contextually bound usage of meaning. This is an obvious and necessary consequence of being located in a functioning context over time: meanings become assumed. But there is more to schooling than becoming human; there is a continual accessing of a more formal lexicon of concepts that constrain upward movement into specific directions. It is not context-bound usage of meaning that is at fault in its own terms; this is often what makes life worth living, but the paucity of artificially learned concepts, and here, Hoadley shows, working-class environments do not seem to provide as
Figure 2.8 Elementary Building Blocks for Curriculum Studies in Post-Apartheid South Africa
carefully for them. Middle-class learners do have more elaborated and generalized ways of working with knowledge and this is discriminatory, not because they unfairly impose their way of functioning onto school knowledge structures, but because they have been inducted into how knowledge structures work in the most artificial and most intensional of ways. They have more freedom in terms of how knowledge works. This does not mean that they have more emotional freedom, contextual freedom, or any other freedom, although they might (as the emotions are made explicit), but it does mean that they have access to the freedom that counts at school, epistemological freedom.

The issue Hoadley then directly takes on is, given this orientation to meaning from working-class learners, what kinds of pedagogic interventions can we make. It is here that she makes a contribution substantially in line with the discussion of preferred forms of pedagogy for working-class learners, showing how weak framing of the distributive and hierarchical rule along with strong framing of evaluation and strong classification between everyday and school knowledge assists in both making visible what it is learners are expected to do along with opening up time and space for them to engage properly. So here we see a lucid attempt to hold together a complex set of lines in one whole. An intense understanding of how curriculum studies is steeped within hierarchical logics, worked from a strong base in the reproduction of inequality along social class lines, but then exploring how this manifests in forms of cultural capital, orientation to meaning, and specialization of voice in both teacher and learner. Furthermore there is an intelligible development of an internal language of description using the theoretical corpus of Bernstein, a language that specifically hones in on curriculum and pedagogy, but this is then worked outwards into an external language of description that tackles the empirical data in a rigorous manner.

It is with this demonstration of excellent research in PACS that I end this chapter, leaving a final figure (figure 2.8) that captures the elementary building blocks of what I take to be the basic elements needed for curriculum studies in South Africa in particular and for curriculum studies as a discipline in its own right.

Notes

1. The first use of curriculum is found in the work of Peter Ramus and it precisely points to this hierarchical dimension, providing a map of knowledge that works taxonomically from the general to the particular. A far earlier and more systematic kind of diagram can be found in the tree of Porphyry. The point I am going
to make fairly continuously is that CS has to work through hierarchy to get beyond it and that in South Africa this process is only beginning. Hierarchy provides CS with its fundamental structure, not its significant structure. Hierarchy is crude, oversimplified, rigid but it provides a simple form from which the rest of CS spills from in ever greater variety and critique. There is a reason why Franklin Bobbit, Ralph Tyler, and Benjamin Bloom worked hierarchically within CS: it was its most obvious basic form. Now that we have moved beyond them does not mean we should forget first steps, or if we have not taken them already, expect to not have to. To put it personally. I am not overly enamored with hierarchy, I far prefer the exotics, but in South Africa my diagnosis is that the curriculum field has excluded hierarchy as an basic operating principle to its own severe cost.

2. The variations of hierarchical types and their intersections with all sorts of other types are not dealt with here. For example, extensional hierarchies work in a topological manner, and this is different to a mereological manner that works with wholes and their parts. Sowa's Knowledge Representation (2000) gives a good first take on the complexities involved here.

3. A key distinction in terms of the division of labor in South Africa and its impact on PACS has been Durkheim's distinction between mechanical and organic forms of solidarity. A mechanical form of solidarity is identified by little specialization, strong cooperation, and powerful obligatory customs emphasizing traditional values with the status of the individual determined by kinship. Resemblance is the key logic. Organic solidarity has a more complex division of labor where individuals specialize and then depend on other specialists to perform roles they cannot. This creates interdependent ties based on individual occupations with a corresponding emphasis on individual legal rights and freedoms. Difference is the key logic. It was Bernstein who tried to use this key distinction in terms of school and curriculum structure, initially making the mistake of correlating mechanical solidarity with an explicitly organized curriculum with clear subject boundaries and organic solidarity with an integrated kind of curriculum. The mistake is that precisely an explicitly organized curriculum around subject specialisms results in specialization and therefore also promotes organic solidarity. In no way is an integrated, open kind of curriculum the most suitable structure for a society organized along organic forms of solidarity, both society and schools are far more complex than this. Explicitly organized curricula can work both within a premodern and modern world; same applies for the often implicit apprenticing model. Just as there is a danger that cognitive neuroscience is crudely mapped onto CS using a mimetic model, so there is a danger that curriculum structures are read off from supposed homologies to social forms.

4. I have been liberal in my definition of evaluation over here and combined the external selection of knowledge in terms of what is to be studied in the intended curriculum along with criteria for producing an adequate response. Both are important for strong framing in terms of evaluation.

5. “What matters here is to understand the time and not to try to cover up poverty with empty pretense. If a time of scanty resources brings out an inner truth, one must not feel ashamed of simplicity. For simplicity is then the very thing
needed to provide inner strength for further undertakings. Indeed, there need be no concern if the outward beauty of the civilization, even the elaboration of religious forms, should have to suffer because of simplicity. One must draw on the strength of the inner attitude to compensate for what is lacking in externals; then the power of the content makes up for the simplicity of form” (http://deoxy.org/iching).

6. A technical point of some importance here. Bernstein and Holland argued that the reason why this experiment was so telling is that it indicated working-class learners did not have the recognition rules about the context of the experiment and this resulted in them providing responses different to what middle-class kids provided (who were clear about what the experiment demanded). I think this misses the point and sidesteps a horrible issue. Even if the working-class learners were provided with clear recognition rules for what the classification task was asking for, I think they would still have struggled to realize its demands in practice, as it is not their ability to recognize the context but their weakness in dealing with the concept that is at issue. A similar issue presents itself in South Africa where we do not square up to the stunting of mental development caused by poverty and want to hold onto some kind of miraculous equality between different contexts. Specific contexts directly damage and impair learners’ abilities to work conceptually. It is not about a lack of resonance between two different cultural set ups (like working-class culture and school culture) but about the impoverishment of mind and body within specific contextual backgrounds. In giving an account of this experiment I have focused not on mistakes of recognition but on the weakness of conceptual development.

References


Chapter 3

From Response to Theorizing: Curriculum Genesis in South Africa from the Perspective of Critical Incidence Autoethnography

Labby Ramrathan

Introduction

We are currently in a curriculum craze in South Africa. Almost every sector of our society is demanding educational intervention. Since 1994, there has been a proliferation of new policies and changes to the education system that have had a major impact on the teaching context and schools. Statements of social justice, equity, redress, human rights, healthy environment, and quality are found in the introduction and background of almost all policy documents, gazettes, and regulations within education. How are these issues realized and what effect does this have on schooling and teaching within a South African school?

Individual studies have been done on many of the aspects that constitute the teaching context, each with its sets of biases and claims. The impact of HIV/AIDS on schools and the demands on teachers and schools have been well documented (Coombe 2000; Badcock-Walters 2001; Ramrathan 2002). In addition, analysis on social issues among primary school learners and schooling highlight the issues of gender (Bhana 2002; 2003). With the introduction of curriculum C2005 and
now the National Curriculum Statement (NCS) and the new Further Education and Training (FET) curriculum, the impact of curriculum change within schools has been fairly well researched (Jansen 1998). Similarly, policy studies have focused on impact, perceptions, and evaluations of school policies on school management and teaching (Gounden 2003; Nkosi 2004).

Compounding these demands are drivers from the social, political, cultural, health, and economic terrain influencing curriculum changes in education in South Africa. Each of these research areas and contextual drivers claims a space for curriculum intervention to manage the changes that are taking place in our society. Is curriculum the vehicle responding to these post-Apartheid demands and drivers? How are we thinking about curriculum intellectually within South Africa?

Two theoretical constructs explain how we are conceptualizing curriculum intellectualization within South Africa. The first construct is response: we respond to demands and drivers that influence curriculum reconceptualization and innovation as we strategically focus our endeavors toward achieving the spirits of our constitution. The second construct is serendipity, that is, the opportune moments in our history that redirect our focus on curriculum intellectualization. These constructs will be argued for through an autoethnographic gaze of my preoccupation with curriculum since my employment at a faculty of education in a higher education institution in South Africa. Through this gaze, I introduce the theoretical concept of curriculum force field¹ to explain why curriculum intellectualization is limited within South Africa.

An Autoethnographic Account

I started work within an academic institution (the former University of Durban-Westville) as a junior laboratory assistant in a science education laboratory in the faculty of education in 1982. Having completed my BSc degree part time, I enrolled for a teacher’s diploma (higher education diploma) through correspondence study. While I was studying, my job description changed to that of faculty administrator within the faculty of education. In addition to administrative responsibilities, I had engaged myself in teaching computer to final year teacher education students. My interest in computers began when the lecturer responsible for introducing computers within the teacher education program resigned. Also, computer literacy had been introduced recently in higher education and I was attracted by the newness and potential that computers presented to
teachers. I learned through my own interest how to operate and teach computer and this was recognized within the faculty that I worked for. My involvement in administrative issues within the faculty ranged from financial administration to student selection and registration. On completion of my honors study in education, new responsibilities were given to me. I took on responsibilities associated with teaching practice. The engagement with teaching practice started off with administrative responsibilities. Three things contributed to my involvement in teaching practice: (1) my knowledge of computers and the use of a computer database, an innovation in administratively managing students’ school placements—the technological advancement in teaching practice management changed the way the faculty of education managed its school placement and school-based supervision; (2) obtaining a higher qualification, which gave me credibility to take on what was regarded as an academic responsibility; and (3) my personal interest to expand my involvement within the faculty of education and venture into something new.

At this stage of my working career, I became the first nonacademic staff to be elected as the faculty board secretary, taking on greater responsibility for decision making on all aspects within the faculty of education. Later, I took on full responsibility for organizing and managing teaching practice (TP). This included liaising with schools, placing students in schools for teaching practice, developing assessment protocols, doing post–teaching practice surveys, and carrying out other administrative needs for teaching practice. In 1987, I completed my master’s degree in teacher education and was subsequently employed as a lecturer and teacher education coordinator within the faculty of education. After that I progressed to senior lecturer, Chair of Initial Teacher Education sector of the School of Educational Studies and later, Head of the School of Education Studies.

My interest in my present intellectual preoccupation (which is teacher education) and research that I describe as topical started with my involvement with computers in education (in the late 1980s and 1990s). I began to explore how computers would assist teachers in their work, both as a teaching tool and in their administration of their responsibilities. In South Africa there is a policy intention to make all schools e-learning compliant by 2014. This suggests that there is strong support for the potential of computers to assist teachers and learners in their work. However, the reality of making this possible is very slim—there are contextual, resource, and skills issues that need to be in place before this can have any level of success. There seems to be an excessive enthusiasm about the potential that computers can offer, but this kind of technological aid to teaching and learning presupposes a teaching methodology that supports the use of computers in teaching and learning.
My interest in computers was pursued into my honors study in education in which I conducted my first formal research activity. Within the honors program we were required to do a research report. My research focus combined my interest in computers, my disciplinary base (i.e., mathematics), and my curriculum interest in teacher education. Hence, I explored through action research how computers could be used in the teaching of aspects of mathematics within the school curriculum. I developed a program in BASIC language to explore how a straight line emerges from the graph of \( y = mx + c \) and what happens to a straight-line graph when the variables are changed. Computers in education were at that time a topical issue within teacher education, which included computer-based learning.

My second formal research in teacher education curriculum through my masters study in teacher education stemmed from my engagement with teaching practice. The results of the teaching practice course surveys raised a number of issues about the curriculum that we offered. For example, our students, while on teaching practice, were expected to teach subjects they were not specialized in. Hence, my research focus in my masters study was on tracing recent graduates of our teacher education program. This research interest was also shaped by the national agendas within South Africa. In 1993, a Committee on Teacher Education Policy (COTEP) was formed to inform the new minister of education on issues of teacher education in the post-1994 democratic South Africa. The work of COTEP included three broad aims. These were (1) to do a situation analysis of teacher education in the country (the outcome of this aim was the publication of the National Teacher Education Audit [Department of Education 1995b]); (2) to do a review of teacher education curriculum offered across the teacher education institutions within South Africa (the outcome of this aim was the development of a teacher education curriculum framework—initially referred to as the COTEP document and later gazetted [in 2000] as the Norms and Standards for Educators [Department of Education 2000]); and (3) to determine where teacher education should be located (the outcome of this was the declaration that teacher education is a higher education competence and as such should be a national provision rather than a provincial provision). COTEP’s National Teacher Education Audit indicated a general oversupply of teachers with shortages in specific subject areas. As a result of this audit, several things happened within South Africa. A moratorium on employment of newly qualified teachers was put in place to address the oversupply issue. In addition, a rationalization and redeployment policy was introduced to address shortages of fully qualified teachers in specific subject areas. Hence, teaching became an unfavorable career option and interest in teacher education diminished substantially,
forcing higher education institutions to review their offerings, and to
downsize or close down Faculties and Departments of Education.

In the late 1990s, higher education institutions had to recurriculate
their offerings to meet two national requirements: (1) modularization (i.e.,
year-long courses had to be packaged into smaller learning units that were
coherent, portable, and transferable); (2) revamping of the syllabi (i.e., the
teaching programs offered must correspond to the employment opportuni-
ties). Hence they were designed according to the 12 learning fields identi-
fied through the South African Qualifications Authority (SAQA).

My masters tracer study explored what happened to newly qualified
teachers and, if they found jobs as teachers, what they taught. The results
of this study influenced my engagement in developing a curriculum for
teacher education that was responsive to theoretical developments in
teacher education as well as national priorities and national context. A
new, innovative curriculum in teacher education was introduced at the
University of Durban-Westville. This program was unique and largely
resembles the new National Teacher Education Framework (Department
of Education 2007) within South Africa.

My preoccupation with curriculum design emerged through my
involvement in several activities. These include my engagement with
administrative matters as a faculty administrator, in teaching practice, in
my postgraduate studies in education, at the institutional level in terms of
curriculum reconceptualization and institutional responsiveness to national
agendas (see below), and at the national level through the Deans and Heads
of Education units within higher education institutions in South Africa
(see below). Curriculum design was, therefore, a response to a range of
drivers and initiatives, some from national agendas, some from individu-
als, and some from institutions.

Higher education institutions within South Africa were required to
transform their curriculum offerings from a year-long course structure to
modular offerings, responding (presumably) to national imperatives of
portability, pace, and recognition of prior learning. In addition, higher
education institutions had to register their offerings within a newly devel-
oped National Qualification Framework (NQF), acquire approval from
the Department of Education for funding in terms of program qualifica-
tion mix, and obtain accreditation from the Council for Higher Education
to offer registered and approved qualifications. All of these national imper-
atives required higher education institutions to fundamentally transform
their offerings. I was elected as one of four faculty staff to drive this curric-
ulum transformation process within the faculty of education.

As Chair of the Initial Teacher Education sector of the School of
Educational Studies, I introduced two new programs for teacher
professional development. This was in response to a national agenda of upgrading un- and underqualified practicing teachers, reskilling practicing teachers to engage with new subjects, teach within the new outcomes-based education framework, and update their knowledge.

My engagement as Head of School of Education Studies allowed me to participate at the national level, where common agendas such as introducing HIV/AIDS education within teacher education programs became a national interest and priority.

Finally, my research interest in teacher education curriculum as well as in other areas of teacher education was influenced by my involvement in an international study, coordinated by Sussex University, researching teacher education within five different contexts: South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Malawi, Botswana, and Lesotho. Through this research project, I located my doctoral study on teacher supply and demand within the context of HIV/AIDS. HIV/AIDS came to the fore sharply within South Africa in 2000. My interest in HIV/AIDS in education was influenced by the international research project, by my doctoral study, and by the general interest that HIV/AIDS research generated within South Africa.

The topical nature of my research interest stems from two sources. One is that generated through my research activities, which responded to topical issues impacting teacher education. The other is derived from my vast research supervision of postgraduate students in education.

The above description of the genesis of my present preoccupation and research agenda integrates my individuality, my career life history, and the sociopolitical context of teacher education and higher education within South Africa driven by responses to varying imperatives of transformation, democracy, and globalization.

A Critical Incident of My Autoethnography

The National Teacher Education Audit (Department of Education 1995b) was the point of serendipity within South Africa that changed the face of curriculum intellectualization, especially in education. Prior to the audit, South Africa was producing approximately 26,000 new teachers annually. As intellectuals in education, we were focused on producing teachers within an instrumentalist ideology. Models borrowed from other (world) contexts were used to develop newly qualified teachers. Academics in education largely focused on implementing this model without reflecting on its appropriateness for our context or needs. The declaration by the audit that our country was overproducing teachers was a turning point. The
implications of the audit were a severe reduction in the production of newly qualified teachers. This reduction meant that Faculties of Education had to close their initial teacher education programs or refocus their offerings to academic study in education for their financial survival. Many institutions of higher education chose the latter. This response led to the country producing a larger pool of intellectuals who, through research, began shaping how we conceptualize education within South Africa.

What follows is my account of how this serendipitous event influenced my curriculum intellectualization.

Introducing the 3 + 1 Model of Teacher Development

Within an environment of rapidly changing policies and practices after the end of the Apartheid regime, the faculty of education at the then University of Durban-Westville made a strategic decision to create a post of Teacher Education Coordinator to coherently manage this transition period. In the late 1990s, appointed to this newly created post, one of my tasks was to respond to the changing context and demands for the provision of quality initial teacher education. Later, as the Head of the Academic Department of Education, I had to respond to a different set of imperatives shaping teacher education. The changing context since the late 1990s presented themselves at two levels: institutional and national.

Institutionally, I had to respond to

1. the process of “recurricularizing” our offerings within a modular framework. Responding to issues such as access, pace, transferability, portability, and throughput, the university took a decision to change from a British cohort system to a modular system of accreditation. This meant that Faculties had to reconceptualize their degree structure and develop modules within an outcomes-based framework.

2. the review of teaching practice, as one of the key functions of the teacher education coordinator’s post, in terms of quality, effectiveness, and efficiency.

3. the merging of institutions within the relandscaping of higher education process.

Nationally, institutions had to respond to

1. rationalization and relandscaping of higher education institutions within the higher education sector. For example, changes in higher education funding meant that universities had to restructure their
offerings as programs directed at satisfying national needs. This meant that in order to attract state funding, institutions had to develop programs that were goal directed, coherent, market driven, and viable, and that they should be responsive to the transformational goals of the higher education sector. The relandscaping of higher education meant that reconfigured higher education institutions had to develop new mission and vision statements to focus their purposes and to redress Apartheid’s inequities.

2. rationalization and redeployment of teachers nationally in the late 1990s. This created a negative image of teaching as a career through media publicity. Added to this was the notion of teacher oversupply as declared by the National Teacher Education Audit (Hofmeyer and Hall 1995); high unemployment of teachers; and diminished admission to teaching degrees/diplomas. This period was followed by one of teacher undersupply (Crouch 2001; Ramrathan 2002; Crouch and Perry 2003), teacher demand analysis within the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Coombe 2000; Crouch 2001; Badcock-Walters 2001; Ramrathan 2002; HSRC 2005), and curriculum transformation with the introduction of national curriculum statements and reconfiguration of the schooling system.

3. changing policy frameworks for regulating teacher education within South Africa, including the registration of qualifications on the NQF, accreditation of programs and institutions by the Council for Higher Education, and the Department of Education’s approval of qualification for funding through the program qualification mix process.

It is widely recognized that South African education during the Apartheid era was deeply fragmented, cost-inefficient, and unlikely to meet the demands of a transforming society (Reddy 1995; Norris 1996). Transforming education whilst increasing access to higher education has, in most developing countries, not been supported by a commensurate increase in funding provisions (Kitaev 1992). Within the South African context, with increasing demand for postsecondary education and no commensurate increase in funding, transforming the higher education system to meet the national needs as well as competing globally (Department of Education 1997) meant that institutions were required to restructure their curriculum within a quality-driven, cost-effective domain.

Instrumental in the process of program review and reconceptualization within the faculty of education, and responding to macrotransitional goals and national norms, the launch of an innovative degree in initial teacher education, the Bachelor of General Education and Training (BAGET),
later renamed the Bachelor of Education (undergraduate), at UDW, I believe, has captured the essence of educational transformation.

From an Applied Science Model to a Professional Model of Teacher Development: The Bachelor of Paedagogy (BPaed) degree at the former University of Durban-Westville was a four-year initial teaching degree and had four qualifiers:

1. BPaed (Arts)—qualifies teachers for the secondary school system teaching general subjects, for example, English, history, geography.
2. BPaed (Commerce)—qualifies teachers for the secondary school system teaching commercial subjects, for example, accounting, economics, business economics.
3. BPaed (Science)—qualifies teachers for the secondary school system teaching science subjects, for example, general science, mathematics, biology.
4. BPaed (Primary Education)—qualifies teachers for the primary school system.

In each of these degree programs, the first three years were devoted to acquisition of subject content, while the final year of study was focused on developing teaching methodology and teaching practice. Teaching practice at a school was limited to a period of six weeks, usually in the third term of the final year of study. A so-called campus-based teaching practice was also offered in the final year of study, and its focus was on preparation for the school-based session. Media Education, Computer Literacy, and Professional Studies formed the campus-based teaching practice.

For school-based teaching practice, students were placed at schools near their usual place of residence. Students who boarded on and around campus were transported to their placement schools by hired minibuses. While there were sufficient schools near the campus, the students’ subject specialization (e.g., Zulu) required that they be transported to township school (schools that are located within a Black African residential settlement). Students usually chose their own schools for the teaching practice. During the school-based teaching practice session students were supervised by staff of the faculty. Subject specialist supervision was done at secondary school, usually by the subject method lecturers. Part-time staff were employed to assist the full-time staff in the subject specialist supervision of students. Some subject specialist supervision was done at the primary schools, where
otherwise general supervision was conducted by “caretaker” supervisors (lecturing staff).

A Critique

The model of teaching development offered at this institution suggests an applied science model of teacher development, where the students apply the knowledge learned on campus in an authentic school classroom environment. It assumes that the teacher is prepared for all eventualities and that learning is linear. Furthermore, the notion of supervision presupposes that the supervisor is an expert and that the students have the necessary academic background to teach. The role, therefore, of the supervisor is to oversee the implementation of the knowledge gained.

Ideally, according to this model of teacher development, students should, at the point of going on their teaching practice, have

- an extensive professional knowledge of their subject specializations;
- an extensive foundational knowledge in the discipline of education;
- pedagogical knowledge of teaching their subject discipline.
- teaching practice, within this model, is a period within which the students will demonstrate their acquired knowledge in an authentic environment.

However, students’ responses to their experience of school-based teaching practice in 1998, as gleaned from an evaluation completed on return to campus, ranged from being unprepared for the classroom and school situation, to insufficient guidance from method courses, conflicting requirements from different supervisors, and enhanced experience of teaching and learning. Many of them indicated that they had gained more knowledge from the six weeks of teaching practice than from their entire experience on campus. A common suggestion of increasing the length of school-based teaching practice was noted from the questionnaires.

These evaluations raised two key questions: Were universities preparing students for the realities of teaching in a school? Were schools supporting learning during school-based teacher development to enable students to take on the role of a teacher in school?

In addition to the evaluation reports received from students and school principals, the reconceptualization of the BPaed was influenced by a tracer study of education graduates focusing on the employment patterns of newly qualified teachers, which revealed, for example, that newly qualified teachers who managed to find jobs as teachers were largely employed to teach subjects they were not qualified to teach (Ramrathan 1997).
Rationale for Curriculum Transformation

Changing teacher education policies instituted before and after the change of government in 1994 required faculties of education to reconfigure their preservice education programs. The key policy changes can be summarized as follows:

- the extension of the professional practice experience toward a uniform one-year residence within school (developed within the framework of licensing a newly qualified teacher);
- refocusing from the dominant emphasis on foundational education (abstract) to a balance among academic, professional, and occupational competencies;
- broadening of the teacher education program to include the training of educators for a range of learning sites (e.g., schools, workplaces, the community, early childhood centers);
- the shift away from discrete subject disciplines to learning areas;
- the shift toward a general education and training phase rather than the traditional primary/secondary school phase.

The aims of teacher education policy include the following:

- to view teacher development as part of national human resources development and not simply as the preparation of teachers;
- to view teacher education as a development of professional competencies, including knowledge, skills, and values regarding teaching and learning;
- to emphasize education rather than just qualifications;
- to shift from examination-driven programs to an integrated assessment system in which qualifications are linked to particular occupations.

In addition to policy changes, the changing labor market for graduating teachers contributed to the conceptualization of BAGET, as follows:

- Graduating teachers are no longer guaranteed a job in schools; in fact, experienced teachers are being laid off or “voluntarily severed” from the profession (Singh 1998; Ramrathan 1997).
- Graduating teachers are not necessarily employed within their training specializations, bringing into question the need for such specialized training (e.g., in mathematics or science education) in universities (Ramrathan 1997).
Graduating teachers fortunate enough to find formal employment tend to find work within the nonschooling sector (e.g., educational broadcasting) or outside of the education field altogether (e.g., public relations).

Because of the country’s level of unemployment, graduating first-degree teachers tend to continue their education through postgraduate qualifications (e.g., the growing BEd [honors] community).

Graduating teachers are narrowly skilled for a single-profession market (teaching), which limits their employability elsewhere.

Graduating university teachers are insufficiently trained in professional practice (their teaching practice is simply too short), a factor that further limits their employability within schools, given the large numbers of qualified and experienced teachers flooding the market.

Graduating teachers are increasingly snapped up by overseas employment agencies (e.g., in the United Kingdom), raising critical questions about state investment (via the subsidy) in a profession in which graduates leave for first world countries.

The BAGET Model of Teacher Development

In terms of what an education degree should develop conceptually, five areas were identified from an analysis of the data from the tracer study (Ramrathan 1997) and evaluation reports and a review of the literature in this area. From this analysis, the following components of a professional teacher education qualification emerged:

- theoretical study of education as a discipline;
- study of teaching as a profession, education as a system, and who we are as teachers within the education system;
- personal functional literacy development;
- teaching specialization;
- teaching practice.

Using these components as a basis on which to construct the curriculum, some guidelines have been developed:

- The degree will be constructed in a modular structure.
- The final year of study will be in an authentic school environment, using an itinerant lecturer-supervision model of engagement in the internship. This model envisages that a group of five or so students
will be placed in a partnership (professional development) school and attached to specifically identified mentor teachers. University staff will work in the school, conducting lectures and seminars with students and mentor teachers, so that students are exposed to theory on site. For example, curriculum theory will be taught (by university staff) at the school within a theory-practice dialectic. Students and mentor teachers will also present weekly seminars to their fellow students, other mentor teachers, and university staff on their teaching experience during the week. The seminars will be used as a platform for reflection on planning and teaching; engagement with theory in the context of the school, classroom, and pupils; and professional development of students, mentor teachers, and university lecturers.

The university-school partnership will be based on a principle of reciprocity in professional development and will not involve any financial reward. It is envisaged that mentor teachers will be recruited into the university’s higher education programs and will accumulate credits toward these programs. Schools will have access to the resources (human and physical) of the faculty for support and development. The selection of schools for this partnership will be based on mutual acceptance and on their having the necessary infrastructure to support learning. It is also envisaged that students will receive a stipend or government bursary for their year’s service in schools (although this is yet to be negotiated with relevant stakeholders). The main points follow:

○ Teaching practice will also be offered over the duration of a school term in the second and third years of study to facilitate the theory-practice dialectic.

○ We should be responsive to the demand analysis for teachers—in this respect, the qualification’s offerings are focused on the general education and training phase, with math, science, and language as core teaching specializations, while offering exposure to other learning area modules.

○ In responding to the low demand for teachers and the fact that teachers indicated, in the tracer study, their intention to resign from teaching but their inability to do so because they were not educated or skilled for other employment sectors, the new program should allow students to take modules of their choice leading to an alternative career part.

BAGET was developed using this conceptual model and these principles.
BAGET Curriculum

BAGET is an expression of a fundamental shift in thinking on teacher education. It is a radical combination of training to become a generic educator and generic workplace education, including computer skills, specialization in mathematics and science education, integration of teaching and learning within an itinerant lecturer-supervision model, and a flexible qualification that allows for alternate career paths. The following principles formed the framework of the degree structure:

- The curriculum will include at least one-and-a-half years of internship at appropriate sites of learning to facilitate the theory-practice dialectic.
- The curriculum will prepare a generic professional educator but allow flexibility for alternate career paths and nonschool education-related vocations.
- The professional curriculum will be based on program themes (e.g., teaching and learning; identity and diversity) rather than traditional fields (e.g., sociology of education) in order to promote interdisciplinarity and a cooperative teaching ethos.
- The curriculum will integrate “academic development” into all four years of the degree, rather than treating it as a separate entity.

Critical Outcomes of BAGET

Students graduating from the faculty of education’s BAGET degree course must be able to demonstrate that

- they have developed into critical and reflective practitioners who understand their role in transforming educational practice;
- they have acquired subject matter expertise, that is, at the very least, a basic competence in one or more subject matter areas;
- they have developed a sound base of pedagogical expertise, that is, an applied competence in the areas of teaching, learning, curriculum, assessment, and management;
- they have developed into competent and caring educators who can promote positive and empowering learning environments for students from diverse backgrounds (race, gender, culture, language, special needs, etc.);
- they have acquired generic workplace competence (including computer literacy, communication skills, personal confidence, and
occupational flexibility) that would enable them to enter and participate in a variety of workplace environments.

The reflections of school principals during supervision and the responses of students during and after their one-year internship suggest that this is a preferred model of teacher development. The indication is that the learners have matured throughout the year and are able to take on a teacher’s responsibilities without the need for an induction year. Students feel themselves part of the school culture and are able to understand the profession and see themselves working within that system. The itinerant-lecture supervision model allows students to develop their teaching competence within the school context and hence promotes context-based teaching while linking the teaching of school subjects to broader theoretical engagements. The theory-practice dialogue is at the heart of this itinerant lecture-supervision model.

Reflecting this professional model of teacher development, the BAGET program provides a conception of teacher development that progresses from personal and foundational development (year 1), to developing competence in planning for teaching the student’s specialization (year 2), to developing competence in teaching that specialization (year 3), to developing the competence to be a teacher within the South African school system (year 4). It integrates experiential learning and theoretical advances in teaching and learning as a professional.

Through this account of curriculum innovation, I have demonstrated how curriculum intellectualization in South Africa was initiated in response to certain imperatives and drivers and how it was supported through intellectual capital derived from a change in focus from instrumentalist to intellectual as a result of promoting academic studies in education.

Conclusion

The academic field of curriculum studies in South Africa is shaped largely by contextual issues of transformation, redress, rationalization, and an outcomes-based approach to curriculum change and societal change. I would call this the force-field approach to curriculum design, in which, given that curriculum is a highly contested terrain, curriculum transformation within South Africa is at the intersection of a multitude of forces that are driving and shaping it. For example, with the introduction of a new democratic political order, outcomes-based education was introduced into school education as a transformative curriculum, despite the
knowledge that the school system and the teaching force were not ready to implement this paradigm shift. The higher education curriculum was shaped by issues of political transformation, rationalization, and economic forces. Hence, a modular approach to curriculum change was introduced into higher education programs. Portability, transferability, generic and specific competence, cross-field competence, and relevance to the job market were the driving forces behind curriculum change within higher education. The labor market became integral in shaping curriculum change in South Africa. The NQF is the result of the organized education and labor movement within South Africa, and hence the underlying principles of the NQF are shaped by both education and labor. Thus, the 12 fields of education span the labor fields within the country. Recognition of prior learning, experiential learning, and skills development are central to the NQF.

Social and health issues are shaping all fields of curriculum innovation. HIV/AIDS is a major issue in South Africa. Education about the prevention and management of the disease and medical studies about HIV/AIDS span school education, higher education, and the labor sector. This has curriculum implications in terms of developing programs of education and action in an attempt to reduce transmission and to support individuals and systems affected by the disease.

This chapter has provided a brief analysis of curriculum change within school education, higher education, and labor. The field of curriculum studies spans all three of these domains of curriculum change. School education curriculum studies are being shaped by contextual and theoretical issues relating to outcomes-based education. Higher education curriculum studies are being shaped by issues of relevance, knowledge production, and transformation (e.g., the context of merging higher education institutions, responsiveness to higher education access, and academic support). Cross-cutting curriculum studies across education and labor are being shaped by issues of literacy, competence, and recognition of prior and experiential learning. The health of our nation and our social development cut across all spheres of education and training.

Notes

1. The force-field model of teacher development was proposed by Michael A. Samuel (1999. This concept is borrowed from Samuel and adapted within the context of a curriculum discourse in South Africa.

2. The academic development program at the university assists students who may not have had the necessary schooling in the subject discipline and students who are not coping with the course content because of language barriers, poor prior
exposure, or denied exposure. The principle of academic development was meant to increase access to higher education for the disadvantaged communities.

References


Chapter 4

Tribes and Territory: Contestation around Curriculum in South Africa

Ursula Hoadley

Introduction

The field of curriculum studies in South Africa is characterized by fragmentation, diversity of method, theory and approach, and the seeming intransigence of certain divisions within the field. Though this phenomenon is not peculiar to South Africa, there appear to be certain dynamics that are mediated by our particular history. And there are others that are about how curriculum and knowledge are understood. In this chapter I attempt to give an account of these divergences. The account that I give is, however, partial and does not represent a comprehensive view of the field of curriculum studies in South Africa. Rather, I am interested in divisions that appear to emerge along institutional lines. In the formerly racialized system of Apartheid education, universities were created for White, Black, Colored, and Indian racially defined groups. White universities were divided into two: those for Afrikaners and those for English speakers. In many ways, these historical divides defined the nature of the scholarship and teaching in different institutions.

Currently, although the majority of teacher training takes place in the former Afrikaans universities and to some extent in the former Black universities, most of the critique around curriculum and pedagogy appears to emerge from the former White English universities. The question thus posed for this chapter is the following: what is the nature of critical
curriculum work emerging in the former “liberal” White universities, and what is going on in institutions where most of the teacher education is taking place? What do these institutions, the former Afrikaans and Black universities, think about curriculum and what is the nature of their scholarly work? The focus is on how different ways of considering curriculum in the past play out in the present time.

Table 4.1 shows the distribution of students across universities. The majority of teacher training is taking place in the former Afrikaans and Black universities.

The former Afrikaans and Black universities, UNISA, Pretoria University, North West University (formerly Potchefstroom and University of the North West), Free State, Tshwane, University of Johannesburg and Stellenbosch, Venda, Limpopo, and Zululand represent 71 percent of enrollments in the country. The greatest numbers of students are concentrated in the former Afrikaans universities. These institutions are engaged in large-scale teacher education and upgrading programs, many of them state-sponsored. University of Cape Town, University of the Witwatersrand, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal, and Rhodes University—all former White liberal universities—represent about 8.5 percent of enrollments.

In addressing the question of who is doing what, and where, the chapter takes a rather circuitous route. I begin with a brief discussion of the work of Tony Becher, who is helpful in thinking through the social and cultural organization of the field of curriculum studies in South Africa. The work of Karl Maton also provides theoretical resources to consider more carefully the “internal” configuration of different grouping—their epistemological features. Following the introduction of the conceptual orientation of the chapter, I give a brief history of the nature of South African universities from Apartheid, as well as an overview of curriculum reform in South Africa from Apartheid to the present time. The focus of the chapter is on the patterns into which the field has settled, and what “tribes and territories” (Becher 1989) exist in the present time. In showing how these divisions came about, I portray in very broad strokes the major developments of the field in the past 30 years.

There are three main approaches to the study of curriculum in South Africa. The first approach is concerned with political sociology accounts of curriculum process, with a focus on policy. The second is a concern with critical curriculum work, what Pinar et al. (1995) identify as “understanding curriculum” in terms of knowledge and pedagogy. The third approach to curriculum is concerned with curriculum development and implementation. The first group helps to construct the context for the chapter and my interest is in the “tribes” that constitute the second and third approaches. Within critical curriculum work, two groups are defined—those working in a “knowledge mode” and those in a “knower” mode. Fundamentally different
Table 4.1  Headcount Education Enrolments Per University 2005

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<th>Headcount Enrolment</th>
<th>% Institutional Total</th>
<th>% National Education Enrolment</th>
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<td>University of Kwa-Zulu Natal</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>13.59</td>
<td>5.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University</td>
<td>5,409</td>
<td>22.39</td>
<td>5.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Sisulu University for Technology and Science, Eastern Cape</td>
<td>5,159</td>
<td>21.06</td>
<td>4.799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of the Free State</td>
<td>4,807</td>
<td>19.49</td>
<td>4.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Zululand</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>37.03</td>
<td>3.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Limpopo</td>
<td>3,265</td>
<td>18.57</td>
<td>3.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Peninsula</td>
<td>2,788</td>
<td>9.63</td>
<td>2.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Technology</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Fort Hare</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>26.45</td>
<td>2.163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Witwatersrand</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>1.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Venda</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>16.36</td>
<td>1.597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Western Cape</td>
<td>1,307</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>1.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Stellenbosch</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>1.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodes University</td>
<td>1,119</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central University of Technology</td>
<td>562</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>0.523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Cape Town</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durban University of Technology</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaal University of Technology</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Education</td>
<td>107,505</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Kruss (2008)

orientations to knowledge, in particular curriculum knowledge, are captured in this distinction. Finally, I refer to those who approach curriculum in terms of implementation as working within a “bureaucratic mode” that treats knowledge, curriculum, and pedagogy in a particular way.
Whereas the knowledge and knower modes are found largely in the former liberal White universities, the bureaucratic mode predominates in the former Afrikaans universities. Some speculative explanations are sought for this configuration and its persistence. The central argument made in this chapter is that, there have been some significant inroads made in policy and curriculum-making by critical curriculum theorists, as well as robust findings regarding preferred models of curriculum and pedagogy in South Africa. However, a highly bureaucratic approach to curriculum is sustained in those institutions with the greatest reach in terms of teachers who are preparing to enter our schools.

Becher’s Tribes and Territories

Becher’s (1989) metaphor of tribes and territories is useful in thinking about the camps, schisms, and divisions in the field of curriculum studies in South Africa. Becher is centrally interested in the sociological formation of disciplines and their epistemological features that, in turn, inform the social and cultural nature of discipline groupings. His rather loose framework is used here to think through the nature of the field of curriculum studies as well as some of the differences among groupings within the field.

Following Kolb and Biglan, Becher adopts a fourfold typology of disciplines. He distinguishes between abstract-reflective (hard pure) disciplines, where we find the natural sciences and mathematics; abstract-active (hard applied) disciplines, the domain of the science-based professions, such as engineering; concrete-active (soft-applied) disciplines, for what he calls the social professions, including education, social work, and law; and the concrete-reflective quadrant (soft-pure) that includes the humanities and the social sciences. Becher chooses this system of classification because it draws attention both to the epistemological properties of fields as well as to their social characteristics. He argues that the intellectual territory of the soft-pure and the soft-applied remains largely unchartered. Soft-applied knowledge, where education is located, draws on soft-pure knowledge to understand human life, always with a view to its enhancement (15). Because there is not much building on others’ work, there is less stability in the knowledge produced, and less progression than hard applied knowledge. This in part is because “its intellectual roots are in the frequently reformulated interpretations of the humanities and social sciences rather than in the steady growth of the natural sciences” (15). Becher summarizes the different nature of knowledge within the different disciplines as shown in table 4.2.
Becher also identifies the culture of these “disciplinary communities.” Whereas the hard sciences are competitive, with high publication rates, politically well-organized approaches, and a “gregarious” community, the soft-applied disciplines are power oriented, fall prey to intellectual fashions, have low publication rates, and exhibit status anxiety. Becher (1990) also points out that subdisciplinary groupings are even more unstable. So, in considering curriculum studies, a subfield of a soft-applied discipline, one would expect to find a great deal of instability, fragmentation, and division.

Becher (1989) draws attention to a number of specific aspects that might be considered in looking at a field of study and its practitioners. In terms of the cognitive territory, these include the content and nature of the field, its boundaries, and unity or fragmentation. Epistemological issues, such as the role of theory, the way in which conclusions are established, the issue of methods and generalizability, are considered. In relation to the cultural domain, we can look at the career patterns of practitioners, how new members are inducted, and how specialisms are defined. Concerns about reputation and rewards, the existence and characteristics of disciplinary heroes, terms of praise, and marks of distinction also define the cultural domain. Finally, in terms of intellectual values, professional activities focus our attention on forms and rates of publication, networks, and

### Table 4.2 Disciplinary Groupings and the Nature of Knowledge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disciplinary Grouping</th>
<th>Nature of Knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure sciences (“hard-pure”)</td>
<td>Cumulative; atomistic; concerned with universals; impersonal; value-free; clear criteria for knowledge verification and consensus over significant questions (to address, now and then in the future)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanities and pure social sciences (“soft-pure”)</td>
<td>Reiterative; holistic; concerned with particulars; personal; value-laden; dispute over criteria for knowledge verification and obsolescence; lack of consensus over significant questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technologies (“hard applied”)</td>
<td>Purposive; pragmatic; concerned with mastery of physical environment; applies heuristic approaches; uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches; criteria for judgment are purposive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applied social sciences (“soft-applied”)</td>
<td>Functional; utilitarian; concerned with enhancement of semiprofessional practice; uses “case” studies and case law to a large extent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Becher (1989).
the extent of jargon. Also, the involvement in work, the attention to social
and environmental issues, and the stereotypes of fellow practitioners can
inform how we understand the intellectual values of a community of

Becher’s work was based on an extensive interview study and focused on
different disciplines. The present work considers a field of study, a curric-
ulum within the discipline of education, and is based largely on reviews of
journal articles, as well as a personal reading of the field. The categories
Becher presents, however, provide a useful orienting device in considering
the field.

Knowledge and Knowers

Becher’s (1989) orienting concepts, however, take us only part of the way.
His categorization of disciplines is at too low a level of abstraction to deal
with the amount of variation, cross-over, and fall-out in the empirical.
Though they usefully describe the cultural and sociological dimensions of
the formation of knowledge communities (relations to) and may help us to
discern some divisions on that basis, his schema doesn’t offer us a means for
talking about knowledge itself (relations within). In relation to questions of
curriculum this is crucially important—because we want to know how dif-
erent tribes’ theory of knowledge relates to the kind of curriculum and
pedagogy that is supported by this theory, and what the implications are.

Bernstein (1999) characterizes intellectual fields in terms of horizontal
and vertical discourse. Horizontal discourse is that of the everyday, the
non-specialized knowledge used in engaging with the world in everyday
situations. Vertical discourse, on the other hand, pertains to specialized
knowledge, as found in the disciplines. He distinguishes further the differ-
ent knowledge structures within vertical discourse—horizontal and verti-
cal—that characterize different disciplines. Becher’s pure sciences, for
example, would be categorized in terms of hierarchical knowledge struc-
tures, where knowledge is cumulative and hierarchical and progresses in
the image of a triangle—with the integration and subsumption of findings
and theories to sharpen the tip—the overarching propositions (Maton and
Muller 2007). Horizontal knowledge structures characterize the humani-
ties and the social sciences, where knowledge proliferates horizontally, into
“a series of specialised languages, each with its own specialised modes of
interrogation and specialised criteria…with non-comparable principles of
description based on different, often opposed, assumptions” (Bernstein
1996, 172–173). Here we have the accumulation of competing languages.
Physics would represent a hierarchical knowledge structure, where there are very general propositions and theories shared by all. Sociology is a good example of horizontal knowledge structure, with a proliferation of competing languages and theories, such as Marxism, functionalism, poststructuralism, which are relatively well insulated from each other.

In response to attacks that vertical discourse is authoritarian, elitist, and exclusionary, there has been a move, in some quarters, to incorporate horizontal discourse (that of the everyday) into vertical discourse, and this has been done especially in the name of marginalized “voices.” The move has been described by Maton (2000) as a shift from “knowledge modes” to “knower modes.” In brief, in the “knowledge mode,” it is the epistemic relation that is of concern, and the way in which a science would legitimate itself would be in relation to the particular procedures related to a particular object of study. In the “knower mode,” the focus is on the social relation, and the personal characteristics of the author or subject are privileged in legitimating what knowledge is produced and how it is produced. In relation to curriculum research, the knower mode would be concerned with relations to gender, class, race, and disability; in other words categories of “knowers”; in the knowledge mode, the interest would crucially be in the intrinsic features and structuring of the knowledge itself.

Actors may emphasize the knowledge mode or the knower mode, both, or neither. In this way actors derive their “distinctiveness, authority and status” (Maton 2007, 104), at the same time as these conferring their “identity, relations and consciousness” (ibid.).

For the purposes of this chapter, how would we recognize a knower or knowledge mode? Maton summarizes: “the knowledge code is predicated upon the rule ‘What matters is what you know,’ and the knower code is predicated upon the rule ‘What matters is who you are.’” In the knowledge mode, we will find an emphasis on specialized procedures and on an object of study. In the knower mode, the emphasis will be on the social attributes of the subject. In terms of curriculum specifically, we are likely to find that in the knower mode the focus will be on the epistemological—how different subjects (with different social attributes) come to know; in the knowledge mode, it will be on the ontological—what is the nature of knowledge (e.g., what is its structure).

Method

To study curriculum studies in South Africa, I proceeded as follows. To cover the period prior to 2000, I selected some of the major books, articles,
and chapters that represent, judging from my own knowledge and from citations, the most prominent analyses of curriculum from that time. In order to consider the present period, which is the focus of the essay, I selected all articles on curriculum from 2000 to 2007 from three main South African education journals: the *South African Journal of Education*, *Perspectives in Education* and the *Journal of Education*. All editions from 2000 onward were surveyed. The 67 articles studied were augmented by prominent writing in the field in other publications. I have chosen to focus on articles that are relevant to schooling rather than higher education. There is a vast higher education curriculum studies literature, with its attendant local journal, and a growing body of local and international published work. Also, work on teacher education curriculum, which is a growing area of study, is not considered here.

In reviewing the articles I considered the following issues:

- Orientation toward a knower mode (the social relation), knowledge mode (the epistemic relation), or bureaucratic mode;
- The disciplinary focus of the work;
- The methods deployed;
- Referencing and peer review mechanisms;
- Theory (what theory, and the sustaining of theory over time);
- Claims about pedagogy (the how of curriculum) and knowledge (the what of curriculum).

In considering the three groupings into which the articles were organized, each of these dimensions is commented on in the analysis.

### The Territory: Institutions Inherited from the Past

The highly segregated educational system of Apartheid meant that the intellectual values, cultures, professional activities, and epistemological approaches—in short “the territory” for scholarly work—was largely shaped institutionally. In what follows, I provide a brief account of universities under Apartheid. The account relies heavily on the history written by Bunting (2004). Following this, I also piece together accounts of what kind of educational intellectual work was undertaken in these different, racially defined institutions. The purpose is to provide a context for understanding broad categorizations of curriculum work being undertaken in specific places, and also to consider the issue of continuity in these institutions from
the past to the present. I have oversimplified for the purposes of brevity. De Clercq (1991), for example, provides a detailed account of how the category of Black university under Apartheid was not homogenous. What the account below provides, however, are general orientations and practices under the segregated system in different types of institutions.

Apartheid universities were segregated into those catering for the White, Black, Colored, and Indian “population groups.” “White” universities were divided into those for the English and Afrikaans-speaking populations. About half of the African universities were established in the “homelands” (Black reserves), and separate universities for Blacks, Coloreds, and Indians were established in appropriate “group areas” in South Africa.

The White English-speaking universities were generally characterized as “liberal”—Anglo in orientation and linked to big business. They viewed themselves as part of an international academic constituency. These universities maintained an ambivalent relationship with the Apartheid state. Although they accepted the state subsidy and acknowledged that they were public institutions, they attempted to maintain academic and intellectual autonomy (Bunting 2004, 43).

The Afrikaans university sector was set up to serve as an instrument of Afrikaner nationalism. Davies (1994), citing Degenaar (1977), explains that the “volks university” rejected as idealized “the traditional view of the university as an autonomous community of teachers and students dedicated to the search for truth.” The universities accepted their role as “creatures of the state” and consequently acted in the service of the state (Bunting 2004, 40). Afrikaner ideology was reproduced in these universities, both in content and in the forms of authority. Rote learning, spoon-feeding, and a lack of critical engagement are ways in which pedagogy in these universities is characterized. Their primary function was to train civil servants for the Apartheid state. This had consequences for their academic and governance cultures, which Bunting characterizes as “instrumentalist.”

The Black universities were also set up with particular ideological purposes in mind. As in the Afrikaans universities, their function was largely to train Black people needed in the Apartheid state, especially teachers. In the homelands, civil servants for their governments were also trained in these universities.

In the 1980s the leadership, council, and most of the academic staff in the Black universities were White Afrikaners appointed to promote and support the activities of the state. The culture in these universities was explicitly authoritarian and instrumental (Bunting 2004, 45). The curriculum amounted to a watered-down version of that operating at the Afrikaans-language universities. There were virtually no research or
postgraduate programs at these institutions. They existed largely as undergraduate teaching institutions catering for underprepared, predominantly Black, matriculants (Weekly Mail, Supplement April 1993 cited in Davies 1994). In the 1990s these universities were beset by unrest, and teaching and learning were severely disrupted for extended periods of time.

This provides a very broad description of universities under Apartheid. With a series of institutional mergers between 2000 and 2004, the landscape of higher education had fundamentally altered at the structural level. Several of the Black institutions were merged with former Afrikaans universities, and there have been substantial changes in relation to technicons. However, as Jansen (2001a) suggests, the culture of a number of these institutions has not changed, and the staff profile of most institutions has been very low and very difficult to change. Below, I briefly describe the nature of education work, curriculum theorizing specifically, in these universities. Again, these are broad generalizations that serve the purpose of creating a context for the rest of the chapter.

Educational Work in Universities

Educational work and theory in these different universities were also differentiated. Muller (1996) describes how in the 1980s education, in the White English universities, there was a rift between the liberals (who had been criticized for complicity with Apartheid through their complicity with capitalism, which was in league with Apartheid) and the radicals. The latter drove a project (largely out of the University of the Witwatersrand) of an Althusserian-inspired structuralist neo-Marxism (ibid.). Using the conceptual tool of “ideology” and the comportment of “organic intellectual,” the radicals launched an attack on what was characterized as the liberals’ lack of historical, social, and ideological self-awareness. Another division at this time amongst this broad grouping was that of theory/practitioner. A major forum where these debates were played out was at the annual Kenton Conference, which ultimately became the preserve of the radicals, where, according to Muller (1996), they schooled themselves in the “rigours of the New Sociology of Education critique.” The scholarly work at the time reflected these divides.

Outside this rarefied atmosphere of theoretical debate, and penetrating it from time to time, were the populist processes of People’s Education. Chisholm and Fuller (1996) argue that this was not the unified movement it is often presented as but entailed the work of about 50,000 organizations, including some tertiary institutions, inconsistent in the alternatives
it presented to Apartheid education. The rallying cry of the movement was “People’s education for people’s Power,” with curriculum and pedagogic ideals largely based on the work of Paulo Freire.

On the other end of the political spectrum, the Afrikaans universities were dominated by a particular educational philosophy, as were the Black universities. This was Christian National Education (CNE). Its attendant “science” of education was “fundamental pedagogics,” an authoritarian pedagogical philosophy, where the child was regarded as ignorant and undisciplined, in need of guidance from the teacher, whose authority was derived from the God of the Dutch Reformed Church (Ensor 1999). It also promulgated a pedagogy devoid of analysis and critique (Enslin 1984). Under Apartheid there was almost no research or critique issuing from these universities in relation to curriculum, although a substantial amount of theoretical work was undertaken in developing the science of pedagogics (especially fundamental pedagogics) published in numerous textbooks. In some instances academics from these institutions participated in Apartheid curriculum development processes under the auspices of the state.

Black universities were not required to do research at all, at least initially (Muller 2002). The culture of teaching, learning, and research in these institutions suffered under authoritarian control from largely Afrikaans administrators, the predominance of CNE and fundamental pedagogics, and compulsory textbooks generated largely by UNISA. Many academics in these universities were compliant (De Clercq 1991), and although there was some critical work in a few of the homeland universities, in general at the time of transition a research culture in education in Black universities was nonexistent.

When the processes of reform of the Apartheid curriculum began, there were different responses from these institutions. In the section below, I give a brief overview of the major curriculum changes following Apartheid.

**Brief Overview of Curriculum Reform and Critique: From Apartheid to 2000**

There have been a substantial number of overviews of the processes of curriculum reform from pre- to post-Apartheid period. Jansen, Chisholm, and Christie have provided trenchant commentaries and criticism of policy processes from the mid-1980s to the current period from a political sociology and historical perspective. Hereunder I draw mainly on their accounts in providing a brief overview of the three main phases of curriculum
I also consider some of the critical curriculum work that was done in relation to the three phases. The purpose is to pick up some of the threads that inform the debates around curriculum today, particularly in relation to the “tribes” identified earlier. The three reform efforts were (1) transition to democracy; (2) the implementation of Curriculum 2005, the first new post-Apartheid national curriculum in 1997; and (3) the revision of this curriculum from 2000 onward.

**Transitional Curriculum**

Emerging out of the processes of People’s Education, there was an intense period of reform from around 1985 to the early 1990s outside of government. At this time the Apartheid government was also engaged in its own process of curriculum revision, as part of their Education Renewal Strategy, and this involved the development of a new curriculum called the Curriculum Model for South Africa (CUMSA) (1991), which was largely an effort to rationalize curricula to make them more relevant. It was also an attempt to modernize the curriculum, and, as Galant (2002) argues, it responded to curriculum developments in the United States and the United Kingdom, most notably drawing on ideas around constructivism and progressivism that had taken hold there.

At the time of transition in 1994, the curricula that had been implemented in White schools since 1991 were adopted as interim curricula. They were cleansed of racial stereotypes and offensive language. These “new” curricula were effectively new only to Black schools. The differences between the White curriculum of 1990/1991 and the implemented curricula of 1995/1996/1997 were new societal aims and general aims of teaching and learning.

**Curriculum 2005**

In 1997, the new post-Apartheid curriculum, Curriculum 2005 (C2005), was launched. C2005 was strongly informed by a number of trajectories within education, both locally (People’s Education; the integration of education and training) and globally (outcomes-based education, competency-based curriculum). There was a strong move toward integration, which was understood as fundamental to more democratic forms of education. This entailed a rejection of the strong separation between training and
An integrated approach implies a view of learning which rejects the rigid division between “academic” and “applied,” “theory” and “practice,” “knowledge” and “skills,” “head” and “hand.” Such divisions have characterised the organisation of curricula and the distribution of educational opportunity in many countries of the world, including South Africa. They have grown out of, and helped to reproduce, very old occupational and social class distinctions. In South Africa such distinctions in curriculum and career choice have also been closely associated in the past with the ethnic structure of economic opportunity and power. (DoE 1995, 15)

C2005 was defined in relation to the past. It was referred to as a paradigm shift in curriculum, from the traditional curriculum to a new outcomes-based curriculum. It was also designed in relation to the National Qualifications Framework (NQF), which was an attempt to create equivalencies between education and workplace learning. The strong influence of labor and an economic discourse is evident in the quote above and there is general agreement in the literature that the construction of C2005 was largely a product of labor’s needs, and their demands for a skills-based curriculum linked to an NQF. At the heart of this was the outcome—a discrete, generic, demonstrable performance required of the learner.

The curriculum had other progressive features. It placed an emphasis on group work, relevance, local curriculum construction, and local choice of content. There was also a shift away from strong disciplinary boundaries, to a horizontal integration of traditional curriculum subjects. Learning areas, which were clusters of subjects, were introduced to support integration. Phase organizers also introduced themes that directed programs of learning across different learning areas. Learning outcomes were generic, and most of the subject-specific content from the curriculum was removed.

Learner-centeredness was a cornerstone of this project, and the teacher, who was to be a facilitator, was envisioned as selecting the appropriate knowledge, including that of the learners’ own local cultures, to enable the learner to reach the “competency” that was expressed as an outcome. The curriculum had a complex design, with a new language. In addition to its progressive principles, the curriculum advocated a constructivist pedagogy. A well-known table at the time explained the desired shifts.

Although muted at first, the criticism generated by the first post-Apartheid curriculum was significant. A key text at this time, containing a comprehensive critique from training and implementation, system
failures, and curriculum design, was Jansen and Christie’s (1999) *Changing Curriculum: Studies on Outcomes-Based Education in South Africa*. In this book the most prominent critique of C2005 appeared—Jansen’s “Why outcomes-based education will fail.” The principal reason offered was that the curriculum was driven by policy imperatives with no conception of the realities of classroom life (147).

Jansen (2001b, 272–273) argued that policies developed in the first five years of democracy served the purpose of “political symbolism”—helping to mark the shift from Apartheid to post-Apartheid education, and to establish the ideological and political credentials of the new government.

Another key contribution to critique at this time was Harley and Parker’s (1999) analysis of outcomes-based education, the National Qualifications Framework, and competency models. They point out the conflicts in the system generated from incompatible frameworks—such as competence-based and outcomes-based assessment. Muller (2000) also offered a critique focusing on the conceptual design of the curriculum, arguing that although the sociopolitical rationale for integration was clear, the pedagogical purposes were not. The fact that the curriculum had removed most of the content for subjects and replaced it with outcomes expressed as generic skills meant that teachers were expected to select the appropriate content and design “learning programs” themselves. Muller summed up the class implications of this kind of curriculum:

> A success can be made of such an under-stipulated curriculum, but only if the teacher has a well-articulated mental script of what should be covered, and if the pupils come from homes where they have been well prepared to respond to such putative freedom, in other words, only in schools by and for the middle class. (14)

Finally, an important report that fed into the review of C2005 was *Getting Learning Right* (Taylor and Vinjevold 1999), a report on the findings of the President’s Educational Initiative (PEI) that was undertaken in 1998. The 35 small-scale studies that constituted the PEI aimed to interrogate issues of teacher practice, curriculum, and the use of teacher and learner materials. The report claimed convergence in these studies around a number of issues, most importantly around teachers’ extremely poor conceptual knowledge. They also found that teachers lacked the knowledge base to interpret Curriculum 2005 and were unable to “ensure that the everyday approach prescribed by the new curriculum will result in learners developing sound conceptual frameworks” (Taylor and Vinjevold 1999, 230).

These studies were problematic, conceptually and methodologically (Taylor et al. 2003; Ensor and Hoadley 2004). The report was also
criticized for “the reduction of the problems of education to simple technical analyses devoid of political context and controversy” (Jansen 2003). Nonetheless, Taylor presented the important distinction between everyday knowledge and school knowledge as well as the implications of integration (based on the theory of Basil Bernstein) in a way that was understandable to a broader readership, including those in government. The political arguments were also there, especially in the attack on radical constructivism, identifying that “by ignoring the boundary between school and everyday knowledges, radical modes increase the difficulties that working-class children will have in trying to acquire formal discourses” (see Muller and Taylor 1995; Taylor and Vinjevold 1999).

*Getting Learning Right* was a synoptic text. Albeit based on incomplete evidence and imperfect research, it did provide an integrated synthesis of knowledge on pedagogy and curriculum in South Africa up to that point. Up until this time work in the sociology of education and curriculum in South Africa had concentrated on policy studies (Chisholm 1992; Muller 1996). *Getting Learning Right* opened up an area of research into pedagogy and curriculum with an emphasis on knowledge. The text was also particularly important in its influence on the review of C2005 that I describe briefly below.

What is interesting about the account so far is the growing suspicion among very different quarters and different actors about the efficacy of established knowledge. The Apartheid curricula in 1991 were informed by movements in Britain, especially toward more progressive curricula and developments in thinking about constructivist pedagogies. Some of these emphases were sustained in the final Apartheid curriculum under the Education Renewal Strategy (see Galant 1997).

The new curriculum in 1997, therefore, was a new one for Black teachers rather than for White teachers. Harley and Wedekind (2003) identify the same continuities for former White schools and C2005. At the same time, as indicated above, People’s Education in the 1980s construed learning as an active, critical, and constructive enterprise. The learning process was emphasized, and the learner was placed at the center of the learning. Relevance and the integration of students’ everyday lives in academic activities were also emphasized. In C2005, most of these progressive and constructivist tenets were included, coupled with a strong call for “affirming” alternative ways of knowing and knowledge as well as the integration of different knowledge domains. The establishment of a “knower discourse,” emphasizing the learning process and the importance of the recognition of the social identities of learners, had thus been brewing for a long time. So although it reached its apogee in C2005, the shift toward radical constructivism had begun long before.
The National Curriculum Statement (NCS)

To produce the National Curriculum Statement, several papers have reflected in detail on the policy processes involved in the revision of C2005 (Chisholm 2003; 2005; Fataar 2006). All papers are interesting with respect to the analyses of the play of interests and power among different groups in the revision process. Whereas the original C2005 had been drawn up by bureaucrats, in this new round of curriculum revision, academics dominated in the review and the rewriting of the statements. Chisholm (2005) argues that it is not possible to find a neat fit between interests in the process and the outcome of the review. The process was a struggle between different lobbies and she argues that this is obvious in the final form of the NCS. Fataar’s (2006) interpretation is different. In setting up the labor policy network, dominant in C2005, with the Academic Policy Network (APN), Fataar argues that “by the time of the second election in 1999 the state had authorized a fiscally conservative development path, and had put leftist elements such as the unions and civic movements on the ideological retreat” (650). What happened in the NCS process was that the curriculum was wrested back from labor into the hands of educationalists, and here the academics dominated. Fataar argues that Bernstein “loomed large” in the revision process and that Bernstein’s distinction between vertical and horizontal knowledge formed the “key conceptual critique.”

Fataar argues that it was the Getting Learning Right report that paved the way for the dominance of the APN in the review process, two of the Getting Learning Right authors being on the review committee. Those who had begun to make strong arguments around the distinction between different knowledge types, and the importance of disciplinary knowledge (especially Muller), played a prominent role in the review.

The authors of the review took a realist view of knowledge, and of school knowledge as having an objective conceptual structure (especially in terms of the selection and sequence of knowledge). The major design flaw of C2005 was identified as lack of conceptual sequence and learning progression pathway. “It is true that different learners approach learning in different ways, and might even learn concepts in a non-prescribed sequence. But this non-prescribed sequence must be an alternative route up the same conceptual ladder. There is no such thing as an alternative ladder, of optional and replaceable concepts” (DoE 2000a, 44).

The review committee strongly recommended reduced integration and clearer specification of contents. Greater simplicity in the design of the curriculum and language was also recommended. Significantly, under pressure from the unions (Chisholm 2005), outcomes were retained in the
design of the curriculum. Ultimately, those features associated with outcomes would also be retained. These are identified by the review itself: It states that outcomes-based education asserts the dominance of outputs over inputs and contains features of curriculum reform followed the world over, which are

- the active learner and ideas of uniqueness and difference;
- the active teacher who, rather than following a prescriptive syllabus, makes decisions about what to teach and how to teach it;
- the relative importance of activity and skills as a basis for knowing and knowledge;
- the relative importance of induction over deduction.

Although dealing with the central criticism that the C2005 curriculum model was strong on integration and weak on conceptual coherence or progression, these four aspects, features of progressive and constructivist pedagogies, in some ways contradicted the central direction in which the review was heading. Over time, outcomes, constructivism, and progressivism became entwined, and because of their conceptual conflation it became difficult to disentangle them. I return to this below.

The Review Committee also explicitly acknowledged the incompatibility between a more progressive learner-centered education and behavioral objectives (outcomes). The latter were, however, retained, while attempting to reduce the amount of integration and reassert the vertical demarcation of subjects. The review process entailed compromise, and the resulting curriculum was underpinned by conceptual unease. A prominent debate and enduring point of contention was around the issue of constructivism.

The Constructivist Debate

A short diversion is necessary here to discuss constructivism as it is the theory at the heart of the debate between those concerned with knower codes and those who focus on knowledge, and in the debates around integration and relevance more generally. The literature on constructivism is vast, and the ways in which constructivism has been taken up in South Africa is worthy of a paper on its own (see especially Muller 2000; Moll 2002). My attempt here is to clarify briefly some aspects of the debate. First, there are two focuses of interest in relation to constructivism. One relates to the question of epistemology—how we come to know things. It is here that various theories postulate on the way the mind works to “construct”
knowledge. The debates are centrally about the extent to which the mind does the constructing of knowledge, or the extent to which knowledge is “out there” and given, independent of our constructing of it. Phillips (1995) describes this as a continuum from “humans the creators” to “nature the instructor.” The other point of variation in considering this issue is the question of the constitution of public knowledge.

The epistemological considerations of constructivism when applied to education principally concern pedagogy. The radical constructivists, many of whom draw on Von Glasersfeld (1998), take a highly individualistic notion of knowledge construction and argue that each student has his/her own set of preconceptions and perceptions in the learning process based on their own subjective experience. The teacher, following this view, can’t transmit knowledge but must assist (he uses the word “orient”) learners to create these constructions. There is no wrong and right—consequently formal knowledge has no place in this classroom. The other central premise of this view is that, as opposed to the “spectator theory of knowledge,” the learner is active in the process of learning, and that in interaction with the environment “creates” or “constructs knowledge.” The political and social aspects of the environment are of key concern, because this is often what defines the knowledge that is produced.

Ontological considerations around constructivism pertain to the question of public knowledge or the formal curriculum. Here the question of how curriculum knowledge comes to be constituted is the focus. Views on this range between those who maintain that knowledge arises from sociopolitical processes (feminist epistemologies are a good example of this), and from “knowers” and their particular standpoints, to those who view knowledge as imposed from the outside—nature as instructor.

If we stand more on the relativist side of the pole—that emphasizes the position of knowers—in deciding what constitutes public knowledge, we will have a different kind of curriculum to one that places emphasis on knowledge that is derived from a realist point of view. In the latter view, we will have an idea of what ideas are better than others, what knowledge is more worthwhile and appropriate in the curriculum. In the former view, we may want to leave a lot of that knowledge out, for the local facilitator or mediator to decide on. Or rather, we are less concerned with knowledge and more interested in knowing. In psychological terms, constructivism is a theory of learning. In philosophy of knowledge terms, Moore (2002) argues that constructivism does not have a theory of knowledge.

When one is closer to the view that learners construct their own knowledge, that worthwhile knowledge is “constructed” out of individual perceptions and sociopolitical considerations, then the idea of disciplinary knowledge—that agreed upon knowledge that has come to be accepted
over time as constituting an area of study, with its related language, arguments, comportments, and conceptual structure—begins to become backgrounded.

In this view, knowing becomes untethered from concerns about knowledge; the concern is with how we come to know, independent of (or not concerned with) what we know. A further development to this attenuation would be when a concern with how we come to know becomes disarticulated with an actual theory of learning or cognition and proliferates into a set of instructional strategies or technologies that ultimately have little to do with either knowing (how) or knowledge (what). Dowling (1998) in this regard distinguishes between constructivism, the philosophical doctrine, and pedagogical constructivism, the “ensemble of pedagogic techniques” derived from the doctrine (Davis 2005, 52). This pedagogical constructivism is associated with a number of different approaches, including learner-centeredness, problem-based learning, and activity-based learning. It is also associated with a number of techniques, such as cooperative learning and “facilitation.” The derivation of these approaches and techniques from the theory of constructivism can easily be discerned, but the implications of the theory are rarely evident in the way in which the pedagogic constructivists understand what is done in the classroom and why. Further, the empirical basis for constructivism as an adequate theory of learning is extremely weak and has been widely discredited (Bruer 1997; Kirschner et al. 2006).

What of the relation between pedagogy and curriculum, or between the epistemological concern of constructivism and the concern around public knowledge?

In relation to pedagogy, Muller and Taylor (2000) argue for a “moderate constructivist approach” to everyday knowledge in the classroom, which Taylor et al. (2003) summarize as the

selective use of everyday knowledge in order to exemplify and apply relevant principles of formal knowledge, and the careful structuring of the relationship between the formal and the everyday, so as to clearly explicate the syntax and specialised language of the former. (Taylor et al. 2003, 79)

But the logic for the inclusion of everyday knowledge is for the development of school knowledge, because it is the development of the latter that the curriculum and schooling should principally be concerned with. In the classroom, often with a social or political rationale, the more radical constructivists create equivalence between the two forms of knowledge.

In relation to the curriculum, Davis (2005) argues that it is curious that those who argue for an emphasis on relevance and real world
problem-solving demand that the curriculum should organize and package curriculum in an already-integrated way (59). The realists would argue for a more strongly specified curriculum in relation to discipline knowledge as a framework and guide for learning, regardless of the preferred pedagogic style deployed. What becomes clear here is the importance of not eliding the distinction between curriculum and pedagogy in a discussion of constructivism.

Further, the assumption that learning disciplinary content knowledge (the what) can be replaced by learning the procedures and methods of the discipline (the how) is erroneous (ibid.). What is entailed in this is a displacement of the ontological with the epistemological, which in a sense captures the shift from traditional to constructivist pedagogies that C2005 attempted to accomplish. We will see below how these issues have been taken up in the research literature.

It was these debates, highly politicized, that animated much of the discussion around the review of C2005. The outcome, the NCS, was a compromise. It emphasized conceptual coherence and vertical progression, attempted to restore the authority of the curriculum and the teacher, but also retained some of the pedagogical constructivist features, as well as outcomes as the central organizing device for the curriculum.

The foregoing discussion of curriculum reform has relied primarily on accounts from the group of curriculum scholars identified as being concerned centrally with policy and sets the context for the main argument of the chapter. The rest of the chapter will focus on those curriculum theorists dealing with knowledge in the curriculum. In what follows I am concerned centrally with three main “tribes”: those working in a knowledge mode, those working in a knower mode, as described earlier, and finally, those concerned with implementation, which I will term a bureaucratic mode. The focusing question is the nature of scholarly work concerning curriculum in different institutions, especially those where the majority of teacher training takes place.

Knowledge and Knower Modes in Curriculum Research

As stated above, the reviews of work presented in this chapter are not exhaustive. They represent a selection from my own personal view of the field and are also informed by a review of all articles related to curriculum in the three main South African education journals, Journal of Education, South African Journal of Education (SAJE) and Perspectives
TRIBES AND TERRITORY

from 2000–2007. In this section, the concept of the boundary, in my view, helps to understand one of the key debates between the knower tribe and the knowledge tribe. Following a discussion of the boundary, I consider in some detail the work that is being conducted in the two modes. This is followed by a consideration of the bureaucratic mode.

The Boundary

The orientation toward a knowledge mode is instantiated in a concern with the boundary, a metaphor that demarcates the known from the unknown, the sacred from the profane, or in the terms introduced earlier, horizontal discourse from vertical discourse. In the South African context, in relation to schooling, this has generally been spoken about in terms of the relationship between school knowledge and everyday knowledge. This has emerged as one of the key distinctions in debates around curriculum knowledge. It goes to the heart of the contestation and struggles over what knowledge should be included in the curriculum, and how it should be transmitted. Muller and Taylor (2000) put the question thus: “How can or should the common-sense knowledge of experience and local culture, indeed of the everyday world, relate to the codified knowledge deemed worthy of inclusion and certification in the formal curriculum?” (13).

Debates around the distinction between everyday knowledge and school knowledge, and the boundary between, were based on the theory of Basil Bernstein and introduced through a series of papers in the mid 1990s (Dowling 1995; Davis 1996; Ensor 1997; Muller and Taylor 1995). Dowling’s distinction arose out of an analysis of school mathematics textbooks, where he found an uneven distribution of types of knowledge, such that higher ability students were exposed to texts that allowed access to the specialized knowledge of the subject, and lower ability students were subjected to texts where the mathematics knowledge was obscured by everyday exemplars and procedural activities. The implications of the differential distribution of these knowledge types was highlighted. Of Dowling’s research, Muller and Taylor (2000, 68) commented that “the lower ability student, paradoxically, is left free to be a local individual but a failed mathematics learner.”

The unequal distribution of types of knowledge to different students was often on the basis of social class. At stake was the issue of “crossing borders” between these different domains of knowledge. At the same time as this strong argument for “keeping things apart,” was the broader impetus toward integration, relevance, and the collapsing of boundaries, which, as I described earlier, had been gaining momentum through the 1980s.
Ensor (2001, 326) describes the move toward integration and the flattening of knowledge structures as signaling a determination to erode three knowledge boundaries: between education and training, between academic and everyday knowledge, and between different forms of knowledge, disciplines or subjects. The erosion of these boundaries was expected to result in the collapse of a fourth: the social boundaries between groups on the basis of race and class.

It is not surprising then, that the major charge in relation to the assertion of boundaries was that the move was conservative. There was a powerful view that the purpose of curriculum was to validate the life experiences of those previously excluded from the mainstream. Thinking also along the lines of the “gap” presented in much sociological research literature—between working-class students’ lives and the middle-class values and knowledge of the school—the solution was seen by many to be the dissolution of these boundaries. These notions of relevance and integration ultimately structured the political project of C2005, as I described earlier.

Strong arguments followed for an emphasis on disciplinary knowledge. Muller (2002, 66) argued for it recruiting the revolutionary, left theorist Gramsci, who had informed the work of the radicals of the 1980s: “The job of the school is to accustom the students to reason, to think abstractly and schematically while remaining able to plunge back from abstract to real and immediate life, to see in each fact or datum what is general and what is particular, to distinguish the concept from the particular instance (Gramsci 1986).” Muller shows that for Gramsci this occurs through the teaching of the facts of the discipline, such that the student is able to distinguish between the particular and the general (concepts).

Finally, Ensor (1997) focuses specifically on the epistemological issues and identifies the “double distortion” that potentially lies in the integration of school knowledge, workplace knowledge in particular. In recruiting everyday or workplace practices into school mathematics, she shows how this potentially distorts what happens in the workplace or everyday. Similarly, the integration of everyday or workplace activities into school mathematics could render mathematics “more algorithmic and ostensibly utilitarian” (42). For Ensor, the importance is in recognizing the difference between different knowledge structures, and their articulation with the social division of labor (40). She also identifies the potential damaging effects in asserting equivalence without considering these differences, as was the attempt through the NQF and C2005.

The debate around the constitution of the boundary between different knowledge forms is related to the debate around constructivism, relevance,
and integration. The different positions in relation to these issues can be discerned through the journal articles reviewed, especially in *Perspectives* and the *Journal of Education*. Considering Ensor’s (2001) presentation of the issue introduced earlier, it is not surprising that much of the critique of an emphasis on discipline-based knowledge and strong boundaries comes from a strong political standpoint, often subordinating pedagogical and epistemological questions. Alternative views come from a number of different perspectives. Issues of integration (Stears and Malcolm 2005), relevance, and multiculturalism (Kissack 2004) are covered. The emphasis on marginalized “voices,” which, from a relativist standpoint, privileges experience over knowledge, is also prominent (Vithal and Gopal 2005; Vithal and Alant 2005; Julie and Mbekwa 2005, and a special issue of *Perspectives* in 2005, entitled “Speaking the Curriculum: Learner Voices and Silences—Challenges for Mathematics and Science Education in the Twenty First Century”). Writers on indigenous knowledge also make a strong case for integration from a political standpoint that contrasts indigenous ways of knowing with “modern Western” values, arguing for the inclusion of the former in the curriculum (Odora-Hoppers 2001; Breidlid 2003; Moodie 2003). These all constitute a knower mode, where the social category of the knower is privileged, authorizing multiple “voices” and authenticating and valorizing experience. The concern, as was raised earlier, is with the social rather than the epistemic relation. This mode is dealt with in further detail below.

The Knower Mode

I alluded to some of the work conducted within this mode above but take a small number of specific examples here to illustrate more carefully what the concerns of this group are. I have a select number of authors who are prominent in the field and who exemplify three main approaches in the knower mode: (1) voice; (2) indigenous knowledge; and (3) constructivism and relevance.

**Voice**

In order to discern learners and teachers experience, much of the work that focuses on voice and identity employs different forms of biographical methodology. Pedagogy and curriculum is fundamentally seen in relation to the validation of this experience. Jita (2005) claims this as the central
resource for teachers in constituting their pedagogic practice. In his discussion of a science teacher, Sithole, he argues that “personal experiences become a resource (of biography) through reflection, reinterpretation and deployment in the craft of a counter-identity of transformation. Through this complex process of reflection and (re)interpretation of his experiences, Sithole was able to create direct links between his identity forms and science teaching and learning in his classroom” (26).

Jita is interested in “non-traditional forms” of classroom practice in secondary school science classrooms, what he terms “the transformative forms of practice.” In this regard he considers how one Black science teacher’s identity influenced their construction of an alternative practice in their classrooms. The account is primarily about experiences of marginalization and challenge in the teacher’s life, and how this translated into anti-“traditional” practices, such as group work and inclusiveness in who speaks in the classroom. “Neither the teacher nor the textbooks by themselves were vested with this kind of authority” (28). The teacher’s successful practice in the classroom was defined in terms of his “creating a safe and nurturing environment for collaborative learning (group learning); a habit of “independent” exploration and “less reliance on the teacher,” and making the subject matter accessible to the students by “bringing in their experiences into the classroom.” The nature of the knowledge itself is not in question, rather the identities of the students (requiring affirmation) and that of the teacher (drawing on personal biography) are what informed this understanding of the process of coming to know. In later work, Jita and Vandeyar (2006) again make the important point that teachers’ biographies influence their current pedagogic practice. However, the focus is again on the knower, and without a theory or discussion of knowledge (or pedagogy). It is not clear how the past influences the present, or what impact biography has in terms of what knowledge is encountered in the classroom, other than that there is an effect.

In a similar way, a study by Vithal and Gopal (2005) considers learners’ voices and experience of the new curriculum reforms. Their focus is on regulative issues, such as groupwork and learner-centeredness, in discerning what the reform meant. The research and conclusions focus on the extent to which learners understand and are able to articulate these aspects of the reform, and although not shown, the authors claim that what learners say is related to what their teachers say and do about reforms, with “teachers as key figures who mediate the reforms but can be supported or subverted by learners through their voice and their silence” (57).

Again, the interest is in the knower, and the knower’s particular standpoint with respect to the curriculum. There is no outside point on which to adjudicate the students’ perceptions, they are judged from their own
standpoint as potentially supporting or subverting the pedagogy. What knowledge is entailed is not of concern here, but rather how students come to know, and their experience in this regard is affirmed and is what is privileged.

Indigenous Knowledge

There are a number of authors who address the issue of indigenous knowledge. The central issue in these articles is the dominance of “Western knowledge” in the curriculum, the exclusion of indigenous knowledge, and the oppressive nature of this exclusion. For Moodie (2003) this represents a “hegemony of the rational-empirical epistemological mode [which] was also to have a continuing oppressive influence on the ways of knowing of the societies that were dominated” (8–9). Western thought is crudely homogenized and characterized as a “rational” and “empirical mode of knowing the world,” emphasizing the “subject-object dichotomy of its epistemological dualism,” its “atomism,” “materialism,” and “triumphalist” mode. Essentially, Moodie’s answer to Western epistemological domination is a “participatory epistemology” in which the subjective knower is paramount. In this account, knowledge—as a collective, agreed upon representation of reality—is denied. In Moodie’s postmodernism there is no boundary between different kinds of knowledge; in fact, there is no theory of knowledge.

Indigenous Knowledge System (IKS) accounts operate consummately in the knower mode. Because there is no theory of the structuring of knowledge, and no distinction between different types of knowledge beyond Western and non-Western in the discussions of IKS, there is also no suggestion or mechanism for the adjudication of valuable and desirable IKS, and that which is not. All indigenous knowledge is considered good and worthy of inclusion in the curriculum.

Constructivism and Relevance

Stears and Malcolm (2005), taking a social constructionist position, address the issue of the boundary directly in their concern for relevance. Their explicit view of curriculum is that “curriculum design is a political process (Bernstein 2002; Freire 1990) depending on views of the purposes of education, and the rights of people to speak for themselves or others” (23). In other words, the standpoint of the knower is the central determinant in the knowledge for inclusion in the curriculum. The authors set up a module for science learning to consider different kinds of relevance. They
counterpoint relevant curricula with “conventional science curricula,” which are “designed around universal themes such as ‘sinking and floating; the nature of air etc.’” Of these curricula the authors conclude, “While such curricula may include participative activities, the content has little meaning for these learners as it does not address their interests” (26). The focus for the authors in the research was on allowing learners’ voices to be heard, and on constructing a Freirien-inspired curriculum for learners—more democratic relations between teacher and student, a focus on critical reflection, and affirmation of students everyday lives. The emphasis on affirming the experience and understanding the gaze of the knower in the pedagogical project is clear in the following comment:

For many [students], the fact of inclusion was more important than any enhancement of their understanding. Although they might not solve their problems, the science class became a place where the conditions of their lives might be understood. Not only did they feel encouraged that their knowledge was useful in science, they felt that the science they learned in school was useful: it helped them cope with fire in their everyday lives. (28)

Here social experience (the fact of inclusion) is explicitly privileged over knowledge (enhancement of their understanding). One is reminded here of the political implications of this—how the students end up by being left free to be local individuals who are, however, potentially failed science learners (cf. Muller and Taylor 2000, 68).

It is clear from the accounts above, that in privileging the subjectivity of the knower and the experience in the knower mode, often the case for objective knowledge claims is subordinated, rejected, or ignored. The lack of a research question is often encountered in research operating in the knower mode. That could be because the answer is already known, retrievable as it is socially rather than epistemologically. The work then is not about pursuing a problem, but rather asserting a position.

That is to say that these classifications are used here to indicate general patterns in the field of curriculum studies in South Africa. There are several researchers who work betwixt and between these categories. Carrim is a good example of someone who works across knower and knowledge modes. Whilst recognizing the boundaries and understanding the social justice implications of protecting them, he grapples, at the same time, with the difficult question of infusing the curriculum with human rights issues, particularly at a time of curriculum emphasis on a narrow preparation for work. The specification of the curriculum, in terms of “behaviourist assessment standards,” also presents a difficulty in incorporating human rights not easily measured in these terms (Carrim and Keet 2005).
Those working in the knower mode are concentrated not only in the former White liberal universities but also in a few of the former Afrikaans and Black universities. In the next section we look at those working more strictly within a knowledge mode.

The Knowledge Mode

Those working in the knowledge mode are interested in the structuring of knowledge in the curriculum, or with the internal discourse of pedagogy. The theory of Basil Bernstein is the theoretical resource for much, though not all, of this work. One of Bernstein’s key insights was that knowledge, especially educational knowledge, is not just a relay for power relations external to it but an internal logic. His interest was not just in the message, but also in how the message was relayed. Knowledge is social, but it also has an internal structure that is not just about power relations. Bernstein’s theory “aims to make visible knowledge as an object, one with its own properties and powers that are emergent from, but irreducible to, social practices and which, indeed, help shape those practices” (Maton and Muller 2007, 24).

Bernstein’s code theory and his theory of pedagogic discourse provide the conceptual tools for the “anatomising” (Davies and Fitz Forthcoming) of pedagogic discourse. The theory provides categories for a fine-grained, formalized, and theoretically coherent description of classroom practices and allows for a connection between the macro level (especially the distribution of knowledge) and the micro level (especially the specializing of consciousness) of educational discourse. His theorizing around knowledge allows for analyses of the structuring of knowledge and its recontextualizing in the curriculum.

The metaphor of the boundary, introduced earlier, is at the heart of the theory. In particular, the concept of classification (power) concerns the strength of boundaries between categories, and framing (control) refers to the social relations within those categories, with the potential to change and maintain boundaries. Bernstein’s unique sociological distinction is between power and control—referring to the “what” and the “how” of education practice. His point is that there is a differential distribution of power and control relations across different social classes, and these produce different practices and forms of consciousness. It is through Bernstein’s “codes” that we see the differential positioning of subjects of different social class groupings, dominant and dominated.

This work is concentrated mainly in the former White English-speaking universities, especially the University of Cape Town (UCT), the University
of the Witwatersrand (WITS), the University of Kwa-Zulu Natal (UKZN), and Rhodes University. Some introduction to Bernstein’s theory will help to make sense of a central strand of debate in this grouping.

Bernstein provides a sociological framework for the investigation of how social class, social practice, and forms of human consciousness are related (Hasan 2002, 538). Bernstein’s central question—“How does the outside become the inside, and how does the inside reveal itself and shape the outside?” (Bernstein 1987, 563)—is about ideology, in an Althusserian sense, and it is also about the extent to which the student is given access to the means to reproduce the discourse they are to acquire (Ensor 1999). Bernstein introduces a range of distinctions, between the abstract and the concrete, the general and the particular, between context-dependent and context-independent meanings that allow for the analysis of curriculum and pedagogy.

One of the problems in moving the debate forward on the issue of the boundary, the integration of knowledge, and the place of disciplinary knowledge in the classroom was the fact that there was very little research done locally to show that either view of the boundary (its assertion, strengthening, weakening, or dissolution) was correct. The research that was used (i.e., Getting Learning Right, and even later that of Getting Schools Working) was criticized for being methodologically questionable and selective (Carrim 2003). The combined research of a group working on curriculum and pedagogy at the aforementioned universities, however, has begun to show a remarkable consistency around certain aspects of curriculum and pedagogy and a preferred curriculum and pedagogy, especially for poor students. Although Bernstein has informed much of this work, it is by no means hegemonic across all these institutions. There has been, however, a fruitful engagement amongst those working with Bernstein’s theory with a broader group of international scholars. The work of the ESSA group in Lisbon (see Morais 2002; Morais et al. 2004) has been particularly influential in developing metrics for considering pedagogy, curriculum, and social class. The work has also extended the theory, by drawing on other theoretical resources to work with the absences in Bernstein’s theory.

Much of this work features in the Journal of Education and in Perspectives. A selection is presented below.

Through detailed analysis of opportunity to learn variables and types of pedagogic practice, Reeves (Reeves 2005; Reeves and Muller 2005) shows that what is most beneficial for low SES (socio-economic-status) learners is a mixed pedagogy containing dimensions that could be described as progressive (or learner-centered) and those that relate to direct or “traditional” instruction. Explicit instruction with respect to the
elaboration of the “evaluative criteria”—that is, what students are required
to do to produce an appropriate pedagogic performance—was also related
to improved student performance.

Brodie (2004) argues for the relaxing of the framing (control) over the
teacher-student social relation, such that students’ own thinking and
meaning-making can be accessed to work between learners’ meaning and
mathematical meanings. Brodie’s (2005) later work shows, again, that in
working with learners’ thinking, teachers develop “hybrid pedagogies”
that draw on elements of both reform and traditional pedagogies as they
are confronted by a number of dilemmas. Although posing different and
more challenges, this is the case in both high and low socioeconomic
contexts.\(^6\)

Hoadley (2005) shows the effects of integration through theme-based
learning and the collapsing of the boundary between school knowledge and
everyday knowledge for working-class learners. Although this certainly
closes the “gap” between the school and the home for poor learners, long
decreed as one of the impediments to school learning (Delpit 1996; Heath
1985), what the teachers do is confine the students to the local and commu-
nal and students are given no access to the formal knowledge of schooling.

Breier (2003; 2004) and Gamble (2003; 2004) take the discussion into
different learning contexts. In higher education, Breier shows the complex
interplay between informal and formal knowledge, making the “recog-
nition of prior learning” problematic. Breier finds that the inclusion of every-
day knowledge is usually confined to “less able” students and reduces
vertical discourses (the hierarchical knowledge of academic disciplines) to
a set of strategies to improve “their functioning in the every day world of
work and domesticity” (Breier 2004, 204). Gamble’s (2004) concern is
with the tacit base of craft knowledge. Her work has contributed to think-
ing around the NQF, modularization, and knowledge in apprenticeship
models.

Davis’ (2005) exploration of a particular case of problem-centered
learning is perhaps one of the most theoretically ambitious and interesting
explanations of the persistence of progressive discourses that challenge the
boundaries of knowledge. He explains the necessity to break down the
boundary between school knowledge and everyday knowledge and to
assert relevance in terms of the moral discourse that operates in accordance
with dominant ideological imperatives. With a dominant injunction to
pleasure, to the “enjoyment” of learning (e.g., “Enjoy Maths,” “Have fun
learning”), a space is opened up for the operation of utilitarian moral
regulation.

A group at Kwa-Zulu Natal has begun to take the analysis of pedagogy,
in particular the transmission of specialized knowledge in a number of
different disciplines, in the direction of systemic functional linguistics. This is in order to look at the structuring of knowledge in relation to lexical structures in the classroom. Green (2007) investigates in the area of science the logical structuring of science discourse in the classroom. Key to this structuring is the extent to which causality is established, and the “recasting” of everyday lexis in terms of the language of science. Similar work is done in history by Bertram (2007).

A number of scholars have also worked specifically with the structuring of knowledge within the curriculum, especially in relation to specific subjects (e.g., Dempster and Hugo 2006; Beets and Le Grange 2005; Lotz-Sisitka 2007). This work identifies issues around specification, coherence and content, and progression and differentiation of knowledge (Muller 2002) in the new curriculum. The ways in which assessment functions to drive curriculum change are raised by Bertram (2007) and Allais (2006). Both show how it is at the point of evaluation that we see the clearest expression of curriculum intent.

Other more macro work, especially in relation to competence debates and the NQF has been undertaken by Ensor (1997), Muller (1998), Shalem and Slonimsky (1999), and Allais (2007). There has also been a sustained critique of outcomes-based education and its implications for the structuring of knowledge in the curriculum (Allais and Taylor 2007; Morrow 2007; Shalem et al. 2004).

On the basis of this work, we have a good idea of what effective pedagogy entails, especially for students from low socioeconomic contexts, and how we might want to structure (or restructure) the formal curriculum in relation to knowledge and its specification. Muller and Gamble (2007) summarize the four most significant aspects arising from these studies contributing to optimal learning for low SES students. These is a clear explication of the evaluative rules; strong teacher control over the selection of knowledge; variable pacing in order to assess student learning; and more horizontal, personal relations between the teacher and the taught. As they point out, two of these pertain to a more progressive orientation, and two refer to traditional understandings of pedagogy.

The work of those critiquing the concept of outcomes and the NQF, as well as that of Muller (2002), Ensor (1997), and the Review Committee, suggests that clear specification in the intended curriculum, with clear vertical progression paths, is optimal, especially for teachers with weak content and conceptual knowledge. The need to differentiate between different knowledge structures in thinking through curriculum structuring has also begun to emerge as important (Muller 2002). The research has also successfully shaken the blind faith in a strong progressive pedagogy and pedagogic constructivism by considering what this entails in practice.
Characterizing the Tribes

I have indicated a number of the points of difference between the identified groups above, but now I return to some of the other terms introduced by Becher earlier. The metaphor of tribes is provocative—suggesting as it does a mechanical solidarity between different groups. It is also suggestive of Bernstein’s horizontal knowledge structures—incommensurable, hide bound, and strongly insulated from one another. In the review of the journals, and in the citation practices, there is almost no critical engagement between the groups. Muller has over the course of time presented a sustained critique of progressivism (2002), constructivism (2001), and “voice discourse” (Moore and Muller 1999). Counter-critiques (in print) have emerged only from foreigners (Michelson 2004; Gough 2001). In other words, it would seem that while those who work in the knowledge mode assert the boundary, those who work in a knower mode simply don’t recognize it, or at other times misrecognize it as a conservative move. This at times leads to inaccurate, simplistic stereotypes, along the lines of hard realists and soft relativists. As I have stressed before, these groups are much more heterogeneous than presented and an analysis of the articles bears out the general patterns.

The work of those working in the knowledge mode is located within the sociology of education. There is a clear “disciplinary hero” (Bernstein), although most work with other social theory in developing and extending that theory, for example Davis’ (2005) recruitment of Lacan, Freud, Bentham, and Hegel to extend Bernstein’s notions of moral regulation. Dowling has also played a key role as a theorist informing work, as have Vygotsky and the practice theorists in the Wits work.

Both the “internal language” (theory) and “external language” (methodology for analysis) within the knowledge group is strong. The work is overwhelmingly qualitative, with the focus on theoretical development and the generation of models of explanation and analysis. Especially for those working with Bernstein’s theory, the work has a specific, theoretical language and jargon, often criticized for being impenetrable and at times used to obfuscate rather than elucidate, particularly by novices. The frame is relatively narrow, and in the case of UCT in particular, there is a rigorous apprenticeship into the discipline. The main local forum for publishing is the Journal of Education, whose editorial board comprises prominent local scholars mainly from former English universities and international curriculum scholars (including Stephen Appel and Philip Wexler) The group also publishes, though to a lesser extent, in Perspectives, which also has both a national editorial board drawn from former English as well as
Afrikaans and Black universities, and an international board including curriculum scholars (such as Michael Apple).

International publishing is also common amongst the group, and many attend a biennial symposium of Bernstein scholars working around the world. Strong networks, both local and international, characterize the group. As the work reported above suggests, there is an incremental and cumulative aspect to the project in terms of knowledge production, partly as a result of what Collins (2004) terms “congestion”—a critical mass of scholars focused on a similar theoretical project. In the terms introduced earlier, it is possible to say that knowledge production in the “knowledge mode” has more of a triangular shape in relation to the empirical and theoretical knowledge being produced.

Those working in the knower mode also publish in both journals. The work has also become prominent at the Kenton Conference (which in its current form is very different to that described earlier), and a number of the debates between those working in different modes are played out here.

The internal language of this group is eclectic and is drawn from a range of theorists mainly within sociology and psychology. Postmodern and post-structural theories are common, as well as educational studies literature that theorizes around learning and teaching theories from various perspectives. Theoretical resources are often not sustained by individuals across articles or projects. In other words, there is an eclecticism in much of the work, pertaining to the theory deployed as well as the topics addressed. Theory is often used loosely, as “orientations” or as “pointers,” lacking a “stable, explicit and rigorous methodology of production” (Moore and Muller 1999, 202).

The methodological approach is generally qualitative, generally ethnographic, and concerned with alternative methodologies—especially participative methodologies, which seek to undermine the power relations between the researcher and the researched. In this way, the “authenticity” of the research subjects’ voice is sought. Structural concerns, such as those of social stratification, are subordinated to cultural investigations concerned with positioning and identity. Life history and biographical research consequently also feature prominently.

The intellectual values of the groups are also different. The knower tribes are concerned with a broad range of social issues, such as environmental matters as well as issues of race, gender, disability, and inclusion. Those working in the knowledge mode have a much narrower and tighter focus on knowledge, its structure, production, and reproduction. Put another way, the knowledge mode is interested in the relation between the epistemic and the social, and the knower mode focuses almost exclusively on social relations. For those in the knowledge mode, the knowledge boundary is central,
and categories of knowledge for curriculum and pedagogy (what knowledge) are the object of concern. For the knower mode, what is specialized is the social category—which knower, whose knowledge.

What about the relevance of all this work to the broader education project in South Africa? Some intrusion of a Bernsteinian framework into the revised NCS was demonstrated earlier, especially in relation to the notions of integration, differentiation, and progression. There is also a stable and robust set of findings around pedagogy that ultimately do not represent a hard realist position, but rather a socially considered, moderate approach to pedagogy, and a consistent and firm position on curriculum knowledge, its specification and the importance of disciplinarity. One of the limitations of these findings on policy and broader understandings of the curriculum project I have suggested was the retention of outcomes, which appears to have also meant holding onto the associational complex of outcomes, progressivism, and constructivism. Currently, in the institutions where the most teacher training is taking place, what is the impact of this critical work and what is the nature of their scholarly output? I turn to this question in the following section.

The Bureaucratic Mode

In the introduction I indicated that my interest in this chapter was in the impact of the debates and conclusions sketched above on what was happening in education more broadly. In discussing the work that is done in the former Afrikaans universities I talk about a bureaucratic mode. The reason for this is that these institutions shore up resources, especially those flowing from government, to run large-scale teacher training initiatives. Essentially their task is framed as implementing government policy. But it is also the nature of the relation to knowledge that I will argue can be described as bureaucratic. The aim here is to understand what discourses around curriculum knowledge are adopted, and later to provide some speculative suggestions as to why.

In order to obtain a sense of what kind of curriculum work was being done in the former Afrikaans universities, the same three journals cited above were reviewed. Central to this analysis were 39 articles from the South African Journal of Education (SAJE), from 2000 to 2007, being the major location of publishing for the Afrikaans universities. SAJE is the official journal of the traditional Afrikaans education society, the Education Association of South Africa (EASA). Articles were overwhelmingly from North West University (formerly Potchefstroom University and the
University of the North West, which merged in 2004), UNISA, and to a lesser extent Pretoria, Free State and Stellenbosch, and Vista. Although there were obviously differences in the articles, they were also remarkably consistent in certain aspects. The articles fell into two broad types. The first type of article was concerned with the issue of indigenous knowledge, and the second concerned optimizing the implementation of aspects of the curriculum. I discuss each in turn below.

Implementing the Curriculum

Of the 34 articles 28 focused on enhancing implementation of the curriculum, or particular aspects of the curriculum, especially those “new” dimensions of the curriculum such as learner-centeredness, group work, and the like. Some exemplary titles for such work were the following: “Are groups working in the Information Technology class?” (Mentz and Goosen 2007), “To what extent do teachers succeed in achieving the aims and outcomes of the learning area, LO [Life Orientation] in the classroom?” and “Do mathematics learning facilitators implement metacognitive strategies?” (van der Walt and Maree 2007).

The authors take a functionalist view of the curriculum. Curriculum is regarded as a static artifact, a “given” to be “operationalised.” Rhodes and Roux (2004) write, “The aim of the National Curriculum Statement (2001, 9) is to ensure that constitutional and democratic values are expressed and that the values of a democratic state are built into the curriculum” (29). The majority of the articles begin with a statement of this kind, some of them “heralding” the new curriculum or offering a statement of affirmation: “The development of the learning area LO is one of the most successful accomplishments in the construction of the new education dispensation in South Africa” (Prinsloo 2007, 155).

The shift from old (bad) to new (good) is also stressed. Frequent affirmations of outcomes, and the rejection of “traditional education,” are made (Kotze 2002, 77). Walt and Maree (2007, 227) put it like this: “Worldwide a change in emphasis is occurring, with education institutions gradually changing from places that ‘provide tuition’ to places that ‘facilitate learning.’ This paradigm shift is from ‘instructivism’ to ‘constructivism.’” Van Wyk (2002, 311) states: “Contrary to the rigid and prescriptive curriculum demands of the past, the OBE policy framework for all learning areas allows educators ample space to be creative and innovative”

In relation to the arguments presented earlier around constructivism, in this literature the theory, given different meanings, is mostly taken up and
associated with OBE. A number of concerns—self-regulation, metacognition, relevance, action research (Aldridge et al. 2004)—are all understood as part of the constructivist package. There is an unquestioning take up of these theories. None refer to them directly as learning theories stemming from Vygotsky or Piaget, but rather they are treated as “teaching technologies.” No contradiction in adhering to outcomes and following a constructivist path is identified. In these, and other instances, contradiction is subsumed by conviction.

From the articles it appears that currently in former Afrikaans and Black universities, constructivism, variously understood, has been accepted unequivocally as the theory of curriculum—and pedagogy guiding practice (Hoadley 2008) confirms this through a case study of North West University. As pointed out above OBE in the articles is knotted to progressivism and constructivism, with the take up referring overwhelmingly to political or regulative aspects rather than instructional or pedagogical issues. Constructivism here is pedagogical constructivism referred to earlier—a series of techniques.

Most commonly the articles take various concepts related to constructivism, or certain interpretations of them, and ascertain teachers and students attitudes toward these constructs. Alternatively, in control settings, research determines whether they make a difference to learner performance on an administered test (e.g., van Loggerenberg-Hattingh 2003). Constructs dealt with include problem-based learning (ibid.), the self-regulating learner (Lubbe et al. 2006), cooperative learning (Messerschmidt 2003), and “metacognition” (van de Walt and Maree 2007). In each case the selection of this particular construct for research is justified in terms of it being privileged in national curriculum policy, understood as constructivist in design and intent.

Several of the articles follow the pattern evident in statements on what the intended curriculum says; what standardized and international tests say about student achievement; a diagnosis of what the problem is (e.g., teachers’ content knowledge of a particular area; or non-implementation of group work); a rudimentary statistical analysis; and a conclusion around teachers’ lack of ability to implement the curriculum appropriately.

Another set of papers considers teachers and students attitudes or perceptions regarding aspects of the curriculum. Mentz and Goosen (2007) study group work. A table shows learners’ perspectives according to teachers, with the conclusion being drawn that “the learners’ practice, according to the teachers’ experiences, showed that 65% of learners liked to work together in groups” (336).

In the majority of the studies the problem is the teacher or their personal deficits. These usually include not only knowledge or language but
also attitudinal dimensions, such as lack of responsibility (Uys et al. 2007). Mentz and Goosen (2007) conclude in their study:

Not only were teachers uninformed, but they did not seem to appreciate the dynamics of group work and the contribution that group work could make to effective learning and teaching in the IT class. Without informed teachers there will be no effective group work. (241)

Adler and Davis (2006) argue that “a concern with ‘change’ produces a deficit discourse: Teachers are typically found to be lacking. Either they have not changed enough or they have not changed in the right direction” (278). They point out that this is not peculiar to South Africa. In the case of work here, however, an explicit moral statement is often attendant on these characterizations. Prinsloo (2007) provides a good example:

The character of the LO teacher is of the utmost importance. Teachers who themselves have no positive value system, who entertain little enthusiasm in the teaching task, who show no diligence and are unpunctual should not be allowed to present the LO programmes. In many ways, the person of the teacher determines the degree of success with which all aspects of life, survival and communication skills are conveyed to and internalised by learners. An official screening process should ensure that the right calibre of person is appointed in this position. (168)

The articles end either with an exhortation to further teacher training or with a normative statement regarding how practice can be improved. Sixteen of the studies conclude that the solution to the problem is teacher training. In other words, teachers are the problem that teacher education can fix. Thus, through the research the authority of both the state-determined curriculum and the researchers identities as trainers of teachers is asserted.

Indigenous Knowledge

Whist the majority of the curriculum work focuses on implementation as described above, seven of the articles addressed the issue of indigenous knowledge. This focuses primarily on the issue of integration (e.g., Maluleka et al. 2006). The inclusion of indigenous knowledge in the curriculum is set up against “conservative forces for discipline-based knowledge” (Ramsuran and Malcolm 2006, 522), which is often characterized as “Western.” The writers, with the exception of Ramsuran and Malcolm (2006), base their articles not on empirical research but rather on the polemics of the necessity
for the inclusion of indigenous knowledge in the curriculum and perceptions of the importance of indigenous knowledge (Maila and Loubser 2003). The main argument of the articles is that indigenous knowledge should be included in the curriculum, and that the reasons it is not derive from conservative, Western pressures that undervalue indigenous cultures and ethnic groups. The tenor of this writing is politically charged—indigenous knowledge embodies the “liberation of subjugated cultures” (Vandyar 2003), and definitions are often tied to basic interpretations of knowledge distribution: “this knowledge is accorded low status because it belongs to a particular racial or ethnic group which often, it is assumed, lacks the necessary cultural capital” (Maila and Loubser 2003).

The articles draw on a wide range of theories, though these are often not elaborated and in some instances exhibit theoretical confusion and misappropriation. In two instances, strong critics of the authors’ positions are recruited to argue their case. For example, in reference to the title of Taylor’s book *Inventing Knowledge* (2003), where the distinction between everyday knowledge and school knowledge first appeared, and the boundary was asserted, Van Wyk (2002) writes, in support of indigenous knowledge in the curriculum, that “in the South African context Muller and Taylor (1995, 315) speak of the need among learners to invent new knowledge precisely because the domain of everyday life stands in stark contrast to the academic domain” (307).

The conceptual and theoretical muddle is mirrored in the complex claims around the research approach methodologies that are employed. One example comes from a study of mediation claiming the use of chaos theory, activity theory, and complexity theory:

*Qualitative research accommodates and embraces many epistemological traditions such as positivism, constructivism, interpretivism, critical theory and feminism (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). For this study, a qualitative research design with a modernist postpositivist approach to data collection and analysis was chosen. Design experiments were used for systematic eliciting of data as opposed to the creation of freeflowing narratives characteristic of interpretivist approaches to qualitative research. (Ryan and Bernard 2000, 230)*

Consistent with much writing on indigenous knowledge in general, the work reviewed here establishes equivalences between different knowledge types—formal and informal. Indigenous knowledge is also tied into arguments around constructivism, relevance, and multiculturalism. For example,

IKS has a great deal of common ground with constructivism which tells us that there can be no grand narrative for teaching but rather that, in the case
of science and technology, all knowledge must be understood as partial to the social position of the knower—the knower’s race, gender, class, and so on will determine what is paid attention to and how things are interpreted. (van Wyk 2002, 308)

The remainder of the discussion of the bureaucratic mode will consider the categories introduced by Becher earlier. The intellectual values of this academic community are neatly summarized in one of the articles in the SAJE. Drawing on Jenkins and Shipman (1976), Basson (2004) claims the following approach to curriculum:

As opposed to curriculum research being seen as an aspirant body of knowledge, Jenkins and Shipman argue that curriculum studies more usefully may be seen as a social movement which focuses, in the first instance as Schwab indicates, on the unstable but usable arts of the practitioner, rather than on the systematic application of a discipline to elucidate programme purposes and effects and to reflect back on the discipline…. In the final analysis, the criterion of efficacy, rather than elegance, distinguishes research into a curriculum from other debates in education, and from curriculum being conflated with one of its constituent parts like, the rhetoric about programme intents, prescriptions about the form and content of programmes, or procedures for adjudicating curricula. (31)

In this definition curriculum studies is a technical process—“efficacy” being the primary goal. In Pinar et al.’s (1995) terms the focus is on curriculum development rather than “understanding curriculum.”

In disciplinary terms, the education faculties of the former Afrikaans universities are dominated by psychologists, and the authors of the articles predominantly work in the area of psychology of education. This is evident in part in the focus of much of the work—on perceptions and attitudes. It is also clear from the quantitative methods used in the vast majority of studies. In only three cases is the sample described in terms of its racial composition, and class as a social category is not invoked. Popkewitz (1987, 16), discussing the dominant influence of educational psychology since the 1930s (which he refers to as the “psychologization of the curriculum”), asserts that the psychological basis for curriculum design is a mechanism of social control: “Educational research developed within university departments to provide management of the knowledge and of the people processed in schools” (ibid., 16). These initiatives informed by educational psychology research were very often structured around the notion of “need.” That is, around perceptions of what knowledge students “needed” to become productive and moral citizens. This is certainly apparent in the discussion presented above.
The theoretical eclecticism of the work was identified above. Many of the implementation studies contained no theory but rather provided definitions for terms or concepts deployed in the research. Further, in articles published by an individual over time, there was no consistency in the theory deployed. The lack of theory in the studies seriously compromised the reliability and validity of the findings in several cases. This was because they lacked both what Bernstein (2000) terms an internal language of description (theory) and an external language of description—the set of concepts and constructs that allow the theory to structure and analyze the data.

The lack of an internal language also means that ideological assumptions underlying research often go unexamined. In her investigation of whether students subjected to problem-based learning learn as much as those who receive a teacher-centered pedagogy, Van Loggerenberg-Hattingh (2003) sets up a series of dichotomies: constructivism with positivism; the “guide on the side” with the “sage on the stage.” The stereotypical representations of these positions, underpinned with strong ideological elements, provide the basis for the author’s questionable conclusion that students learn more in problem-based settings.

A different kind of challenge to reliability results from a positivist treatment of data, where perception data is treated unproblematically and is taken to represent reality accurately.

In terms of citations, there is very little referencing of work in other South African journals. Many of the references of the SAJE articles are curriculum development publications, many of them emanating from the United States, including a substantial number of references to teacher development websites, such as the National Council for Teacher Education.

The editorial board of the journal comprises academics drawn solely from the former Afrikaans universities. The executive editor, publishing and distribution editor, and administrative editor are all from North West University (formerly Potchefstroom). The editorial committee comprises four members from Pretoria University, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, UNISA, and University of Johannesburg.

The constitution of the editorial committee for the journal indicates a weak peer review system. In such a system, the potential for writers to make strong claims by leaving out whole bodies of work becomes possible, as does the possibility of bypassing criticism from a wider range of referees. Presenting arguments that have already been made elsewhere and parading them as original are also possible. Examples of both of these practices were found. Inaccuracies in theoretical interpretation shown above, as well as problems with reliability and validity, have a greater chance of going
unnoticed. Like the knowledge tribe, but in different ways, this group has established and asserts its own cultural domain as well as its own cognitive territory, defined in disciplinary terms and in the kinds of questions that inform its research.

The bureaucratic mode is not oriented to a knowledge mode. It is concerned with the officially designated position of the author/researcher/scholar and entails a procedural uptake of the knower mode. The knower mode provides it with the terms for establishing political legitimacy. But in this version, critique is backgrounded, and the focus is on the fulfillment of a particular duty with respect to the official position on curriculum and pedagogy. The mandate is closely aligned to the state. In the case of those who focus their curriculum work on the implementation of the curriculum, the official designated position is that of teacher trainer (or teacher educator) and the purpose is to implement or enhance the implementation of the official education message, or at least their understanding of it. Ideas are recruited from official messages around curriculum, and the theoretical resources and understandings are largely located within a knower mode, generally taken up uncritically. In particular, the associational knot identified earlier of OBE, constructivism, and progressivism is adopted without exception. The review of the national curriculum and debates subsequent to it do not appear in the work reviewed here.

Summary

The purpose of the chapter has been to show the diversity of the field, the lack of articulation between different bodies of work, the question of the impact of work, and issues pertaining to continuity from the past. It is a broad, speculative sweep that intends to open up questions for deeper research and consideration.

What the former Afrikaans universities are concerned with, as reflected in the review of journal articles, is the reproduction of official ideology. Failures in curriculum implementation are placed at the feet of teachers, and as teacher trainers they are positioned to repair the situation. A distinct hierarchy as well as positions of power and control are thus established between the state, teacher education, and teachers. This hierarchy has been in place for a very long time. There is some continuity here in the relationship between the universities in this case and the state under Apartheid.

The knowledge tribe, located mainly in the former liberal White universities, is concerned with questions around the structuring of knowledge,
its transmission, and its social stratification. Its solutions are sometimes interpreted as conservative, and its work is at times regarded as elitist and impenetrable. Their central purpose, however, is the critique of dominant forms of curriculum and pedagogy that serve ultimately to disadvantage those who would benefit most from good schooling—the poor and the marginalized. The political nature of the project is often not recognized, going, as it does, against popular notions around what it means to be inclusive and socially just in relation to education. Many of these contestations spin around the concepts of constructivism, progressivism, and outcomes-based education.

In the knower mode the concern is with the specialization of the social category. In relation to the boundary between different kinds of knowledge, the impulse is toward integration that is crucially understood as a political project realized pedagogically through introducing equivalences between formal and everyday knowledge. In this group the emphasis is on experience, voice, and particular forms of pedagogy that affirm the identity and prior knowledge of learners. This work is also located predominantly in the former White liberal universities.

There is clearly a fragmentation in the field. A review of the journals shows that knowledge production across these tribes is generally noncumulative. There is a plethora of publishing across a range of topics, with very little inter-referencing. In this cacophony it is difficult to hear or make anything heard. With so much research that is often self-referential, and in places with closed peer review systems, it is difficult to see how the knowledge base will grow. The activity, then, far from being “intentional” (Ernest) is rendered solipsistic.

What is interesting is the extent to which the associational complex of OBE, constructivism, and progressivism have become and remained axiomatic, despite both scholarly and official criticism (in the review of C2005). Becher (1995) offers some explanation for this in terms of the nature of disciplines in general: “In hard, cumulative subjects of this kind, it is uncommon for two mutually incompatible paradigms to exist side by side for any significant period. However, in softer reiterative knowledge areas, in which a new theory does not in any very evident sense supersede and replace another, rival paradigms may remain locked in contest for a substantial length of time” (342). In the intervening period, we may be doing irreparable damage to yet another generation of students being schooled at a time when a political ideology is railing against what has been shown through research to prove optimal for learning. Understandings from the knower mode are those which are recontextualized in the bureaucratic mode to inform large-scale teacher training. In the conclusion to this chapter I present some initial thoughts as to why this is the case.
Conclusion

Why has the “knower” discourse been taken up, albeit procedurally, in a bureaucratic mode in the Afrikaans universities? There are a number of reasons why we might not expect this. The first is that, although the NCS is still largely overdetermined by ideological elements, there has been a shift. Allais (2006) shows how, largely due to the pressure of assessment and the consequent need for content stipulation, government is, in fact, moving away from an outcomes-based approach. Further, the inroads into the revised curriculum made by the knowledge emphasis also represent a move away from outcomes and strong forms of progressivism. Being close followers of state policy, why then have the Afrikaans universities not adopted more of a knowledge focus? The second reason that we might not expect the Afrikaans universities to adopt a knower mode is that syllabi with strong content specification, suggested in the NCS, are closer to the Apartheid curriculum with which, historically at least, they are familiar.

So, despite the mounting evidence of the failure of a strong progressive project for poor children shown earlier, this is what is being taken up in the bureaucratic mode, representing a procedural uptake of the knower mode. Why is this the case? Becher provided one explanation in terms of the nature of the field. Another way of looking at it might entail a broader consideration of the way in which education as a field of study is structured the world over, and the dominance of the progressive mode. Another explanation could relate to the particular point in history that South Africa finds itself, where the social is still so fractured. A curriculum that promises to break down these divisions by dispensing with knowledge boundaries, subverting fractures and marginalization, is seductive. Prising apart the political and pedagogical project as it has been understood through the transition to democracy may take a long time. The fact that progressivism, OBE, and constructivism have been regarded as largely axiomatic and have been taken up uncritically in some quarters has been a conundrum that a number of people have tried to deal with (Morrow 2001; Harley and Wedekind 2004; Davis 2005). All deal with external accounts (in the social) to describe this: in terms of the adherence to mythological truths (Harley and Wedekind 2004), treatment of the notions as “scripture” (Morrow 2001), or, in Davis’ terms, being part of late capitalism’s utilitarian project. Elsewhere, I have suggested that a bureaucratic mode is consistent with the Afrikaner universities’ past relation to the state, maintaining an uncritical uptake of state policy even when the nature of the state has changed considerably (Hoadley 2008).
But there are also possible “internal” accounts that consider, for example, the similarities between outcomes-based education and behaviorism, the similarity between the roots of fundamental pedagogics and learner-centeredness in Dewey’s pragmatism and phenomenology. Both fundamental pedagogics and learner-centeredness are a-contextual, not making social or knowledge differentiations. In this account a single mode and philosophy of learning is good for all learners in all places and at all times. The point is that there is possibly more continuity between current educational discourses and that of the conservative past than the stereotypical polarity between traditionalism and progressivism would suggest. Although the progressive project has been long in the making (from the 1970s on, as I have shown), the criticism is relatively new. Deeper historical analysis and careful anatomizing of the structuring of different educational philosophies may provide a clearer picture as to why a bureaucratic form of a knower discourse has come to settle over the curriculum terrain, seemingly impervious to sustained criticism.

Notes

1. Maton has subsequently developed this work to talk about knowledge-knower codes. I extract these from his earlier work and simplify them for use in the analysis in this chapter. Given the exploratory nature of this work, the terms are also used heuristically rather than analytically.
2. For a full account of these merger processes, see Jansen (2002). Kruss (2008) provides an account of institutional restructuring of Education faculties and colleges of education specifically.
3. The most comprehensive curriculum critique during this period came from the policy analysts. The precise nature of these debates is outside the scope of this chapter. In summary they covered
   • The competing agendas policy had to deal with (Cross 2002)
   • The symbolic nature of policy (Jansen 1999; 2002)
   • The political privileged over the pedagogic in policy decisions (Cross 2002)
   • The global and the local discourses in curriculum construction (Christie 1997)
   • Representation in the processes of curriculum revision (Jansen 1999; Soudien and Baxen 1997)
   • Policy priorities (Chisholm and Fuller 1997)
4. See also Young’s (2005) response to Michelson (2000) and Muller (2000) on these debates.
5. Neither this group, nor the group in the former Afrikaans universities discussed below, are currently racially homogenous.
6. There are those, like Brodie, who are attempting to work between the knowledge and the knower, in a turn to “practice.” There isn’t space to go into this here, but it is an interesting move, often conceptualized in terms of communities of practice—thinking and knowledge as practice. It will be interesting to see whether such accounts background or foreground disciplinary knowledge, or the social relations that constitute the practice.

7. I am aware that this is a limited measure of the universities’ intellectual output. However, publication rates in these universities are extremely low and are limited to specific journals, SAJE being the major one in relation to curriculum and schooling. Further research, considering postgraduate work, would be a useful next step in taking this speculative research to a deeper level of analysis.

8. The definition “rural” is often deployed, however, which generally seems to refer to poor, Black schools.

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Chapter 5

South African Curriculum Studies: 
A Historical Perspective and 
Autobiographical Account

Lesley Le Grange

Introduction

In this essay I wish to trace the history of South African curriculum studies of the past 30 years through an autobiographical account of my engagement with both the field and the term curriculum. It was as a school learner in the decade of the 1970s that I first heard the term curriculum being used and understood it to mean the collection of school subjects taken in a particular grade. My understanding of the term curriculum and the field of curriculum studies has since expanded and this essay bears testimony to this.

Grumet (1981) wrote that curriculum is “the collective story we tell our children about our past, our present and our future.” When we tell children stories (or a story), some things are made explicit, other things are hidden and certain things are not told. As Eisner (1985, 87) asserts, schools teach three curricula—the explicit, the implicit, and the null. In this essay I draw loosely on both Grumet’s and Eisner’s notions of curriculum in providing a historical perspective on the development of curriculum (policy) in South Africa over the past few decades and my engagement with these developments.
My essay is divided into the following main sections: my early understanding of the term curriculum; my induction into curriculum studies traditions; Fundamental Pedagogics and the didactics tradition in South Africa; people’s education and in-service education for teachers by teachers; National Education Policy Initiative (NEPI) and the introduction of interim syllabuses; outcomes-based education: a major discourse in South African curriculum studies; some parting thoughts. Although the essay is divided into different sections, there inevitably will be overlap, both in terms of chronology and ideas.

My Early Understanding of the Term Curriculum

As a Grade 7 learner I remember the national student revolts of 1976, commonly known as the Soweto uprisings because of the place where it started. The uprisings were sparked by students’ dissatisfaction with Afrikaans being imposed as medium of instruction in African1 schools. At the time, I had made no meaningful connection between the students’ protests and the concept curriculum. Later, in 1980, I was in Grade 11, during a period of protracted school boycotts. These started in the city of Cape Town, where I did my schooling, and rapidly spread throughout the country (Christie 1985, 244). As school students we boycotted “normal school activities,” demanding a single national education department (there were 19 in South Africa at the time divided on ethnic and racial lines), and for educational resources to be distributed equitably to children. During the four-month boycott I attended alternative awareness programs organized by the student representative council (SRC) at our school. During this period I became deeply aware of acute disparities in the distribution of both human and material resources between those then classified as “White,” “Indian,” “Coloured,” and “African.” I also learned that students had the power to change some of the conditions of teaching and learning. Although schools remained segregated following the 1976 and 1980 unrest, after these events the Apartheid State provided more textbooks, repaired school buildings, and set up the De Lange Commission (1981) to investigate education in South Africa (Christie 1985, 248). It was at this point in my life that I began to understand education to be an important site of struggle and also became aware of the role of human agency in bringing about change. Although my consciousness about the evils of Apartheid was raised during this period, I do not recall that I made any meaningful connections between Apartheid policies
and the notion of curriculum. However, there were some students at the time who were able to express their discontent with state schooling articulately and with insight. The words of one student provide an apt illustration:

_They_ decide what we are taught. Our history is written according to their ideas. Biology and physics are taught in our schools but which cannot apply to our everyday lives. We are not told that most diseases of the workers stem from the fact that they are undernourished and overworked. We are taught biology, but not biology of liberation, where we can tackle the concept of “race” to prove that there is no such thing as “race.” We are taught geography, but not the geography of liberation. We are not taught that 80% of South Africans are dumped on 13% of the land… We are taught accountancy merely to calculate the profits of the capitalists. (quoted in Maurice 1983, emphasis in original)

The student quoted above had a good sense of what curriculum was about. (S)he understood the story/stories South African children were (not) told about their past, present, and future. Although the student might not have known technical terms such as _explicit_ and _null curriculum_, (s)he understood what these meant. The words of this student raised a perennial curriculum question: what knowledge was worth learning most (in Apartheid South Africa)?

I did my BSc studies (in earth and biological sciences) in the early to middle 1980s at what was then, arguably, the most radical university in South Africa, the University of the Western Cape (UWC). My formal studies at UWC were often interrupted by student political activities such as public demonstrations, lecture boycotts, and mass meetings. In this period my political consciousness developed even further. However, my political consciousness grew in parallel to my ecological consciousness since I had not at that stage developed meaningful connections between them. In my own mind I separated the political from “the curriculum.” After graduating from the UWC, I decided to study a higher diploma in education (HDE) course at the University of Cape Town and as a consequence was inducted into the curriculum studies traditions. The latter is significant because had I stayed at UWC to do my HDE course, I would have been inducted into the didactics tradition. I return to the curriculum studies versus didactics traditions later in my discussion. Suffice it to say that although the student politics at UWC was radical, what was taught in lecture halls had largely been influenced by academic traditions (such as the didactics tradition) from Afrikaner universities—most of the lecturers at UWC in the 1970s and 1980s were Stellenbosch University graduates.
My Induction into Curriculum Studies

In my HDE year I took a particular module called Curriculum Theory and Classroom Practice. As part of the course I also attended a weekly tutorial session in which we discussed different articles aimed at assisting us to complete a research project called the “Effective Teacher.” Weekly, we would critically discuss one of the articles in the “Effective Teacher” reader. An article that we read in one of the tutorial sessions introduced me to what is probably the first significant debate on curriculum in South Africa. The article was written by Buckland (1982) in response to an article published by Tunmer (1981). Both articles were published in the *South African Journal of Education*. In his article, Buckland critiques Tunmer’s parochial view of curriculum, a view that ignores the relationship between the way knowledge is organized and power is distributed in society. He writes:

> By taking a narrow “philosophical stance” and ignoring the important sociological dimensions of the curriculum process, Tunmer effectively depoliticizes education and treats curriculum as if it were the product not of social, economic, political and ideological history but based on a set of universally-valid “realms of meaning” or selection of “subjects.” (167)

For Buckland curriculum is not a product but instead a contextualized social process. Put differently, curriculum is not a document (something that you can pick up) that contains universally valid knowledge. Instead, he views it as a construct that is embedded in social processes, that is, that it is shaped by both societal structures and human agency. Reading Buckland’s work gave me important insights into distinctions such as the official versus the actual curriculum, the explicit versus the implicit, the intended and the not intended, the overt and the covert, and so on. His emphasis on the important relationship between curriculum and social structure was significant in South Africa at the time and helped me (and I am sure others) in developing a language of critique vis-à-vis state ideology/pedagogy and in particular Christian National Education (CNE) and Fundamental Pedagogics (FP). I return to a discussion on CNE and FP later in this essay. In short, Buckland’s view of curriculum assisted me in understanding the relationship between schooling and society. In my HDE year at the University of Cape Town I was introduced to the works of among others, Paulo Freire (1972), Ivan Illich (1971), Bowles and Gintis (1976), Henry Giroux (1979, 1983), Michael Apple (1979), and so on. Reproduction/correspondence theories helped me to understand that schooling in South Africa largely functioned to reproduce existing divisions (class, ethnic, gender, and racial) and inequalities in South African
society. During my HDE studies, I read Christie’s (1985) book *The Right to Learn* and was particularly interested in the chapter on the hidden curriculum. Christie (125) draws on the work of Basil Bernstein who argues that the way in which schools select subjects, the way they teach these subjects, and the way they examine them tell us about the distribution of power in society and about social control. The construct hidden curriculum provided me with an alternative lens through which to look at schooling in South Africa. I learned, for example, that even though school syllabuses of the 1980s were in the main similar for all South African learners, through their experience of a divided schooling system children learned much about the divided nature of South African society—they learned a great deal about their past, present, and future.

As mentioned, curriculum theory (and in particular radical curriculum theory) provided an impetus for critiquing state pedagogy. With reference to this it might now be fitting to turn to a discussion on the didactics tradition in South Africa. At English medium universities both Christian National Education and Fundamental Pedagogics were fiercely critiqued in works such as the edited book of Peter Kallaway (1984), *Apartheid and Education*, which was one of the recommended readings during my HDE course. I draw on some of the work published in this volume to critically appraise the relationship between the didactics tradition and both Christian National Education and Fundamental Pedagogics.

**Fundamental Pedagogics and the Didactics Tradition in South Africa**

Both Fundamental Pedagogics and didactics were embraced by Faculties of Education at Afrikaans-medium universities in the immediate years following World War II. This is significant because the National Party came into power in 1948 and introduced its policy of Apartheid. Christian National Education was a component of the Apartheid (ruling) ideology. Enslin (1984, 139–140) argues that although the Christian National Education Policy of 1948 purported to be policy for White Afrikaans-speaking children, it also had far-reaching consequences for the education of all children in South Africa. She points out that according to CNE policy, education for Blacks should have the following features: be in the mother tongue; not be funded at the expense of White education; by implication, not prepare Blacks for equal participation in economic and social life; preserve the “cultural identity” of the Black community (although it will nonetheless consist in leading “the native” to acceptance of Christian
and National principles); must of necessity be organized and administered by Whites. Enslin elaborates

The final point reflects a significant paternalistic element in the policy. This is particularly evident in articles 14 and 15, entitled “Coloured Teaching and Education” and “African (Bantu) Teaching and Education” respectively. Black education is the responsibility of “white South Africa,” or more specifically of “the Boer nation as the senior white trustee of the native,” who is in a state of “cultural infancy.” A “subordinate part of the vocation and task of the Afrikaner,” is to “Christianise the non-white races of our fatherland.” It is the “sacred obligation” of the Afrikaner to base black education on Christian National principles. Thus, revealingly, “We believe that only when the coloured man has been Christianised can he and will he be secure against his own heathen and all kinds of foreign ideologies which promise him sham happiness, but in the long run will make him unsatisfied and unhappy.” (140)

Enslin (1984, 140) sees CNE policy as inherently statements of beliefs (“We believe” appears frequently) that purport to constitute the life- and worldview of the Afrikanervolk. It is clear that the CNE policy, as an expression of aspects of the ruling ideology, was intended to justify a separate and inferior education system for Blacks. Enslin (141) notes that since 1948 CNE has been the obvious candidate for critical scrutiny by educational theorists. It is in this context that the responses of Fundamental Pedagogics are particularly significant.

Although Fundamental Pedagogics did not aim to replace CNE, it became the center of attention in certain academic circles in South Africa. Fundamental pedagogics can be traced historically to M. J. Langeveld’s publication Beknopte Theoretische Pedagogiek in the Netherlands in 1945. The first publication in South Africa was C. K. Oberholzer’s Inleiding in die Prinsipiële Opvoedkunde, published in 1954. In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s Fundamental Pedagogics was a powerful doctrine at Afrikaans-medium universities. It was also a powerful doctrine at Black colleges of education and in education faculties of historically Black universities that were dominated by Afrikaner lecturers. Fundamental Pedagogicians argued that the “scientific method” was the only authentic method of studying education. For them, the scientific method that was particularly appropriate for studying education was the phenomenological method (see Landman and Gous 1969; Viljoen and Pienaar 1971; Gunter 1974). Enslin (1984, 141–142) points out that it was believed that through this method the Fundamental Pedagogician would learn to know the phenomenon of education through “radical reflection” on the educational situation. She states that the pedagogician describes the essence of the educational
situation in terms of pedagogic categories and the corresponding criteria derived from them. Advocates of Fundamental Pedagogics such as Landman and Gous (1969) and Gunter (1974) have argued that practicing Pedagogics as science frees it from metaphysics, dogmatics, and ideology. In their textbook entitled *Fundamental Pedagogics*, Viljoen and Pienaar (1971) distinguish three stages in scientific research:

1. the *prescientific* (prereflexive) life-world in which the original phenomena reveal themselves, and which arouse the wonderment of the scientist;
2. the *scientific reflection* on the phenomenon and the universal, verifiable logically systemized body of knowledge offered by such reflection; and
3. the *postscientific* meaningful implementation of this body of knowledge.

According to Enslin (1984, 142) the distinctions made by Viljoen and Pienaar are significant: during the scientific stage values are excluded whereas in the prescientific and postscientific stages values or life-views play a prominent role. During the scientific phase the pedagogician brackets extrinsic aims and beliefs. Enslin (1990, 82) states that the political, therefore, becomes forbidden speech, as it has no legitimate place in the realm of science. The problem of Fundamental Pedagogics was that no room was made for critically examining the question of values in the prescientific and postscientific stages, such as values embedded in CNE policy in the South African case. Instead of being “universally valid” knowledge about education, free from “metaphysics,” “dogmatics,” and “ideology,” Fundamental Pedagogics played a role in reproducing the ruling ideology by legitimating CNE policy.

Didactic theory in South Africa was closely intertwined with Fundamental Pedagogics. In writing about the didactics tradition in South Africa, Krüger (2007) makes an explicit connection between didactics and what he calls “a new pedagogy” that inspired him when he registered for his master’s degree at the University of Pretoria in 1970. He writes: “All thinking not concerned with essentially human existence and human learning…was disfavoured, and there was a search for a ‘fundamental pedagogy,’ that is, an educational theory as an independent human science with its own terminology, its own points of departure, its own methods of investigation and verification based on the premises of educational (pedagogical) essences, that is, the essential characteristics of the teaching-learning phenomenon” (emphasis added). Through being inextricably bound up in Fundamental Pedagogics, *Didaktiek* (Afrikaans for didactics) in South Africa played a key role not only in
reinforcing Christian National Education but also in reproducing it (for a more detailed discussion see Le Grange 2007). And, its close association with Apartheid ideology has probably led to the demise of Didaktiek in post-Apartheid South Africa, a discussion I return to.

Radical curriculum theory (derived from both the United States and United Kingdom) provided a language of critique of Apartheid education policy, Fundamental Pedagogics, and the didactics tradition. But, radical curriculum theory also helped me to understand that there are languages of possibility that can be constructed and that alternative possibilities to the status quo could be imagined and enacted. I would like to refer to two examples here. First, a discourse that emerged in South Africa in the 1980s and second, a short reflection of my experiences as a schoolteacher.

People’s Education and In-Service Education for Teachers by Teachers

A discourse constructed in opposition to the debilitating discourse of Fundamental Pedagogics was “People’s Education for People’s Power.” Levin (1991, 117) points out that the slogan “People’s Education for People’s Power” represents a strategic shift in the education struggle in South Africa, involving a departure from the education boycott as a tactic of struggle in favor of a longer-term strategy of reconstruction through the development of alternative education. People’s education was an attempt coordinated by the then National Education Crisis Committee (NECC), advocating that parents, teachers, students, and other community members (the people) be involved in the government of education. But, not only on matters of governance but also that of curriculum such as the introduction of, for example, People’s mathematics and People’s history as alternatives to Apartheid syllabuses. People’s education was illustrative of the null curriculum that had transformed to become the explicit curriculum—stories children had not been told about their past, present, and future were now being explicitly told. People’s Education provided an alternative story, a story of resistance in hope. People’s Education involved a process of conscientization that would help children to better understand their past, their present, and provide hope for the future. Mkatshwa (1985, 14) notes that People’s education emphasized the links between education, politics, and social transformation. However, in the late 1980s People’s Education plunged into crisis due to state repression as well as a lack of clarity over what, precisely, it meant (see Levin 1991; Walker 1991; Johnson 1991; Gultig and Hart 1991 for more detail on People’s education).
After completing my HDE course, in 1987 I entered the teaching profession with great enthusiasm and an eagerness to share my love for the subject biology with school learners. While my enthusiasm to teach biology never waned, I soon realized that my task was not going to be easy. The culture of the school and the education system were major constraining factors. The culture of the school did not encourage cooperative learning or collaborative work among teachers, and there was no school or system based in-service education programs. The classroom was a private domain where each teacher had to find his or her own way and struggle to survive.

Education department officials and many school principals strictly controlled what was taught in schools. I remember my first inspection by a school inspector (euphemistically referred to at the time as a “subject advisor”). After he observed my lesson I was reprimanded for two reasons: first, for not understanding that work is meant only for higher-grade learners, which is teaching just what is given in the books of standard grade learners and, second, for using an overhead projector to explain the life-cycle of *Taenia solium* (tapeworm) instead of drawing the life-cycle on the blackboard. Although I tried to justify what I did educationally, the subject advisor’s visit was followed by a very negative written report. To ensure that all aspects of syllabuses were covered, subject advisors strictly moderated end-of-year examination papers. These control measures made it very difficult to teach anything other than the formal syllabus in very conventional ways. Although I explored opportunities that the immediate school environment provided for biology teaching, they were few and far between. My main resource as a teacher was the school textbook. Adopting a critical perspective *vis-à-vis* the textbook did not work very well either. I pointed out many errors in the textbooks to learners and encouraged them to view textbooks and what I said critically. This was difficult for them, as they had come to believe that textbooks report truth and are not to be questioned.

Reflecting on the situation that I found myself in made me realize that there were limited opportunities to develop professionally within the system. My deep desire to develop both personally and professionally made me pursue two avenues that significantly influenced my interest in environmental education, educational research, and teacher professional development. First, I continued with formal studies and completed my Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Education degrees part time and completed a Master of Education degree in Science Education full time whilst on study leave (sabbatical). The second avenue I pursued was to network with other teachers who, despite the systemic constraints, were interested in developing professionally. Some of these networks were the Biology Teachers Forum, which was an initiative of the Naturalist Society (Natsoc), two participatory action research projects reported in the theses of Reddy
(1994) and Wagiet (1996) and the Biology and General Science Teachers’ Forum that later led to the establishing of the Peninsula Biology Teachers’ Association (PBTA).

My collaborative work with teachers occurred in the period post-1990. At this time the state’s control of schools slackened in the light of mounting pressure from the organized teaching profession as well as the wider political changes. In the Western Cape Province, many schools banned department officials from visiting them and, with the exception of matriculation examinations, papers and exam marks up to Grade 11 were moderated internally by schools. The teacher union movement strengthened and we saw the launch of the largest teachers’ union, the South African Democratic Teachers’ Union (SADTU) in October 1990, a culmination of a struggle for teacher unity from the middle 1980s (Moll 1991). The changing sociopolitical milieu in the early 1990s provided the space for a group of teachers that I was part of to do collaborative curriculum development work in science and environmental education.

The collaborative work that I did with teachers during this period contributed to my professional development in several ways. Critical discussions that I had with colleagues and the literature that we read made me reflect more deeply on my own teaching practice. I became more critical of the biology content that formed part of the state syllabi. My main concern centered on the relevance of what I was teaching to schools learners. I started asking questions such as the following:

- Why had I uncritically taught the details of the life-cycle of a pine tree (as an example of a gymnosperm) without pointing out to learners that the pine tree is an alien plant and that pine plantations are responsible for diminishing water resources in certain geographical areas in South Africa?
- Why had I taught the structure and reproduction of viruses in details and only made scant reference to the HIV, which is responsible for causing AIDS?
- Why in South Africa were we required to teach the intricacies of the DNA model to learners who are “exhausted and struggling to concentrate because of pregnancy, tuberculosis, chronic bilharzia and other parasitic infections such as roundworms and hookworms, and undernutrition because crops will no longer grow on barren land” (Doidge 1996, 46)?

Moreover, I questioned why I was force-feeding an unrelenting diet of irrelevant biology content to learners through transmission modes of teaching. I thought more deeply about my undemocratic pedagogical practices
and how I had acquired them. This caused me to listen to learners more attentively and to consider their critical questions more carefully—questions such as, what was the relevance to their future lives of learning the osmoregulation process in a tiny organism like the Amoeba? I realized that prescribed syllabi were a mechanism of the state aimed at controlling teachers’ work. Syllabuses were loaded with content to keep teachers and learners busy so that there was very little time to question the social ills of Apartheid. I thought about the contradictory roles we may have been playing as teachers, protesting on the streets against poor service conditions under Apartheid whilst to a large extent contributing to the maintenance of the status quo through our pedagogical practices—I thought critically about the stories I and others were (not) telling children about their past, present, and future.

As a network of teachers we used the space provided by the post-1990 period to explore ways of introducing more relevant topics in our biology classrooms. We collaboratively redesigned the syllabuses (see Wagiet 1996), but their implementation had limited success because members of the network were individuals from different schools who were required to set uniform examinations in line with work done by their school colleagues. However, I learned a language of critique that enabled me to understand how teachers in South Africa had been systematically deskilled and that they functioned merely as “technicians” to implement curricula developed within a Research, Develop, Disseminate and Adopt (RDDA) model of curriculum development. I also, for the first time, started to see other possibilities for developing curricula such as through participatory action research (see Reddy 1994; Wagiet 1996). During this period of collaborative work with other teachers I was able to broaden my understanding of environment as not only biophysical, but also as a construct with interlocking biophysical, economic, social, and political dimensions.

As I reflect on my experiences as a teacher and teacher educator, and my involvement in collaborative work with teachers, it is with a sense of humility that I share some of what I saw was possible. I learned that teachers have power to significantly change some conditions of teaching and learning. Despite many constraints I saw the commitment, creativity, resilience, and strength of teachers to change their circumstances and practices. I witnessed teachers spending their weekends and many afternoons organizing and conducting in-service education programs “for teachers by teachers” because the education department provided no INSET (In-service Education of Teachers) programs. Through my interaction with other teachers I became involved in curriculum development processes, learned, and became interested in participatory action research, environmental education, and materials development and teacher professional
development. As we entered a democratic dispensation in 1994 it was fit-
ting that as a group of teachers we reversed previous practices and con-
ducted in-service education programs for subject advisors as well as other
teachers as part of the activities of the interim syllabus committee for
biology.

NEPI and the Introduction of Interim Syllabuses

In 1991 I did further studies in education at the University of Cape Town
a year after we saw the unbanning of political organizations such as the
African National Congress (ANC) and the release of political prisoners
such as Nelson Mandela. These events paved the way for a new democratic
dispensation and provided the impetus for several projects aimed at trans-
forming all spheres of South African society. One such project was the
NEPI, a project of the NECC, which was conducted between December
1990 and August 1992. Because several of my lecturers were participants
in the NEPI process as a student I was updated on how the process was
evolving and gained insight into the key debates on education policy
options for a democratic society. The aim of NEPI was to interrogate pol-
cy options in all areas of education within a framework informed by the
ideals of the broad democratic movement in South Africa. The project pro-
duced 12 reports including one on curriculum. The principles underpin-
ning the curriculum report were nonracism, nonsexism, a unitary system,
democracy, and redress. These principles informed a key discussion point
in the NEPI group focusing on curriculum, that is, a need for a core cur-
criculum and differentiation. A national core curriculum was deemed nec-
essary to the building of a unitary education system. The NEPI curriculum
report focused on the distinction between the curriculum intended and
the curriculum-in-use and with respect the latter raises important critiques
against the Apartheid curriculum of the time. For example, reference is
made to differentiation along gender lines.

An important point to take cognizance of is that the NEPI process was
fairly inward looking in that it raised issues influenced by factors internal
to South Africa—the need to build a unitary education system with a cur-
criculum that was unbiased with respect to race and gender. And further,
although the NEPI report on curriculum makes reference to curriculum
models/frameworks from abroad, its key focus was not on the how global
forces might or should impact on curriculum policy in South Africa.

In 1995, a year after the South Africa’s first democratic elections, we
witnessed the introduction of what was referred to as interim syllabuses.
Jansen (1999a, 57) critiques these syllabus alterations by arguing that they had very little to do with the school curriculum, but were more concerned with an uncertain state seeking legitimacy following the national elections. In the main, curriculum revision involved exorcizing of racial content as well as outdated and inaccurate subject matter from school syllabuses. Jansen (57) points out that the haste with which the South African state pursued what he terms “a superficial cleansing of the inherited curriculum” needs to be understood in terms of a set of pressures faced by a South African state in transition.² Worth noting is that for Jansen syllabus alterations of this early period in South Africa’s democracy had symbolic rather than substantive significance. There certainly is plausibility in Jansen’s argument, but in fairness to the state, political change in South Africa since 1990 was rapid (it caught most South Africans and the rest of the world by surprise) and so there was not sufficient time to introduce wholesale curriculum change in South Africa by the time the democratic elections was held in 1994. Furthermore, The NEPI report on curriculum that was coproduced by Jansen did not provide proposals substantive enough than to do anything other than the syllabus alterations that took place with the introduction of the interim syllabus documents. However, in the first White Paper on Education and Training (Republic of South Africa 1995) produced by the post-Apartheid government a new discourse, outcomes-based education, was introduced, and was to become the central focus of much of the deliberations on curriculum for more than a decade.

Outcomes-Based Education: A Major Discourse in South African Curriculum Studies

Through the network of teachers I was involved with in the early to middle 1990s, I met a lecturer who worked in the Department of Didactics at Stellenbosch University. We had a common interest in environmental education and became involved in the organization of a conference at the institution in 1996. He invited a colleague and me to do some part-time teaching at the university and we also enrolled at the institution for our PhD studies. In 1999 we were the first Black academics to be offered full-time positions at the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University. Ironically, I was appointed in the Department of Didactics and my PhD was registered as a PhD in didactics even though my areas of specialization were science and environmental education. This was because the Faculty of Education uses the name of the academic department where the student is registered. Moreover, when I was appointed to a personal chair in 2003
it was named Professor of Didactics. These developments were ironic because I had not been educated in this tradition and was in fact critical of it. However, at the outset I was keen to see the name of the department change and so were a few other colleagues. Over a period of about four years, the name of the department was seriously debated. The result was that the department was renamed the Department of Curriculum Studies in 2005. There was, of course, not only pressure from inside to challenge due to new ideas brought by new appointees, but also from outside because most Departments of Didactics at historically Afrikaans-medium universities had changed their names. Interestingly, I was the last person to be named Professor of Didactics in the Faculty of Education at Stellenbosch University because in October 2006 the first professor of curriculum studies was appointed at Stellenbosch University.

My work as an academic at Stellenbosch University over the past decade coincided chronologically with the introduction of an outcomes-based education (OBE) discourse in South Africa and with the fierce contestation of this discourse. Some of my academic work of the past decade has been concerned with a critical engagement with outcomes-based education and I make reference to it briefly in this part of my essay. But first some background on the OBE discourse in South Africa.

It was with a ceremonial flourish culminating in the release of 2005 multicolored balloons that the former South African Minister of Education Professor Bengu launched Curriculum 2005 in March 1997. Under the title Curriculum 2005 (indicating the final year of implementation in all school grades) South Africa’s first post-Apartheid government intended to introduce an outcomes-based education curriculum into all school grades. Based on the tenets of OBE the Education Ministry intended to replace “the all too ubiquitous pedagogical style of rote learning under apartheid” (Mason 1999, 137) with more learner-centered pedagogical approaches that engender critical thought. Furthermore, OBE was intended to redress the legacy of Apartheid by promoting the development of skills throughout the school-leaving population so as to prepare South Africa’s workforce for participation in an increasingly competitive global economy (ibid.). Kraak (1998, 22) argues that outcomes-based education had three antecedents in South Africa:

[T]he first was the ascendancy of competency-based modular education and training in South African industry after 1985; the second was the adoption of Australian and British “outcomes” models in the policy development work undertaken by the ANC and COSATU since the early 1990s; and the third was the resurrection of the radical rhetoric of people’s education which first emerged in the heat of the struggle in the mid-1980s.
These might be precursors to the introduction of OBE in South Africa, but they do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the emergence of an OBE discourse in South Africa. OBE certainly did not evolve very neatly from the antecedents that Kraak suggests—it is introduction caught most South Africans by surprise. For example, after the 1994 democratic elections there was a narrowing of the education policy agenda in South Africa instead of a resurrection of the radical rhetoric of people’s education as Kraak seems to suggest. Chisholm and Fuller (1996, 693) argue that there was a shift in education policy from earlier talk of people’s education and robust civil participation to a technocratic discourse emphasizing centrally defined outcomes-based education, pupil-teacher ratios, and a unified system. The reasons for this shift in the education policy agenda are manifold and cannot be discussed fully in this essay. Suffice it to say, the narrowing of the education policy agenda could make efforts toward greater development, equity, participation, and redress difficult to realize (De Clercq 1997, 127). What is likely to occur is the favoring of interests of privileged sections of society, thus widening the existing gap, benefiting a minority of schools, and alienating the majority of teachers and learners (127; Reddy and Le Grange 1996, 20). Concerns such as development, equity, and participation (which OBE is supposed to address) are likely to remain unrealized. Importantly, Allias (2003) points out that South Africa’s transition in the early 1990s was a dual one, a transition to a democracy and its (re)entry into a global economy. As mentioned, the NEPI process was inward looking because it focused on South Africa’s transition to democracy but after 1994, it appears that greater emphasis has been placed on South Africa’s (re)entry into a global economy than on the transition to democracy. It is against this background that the introduction of outcomes-based education in South Africa might be understood.

At the very inception of OBE in South Africa there was fierce contestation of the discourse. OBE was either wholeheartedly embraced or severely critiqued by South African academics. The OBE produced by published works over the past decade are too numerous to mention and so I am selective in the works I draw on so as to illustrate my own engagement with and thoughts on the discourse. The first significant critique of OBE was a paper presented by Jonathan Jansen at the University of Durban-Westville in 1997 entitled, “Why OBE Will Fail.” A version of the paper was later published in the Cambridge Journal of Education (Jansen 1998) and as a chapter in a book edited by Jansen and Christie (1999). In his critique Jansen (1999b) outlines what he refers to as “principal criticisms of OBE” (146). Some of Jansen’s principal criticisms of OBE, such as its historical lineage (OBE’s links to behavioral psychology and mastery learning) and its epistemological orientation (focus on instrumentalism) are convincing
and well argued. However, some of his other criticisms seem to be critiques of matters contingent to OBE (or its introduction) and not “principal criticisms of OBE.” For example, his criticisms of the complex language of the innovation and that OBE makes flawed assumptions about what happens inside classrooms. These are not “principal criticisms of OBE” but criticisms of a new national curriculum framework (C2005) that happened to have an outcomes-based education orientation. It is possible to conceive of an OBE curriculum having a simple language associated with it and also of a curriculum innovation which has flawed assumptions about what happens inside classrooms, but is not outcomes-based. The complex language of the OBE innovation might better be understood in what Dowling (1998) refers to as the “dystopia-utopia” dichotomy, where everything in the past (education in the Apartheid era) is considered bad (dystopia) and, therefore, the need for a new utopian language that represents the future as everything that is good.

There have been several more detailed and sophisticated critiques of OBE but there is no place to discuss all these in this essay. Enough to say that despite initial critiques leveled against OBE and although revisions were made to C2005, the state pressed on with its OBE agenda for almost a decade. However, more recently there has been a turn of events whereby the Director of a statutory body Umaluzi³ has delivered devastating critiques of OBE in both an academic article and in the popular media—possibly signaling the end of the OBE chapter in South Africa (see Allias 2007; Blaine 2007).

Allias (2007, 66) argues that outcomes-based education is part of a neoliberal agenda and appeals to states that have embraced neoliberalism. She points out that governments are making stronger links between education and economy and it is in this context that outcomes-based qualification frameworks have arisen, “which claim to provide world-class standards against which students must perform and which are linked to employment, economic improvement and international competitiveness” (67). Furthermore, she argues that there is a double bind on states in that on the one hand neoliberalism says that the state must be smaller and on the other hand the state must ensure that tax-payers’ money is well spent. Allias (68) argues that measuring performance through outcome statements has appeared to provide the solution, “which accounts for the duality of managerialism and neo-liberalism.” For Allias, outcomes-based qualifications frameworks give priority to the economy rather than the academy. She goes on to argue that outcomes-based education undermines disciplinary knowledge, the latter being crucial in formal education because central to formal education is the socialization of learners into a field, discipline, or
content area (76). Drawing on the work of Bernstein (2000) and Moore (2004) she argues that outcomes-based education undermines disciplinary knowledge, “which is hierarchically organized, as in the sciences, or organized as a series of specialized languages with specialized modes of interrogation and specialized criteria for the production and circulation of texts, as in the social sciences. She goes on to argue that the way disciplinary knowledge is organized facilitates the sequencing of learning in classrooms. More recently it was reported in the Business Day newspaper by Sue Blaine (2007) that Allias has criticized the lack of clarity in outcome statements, saying that, “Even apparently straightforward outcomes such as ‘sweep floors’ or ‘pack customer purchases at points of sale’ could be interpreted differently by different people in different contexts.”

As mentioned earlier, an outcomes-based curriculum framework was launched in South Africa in 1997. Several revisions of the framework have occurred but new variants have remained outcomes-based. The introduction of outcomes-based education was met with fierce criticism beginning with a paper delivered by Jansen in 1997. We have perhaps come full circle in view of a comprehensive critique produced by a director of a statutory body 10 years after the implementation of OBE in South Africa. Between these two comprehensive critiques there has been a huge body of literature produced by both OBE evangelists and skeptics, too many to refer to in this essay. As an academic, my interest has been to engage critically with some of the ideas of both the OBE evangelists and skeptics, and I now briefly turn to a few of my thoughts in this regard.

The first point that I wish to make is that both OBE evangelists and skeptics tend to view OBE as a monolithic construct that is impervious to penetration and change. In 2000, drawing on the work of Brian Deever (1996) I wrote an article in which I argued for a position that takes the OBE debate beyond a language of critique and a language of possibility toward a language of probability (see Le Grange 2000). My more recent interest, however, is on how insights from French poststructuralists (Deleuze, Foucault, and Guattari) might be brought to bear on educational phenomena, including outcomes-based education.

In their seminal work, A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari introduce the constructs territorialization and deterritorialization. These constructs are generative and help to shift the angle of vision on outcomes-based education and its homogenizing and normalizing effects in an era of neoliberal politics. The vectors of escape from the homogenizing and normalizing effects of contemporary discourses on outcomes-based education do not lie outside of the discourse but in its deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Deterritorialization helps us to understand that any idea or
construct has the potential to become something other than what it is. As Colebrook (2002, xxii) so neatly captures,

Life creates and furthers itself by forming connections or territories. Light connects with plants to allow photosynthesis. Everything, from bodies, [concepts], to societies, is a form of territorialisation, or the connection of forces to produce distinct wholes. But alongside every territorialisation is the power of deterritorialisation. The light that connects with the plant to allow it to grow also allows for the plant to become other than itself: too much sun will kill the plant, or perhaps transform it into something else (such as sun-dried leaves becoming tobacco or sun-drenched grapes becoming sultanas). The very connective forces that allow it to become what it is (territorialise) can allow it to become what it is not (dettiorialise). (Emphasis in original)

In a similar vein, Guattari (2001) wrote about integrated world capitalism (IWC); that new ways of living are not to be found in returning to values of the past nor in replacing existing models with new ones but rather in seeing current events as bearers of alternative constellations. Outcomes-based discourses could reproduce subjectivities configured by performativity, but crucially can become a key site for creative change. In other words, new ways of doing and being are to be found in the “discovery” of alternative paths provided by the very constructs/events/institutions that have propensities toward homogenization and normalization. Outcomes-based education can, therefore, open up pathways to alternatives to the narrow way(s) in which its critics view it.

Two other constructs that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) introduce are the tree and the rhizome. They distinguish between arborescent and rhizomatic thinking where the former refers to conceptions of knowledge as hierarchically articulated branches of a central stem or trunk rooted in firm foundations and the latter refers to chaotically complex networkings of stems interconnecting the upshoots of some grasses (see Gough 2004; Sellers 2006). Thinking rhizomatically troubles the view of disciplinary knowledge that Allias (2007) values as ascribes to and troubles her concern about clarity of outcomes. Le Grange and Beets (2005, 118) argue that outcomes themselves might be viewed as rhizomes. They write:

Viewing outcomes as rhizomes enable us to understand them as being in constant movement, that is, without fixity. They are always tentatively understood as moments that emerge during pedagogical episodes when teachers observe learners’ performances. Inferences drawn about what is learned becomes an art of assembling momentary or emerging performances in a classroom. The inference gives meaning to the outcome and in a sense, tentatively “defines” the outcome.
Drawing on the work of Foucault (1980), Smith (2005, 160) suggests that there is double meaning for disciplinarity. The first is the empirical description of the bodies, texts, and matter that constitute a specific field of knowledge production and the second the mechanism through which academic discourses regulate the production of meaning, “of what can and cannot be thought and said, so that the sedimentary character of the assemblage remains stable or even undisturbed.” A rhizomatic view of knowledge disrupts disciplinarity and “affirms what is excluded from western thought and reintroduces reality as dynamic, heterogeneous, and non-dichotomous; they implicate rather than replicate; they propogate, displace, join, circle back, fold” (O’Riley 2003, 7). By describing outcomes very broadly as it has been done in South Africa, it becomes possible to include that which may be excluded when learners are simply socialized into Western disciplines (which Allias suggests is the role of formal education). I refer here to, for example, indigenous knowledge, which shapes the sociocultural frameworks of the majority of learners in South African schools.

Furthermore, a rhizotextual analysis of policy texts and teachers’ work disrupts linear understandings of policy development and implementation reflected in the work of OBE critic Jansen (2002, 199) and his insistence on the notion of “a policy-practice gap.” Honan (2004, 268) argues that rhizotextual analysis of the relations between teachers and texts disrupts commonplace understanding about these relationships that currently inform much of the work done by policymakers in the United States and in Australia—and I would add policymakers as well. Teachers engage rhizomatically with policy texts such as OBE: some adopt; some resist; some subvert; and so on. When the relationship between policy and practice is understood as linear then the policymaker’s reality is privileged. As Ball (1994, 269) puts it,

Generally, we failed to research, analyse and conceptualise this underlife, the “secondary adjustments” which relate teachers to policy and to the state in different ways. We tend to begin by assuming the adjustment of teachers and context to policy but not of policy to context. There is a privileging of the policymaker’s reality.

Some Parting Thoughts

In this essay I give an autobiographical account of my engagement with the term curriculum and provide a historical perspective of the field of curriculum studies in South Africa. However, much can be gleaned from
my personal encounter with South African curriculum studies to the extent that my essay also provides a historical perspective of curriculum studies in South Africa.

During Apartheid rule the didactics tradition was dominant in South Africa. The curriculum studies traditions characterized work in faculties of education in English medium universities. However, because of its close association with Fundamental Pedagogics and Christian National Education, we have seen the demise of the didactics tradition in South Africa, despite prominence given to this tradition internationally over the past decade, as part of an effort to internationalize curriculum studies.

With its emphasis on understanding the relationship between school and society (Pinar 2006, 1) curriculum studies traditions were more appropriate in mapping a trajectory for the transformation of education in South Africa. It also served as a sound basis for interrogating policy options for Apartheid education as evident in the use of constructs curriculum intended and curriculum-in-use in the NEPI of the early 1990s. Radical curriculum theory provided inspiration to the people’s education movement, as we witnessed the null curriculum of Apartheid education migrate to become the explicit curriculum.

But post-Apartheid education has been dominated by the outcomes-based education discourse, which has been the subject of vociferous debates over the past decade. Critics of OBE have tended to view it arborescently (in a tree-like manner), that is a monolithic entity that is impervious to penetration and change. I have suggested that a more rhizomatic view of outcomes, knowledge, and outcomes-based education could begin to include that which is excluded (the null curriculum) and bring it into the conversations, and make it part of the activities in South African classrooms (issues such as race, gender, sexual orientation, cultural inclusivity, Africanization of knowledge, etc.). Through tracing the emergence of different curriculum discourses in South Africa over the past decades, changes to the “collective story” children are told about their past, present, and future become manifest and the fluidity constructs explicit, hidden, and null curriculum is understood.

Notes

1. African is a termed used to describe all Black South Africans, excluding those classified, Coloured and Indian during Apartheid.

2. Jansen (1999a, 64–65) points out that syllabus alterations immediately after South Africa’s first democratic elections might be understood in four ways: in the context of the constitutional and bureaucratic constraints of political
transition under a Government of National Unity; as a process that emerged in the context of weak political leadership in the then Ministry of Education; as a process propelled by mounting pressure on the Minister of Education from the media; as a process made possible by a weak political challenge from the education community on the educational terms of the project.

3. Umaluzi is the quality assurance body for General and Further Education and Training in South Africa.

References


SOUTH AFRICAN CURRICULUM STUDIES


Chapter 6

Toward Authentic Teaching and Learning in Post-Apartheid South Africa: In Defense of Freedom, Friendship, and Democratic Citizenship

Yusef Waghid

Setting the Stage: Against Frivolous Learning

During the post-Apartheid period, teacher education discourses in South Africa have undergone several program reviews at the levels of the Postgraduate Certificate in Education (PGCE), BEd, and MEd. The Council on Higher Education’s (CHE) Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC) has conducted extensive reviews of teacher education programs in the country with the aim to ascertain whether the faculties, schools, and departments of all 23 universities comply with at least the “minimum standards” for quality education. According to the HEQC, a teacher education program such as the PGCE, BEd, or MEd would comply with some of the minimum standards if it has a coherent and integrated focus, foster critical learning, and have institutional support for their implementation (HEQC 2005). As a member of the HEQC’s Accreditation Committee since 2005, I have found that by far the majority of the programs did not gain a full accreditation, which means that
most of them either have been found not to comply with the minimum standards or have gained a conditional accreditation subject to certain amendments being made to universities’ program offerings. What has emerged from the Accreditation Committee’s deliberations about the teacher education programs is that they seem to lack focus on engendering critical inquiry. In the cases of the PGCE and MEd, it was found that some institutions are still intent on promoting uncritical rote learning whereby students are expected to regurgitate information without challenging and questioning.

My own experiences in teaching PGCE and MEd students reveal that some instances of uncritical learning do take place at the university where I work. But what is more worrisome is the fact that students seem to have become consumed with a market-oriented “logic” of learning. Most of the students I have worked with started off by claiming that they needed to be “reskilled,” to “improve their qualifications,” to “become more marketable,” to “increase their chances of employment,” and to “increase their opportunities to earn better salaries.” All these reasons for obtaining a PGCE or MEd seem to suggest that the achievement of a formal qualification is inextricably linked to some kind of external gain: if I achieve $x$, my chances of gaining $y$ will increase. So, learning in this instance can be associated with consumerist logic—a student’s needs are met and hence the teacher or the supervisor’s role as the facilitator (provider) of education has been fulfilled. In this instance, education itself becomes the commodity provided by the teacher or the supervisor to the student, who consumes it (Biesta 2004, 74). No wonder that I hear many of my students comment that they will do anything I say, since they are interested only in acquiring a formal qualification. In the words of one student: “I don’t mind your critical feedback, since I’m only concerned about passing.” Certainly, at the postgraduate level these kinds of comments are shocking or, to say the least, surprising, since we do not expect students to be passive recipients of information, but rather to engage dialogically with their supervisors in order to construct meanings, couch their stories, do detached and rigorous analyses, reflect, and disclose the unheard and unexpected (Greene 1995, 28)—that is, to learn.

Moreover, the apparently uncritical attitudes of several of my master’s students toward knowledge and knowledge (re)constructions and deconstructions can be attributed to the fact that these students are still affected by the Apartheid legacy, in which rote learning, conformity, and passivity seem to have informed pedagogical practices at both school and university levels. At my institution, a former White Afrikaans-speaking university, many of the non-White students felt quite inhibited to question freely, since they seemed to have been historically imbued with a culture of not
undermining the White professors or even disclosing their views in the presence of those considered as racially superior during the Apartheid years. Most of the non-White postgraduate students I have encountered during the past five years have expressed a bias in favor of achieving a qualification at a historically advantaged White university. For most of them success at our institution could enhance ensuing employment or promotional opportunities. Also, during my interactions with master’s students, it seemed that because I am a Black university professor they responded more favorably to me than to my White colleagues. I am by no means suggesting that my White colleagues practice racial discrimination. Hopefully not! However, almost 15 years into a new democracy many Black students (certainly the ones I have encountered) still seem to be left with feelings of mistrust and insecurity that need to be attended to.

This brings me to the following question: does satisfying the expected “needs” of students necessarily result in learning? Of course, students who have obtained a master’s degree have undoubtedly improved their opportunities to get better jobs and to earn more—in a sense they have become more marketable than before. Some of my master’s students have been teachers, but on completion of their formal and advanced qualifications they moved on to more lucrative jobs. In a way their employability “needs” have been met. However, unless these students have, for instance, engaged critically with texts, or taken some texts into systematic controversy, or perhaps articulated coherent arguments in justification of their points of view, they cannot be said to have learned. MacIntyre (1990, 231–233) makes the point that a central freedom of higher education is to initiate students into inquiry and controversy. This involves two interrelated processes. First, students should be taught to read texts scrupulously and carefully in order for them to arrive at independent interpretive judgments so that they can accept or reject their teachers’ (supervisors’) interpretations. Second, students should be taught to subject texts to questioning, that is, to engage in systematic controversy any rival or conflicting points of view. Most of the students whom I supervised in their early stages of master’s studies did not know what it meant to make independent and interpretive judgments. They assumed that master’s studies involved giving extensive quotations and paraphrases without scrupulously and carefully engaging with theoretical works of prominent scholars to the extent that the voices of those scholars became muted. These students also encountered difficulties in subjecting the works of theorists to systematic controversy. Unless such forms of inquiry and controversy occur, students cannot be said to be learning. They merely become proponents of “their master’s voice.”

Now this “frivolous”—that which is questionable in terms of its worth (Derrida 1980, 118)—understanding of learning, whereby students do not
always make independent interpretive judgments and take texts into systematic controversy, fits well with the economic “needs” of students, which students assume have to be facilitated by the supervisor. Students have to produce a manuscript they perhaps assume complies with the requirements for master’s studies on the basis of the quantity of work produced. For instance, one of my master’s students produced her complete text after six months of study and expected me to approve her work and submit it for examination since, according to her, it complied with the number of pages required for MEd research theses in our department.2 Having gone through her work, I told her that it lacked independent interpretive judgments and scholarly rigor and she became very upset, since she “wanted to finish in order to become eligible for a more financially rewarding job in the public sector.” In fact, she accused me of being more of a gatekeeper than a White professor would probably have been. What she did not understand was that a supervisor expects students’ texts to be argumentative, coherent, and reflective of their voices—that is, academically persuasive texts that meet the expectations of professional judgment that do not stop at what students might think is sufficient. This instance makes it clear that for students the purpose of learning is “getting ready for the market.” This not only undermines our professional roles as supervisors but also minimizes opportunities for students and supervisors to engage deliberatively about the purpose of education and its role in society. I specifically remember another student becoming very perturbed when I questioned the work she submitted. She treated my comments about her work with suspicion, arguing that the level of her work had improved and that I had no reason to imply that she had committed plagiarism. Of course, I do not dispute the fact that students can and do improve their writing and have every right to prove their progress. But it seemed most unlikely to me that this student’s style of writing could differ so greatly from what I had seen previously (about two months earlier). So the point I am making is that this particular student felt threatened when I (as a supervisor) responded critically to her work. I detected a sense of guilt on the part of the student that hinted that she might have used extracts or ideas from other writers’ materials that she did not acknowledge. If this were the case (and I knew it was), it would be highly problematic that students question supervisors’ critical and professional judgments on their work, and that they actually feel the need or impulse to do so, considering that these students have already familiarized their supervisors with a certain expected level of their academic writing. I can only conclude that the type of learning that seems to constitute such students’ practices is consumerist in nature, since a market-oriented logic has the effect of students knowing what their needs actually are—in this instance, the student knew what
feedback she required and hence what feedback complied with her expectation of good academic writing and argumentation.

This seemingly frivolous approach to learning becomes more disconcerting when students want to know who their examiners are so that “they can do everything to satisfy them.” I had a case of a master’s candidate who had previously worked as a research assistant in our department finding out the identity of one of his examiners. What he then set out to do was to use aspects of this person’s work in his manuscript. Of course, there is nothing wrong with any student engaging critically with the work of others, especially when the ideas of other writers are evaluated and used as evidence to substantiate particular arguments, or when their ideas are critically scrutinized to ascertain whether there are gaps in their arguments, which one then attempts to bridge in relation to one’s own research project. But the possibility of learning becomes eroded when one refers uncritically to the work of others without meeting two conditions: first, reading the text in such a way as to determine the range of possible interpretations of the text and to identify and evaluate the presuppositions of this or that particular argument in the text; second, reading the text in such a way that the student is challenged by the questions of the text as much as the text is challenged by the student (without engaging in systematic controversy). It is for this reason that I agree with MacIntyre (2002, 4), who posits that some universities lose sight of the end of education and the development of students’ intellectual powers and instead substitute for these ends merely the passing of examinations. Students might have passed examinations, but this does not mean that they have actually become critical thinkers who have acquired the “outcomes of scientific inquiry for their own sake” (5). The point I am making is that master’s students need to guard against vainly using the work of others whom they think might find their work palatable and acceptable, without having engaged reasonably with that work. Reasonableness requires that one persuades others (say, potential examiners) by having one’s (i.e., the student’s) reasons put to question by others—learning to move from merely having reasons toward subjecting one’s reasons to evaluation by others. Only when one has subjected one’s reasons to critical scrutiny by others, and others have in turn found one’s reasons persuasive, can one begin to talk about learning. Put differently, it is not just a matter of making sure that you have cited the work of scholars adequately (whether they are potential evaluators or not). Instead you need to have shown that you have engaged critically with their work, which you might have considered apposite in advancing your own arguments.3

This kind of frivolous learning poses another problem. I recall a situation in which a student in my department accused a White colleague of not giving her sufficient “structural and conclusive guidelines” on what she
had to do to complete her master’s thesis. She felt that for more than two years after joining our master’s program she was progressing “slowly” and thought that her supervisor was prejudiced against her. I agree that students might have legitimate concerns when supervisors give them scant feedback on their work. Some supervisors should even take the blame for students’ low morale because they have not received systematic and rigorous feedback.\(^4\) However, two points need to be made. The first is that when students practically demand that supervisors provide them in advance with “clear” guidelines as to how their theses must be “structured,” the possibility of unexpected breakthroughs that students might make—as can legitimately be expected of postgraduate students—becomes highly unlikely. I certainly agree that structure can sometimes provide guidelines for students in terms of which they can articulate their arguments. But it is more likely that a predetermined structure could curtail inventiveness and curb students from exploring alternative possibilities. I recall that a student once remarked, “The structure of my thesis does not correspond with what I intended to do in my research proposal.” The student felt inhibited about exploring other possibilities than those he initially set out in his research proposal. In this instance, the possibility for learning seemed to have been restricted, since learning is connected to performing the unexpected—that is, what is “infinitely improbable” (Greene 1995, 178).

In any case, relying solely on structure provided by the supervisor seems to be in line with a consumerist “logic” that requires that supervisors “deliver” what students want—“structural guidelines” that can assist them in producing improved manuscripts.

Second, the fact that the student also needed “conclusive” feedback, which he believed would result in an improved manuscript, illustrates another dilemma. In a university, where the expression of rational judgments is given priority, matters of public concern have to be adjudicated on intelligible grounds in argumentative discourse. Argumentation in this context requires students and supervisors to engage in the institutionalized social space of a university, where meanings are determined through “communicative interaction.” Put differently, argumentation maintains that meanings are constructed, reconceived, and subjected to questioning through forms of dialogical or communicative action oriented to reaching understanding on the basis of inconclusive and “criticisable validity claims” (Habermas 1995, xx). Also, inconclusive rational judgments ensure that rival voices are not illegitimately suppressed. Rather, inconclusive rational judgments would sustain the university as an arena of conflict where rival standpoints are brought into controversy with one another. In other words, inconclusive rational judgments in relation to a university reconceived are concerned not only with issues of rational justification, but also with
eliciting dissent and explaining the conditions that ensure this. Thus when students demand that their supervisors give them “conclusive” judgments about the arguments in their theses, they wish away the legitimacy of contending viewpoints and dissent so vital to university (scholarly) life.

Thus far I have shown why I think that it is problematic—or rather, frivolous—to understand learning as a process in which students are supposed to know what they want, and where supervisors are simply there to meet the needs of students or to satisfy their demands. This kind of learning ignores a primary reason for doing a master’s degree—that is, to explore unintended and unexpected possibilities, and in the process find out what one’s needs are—a process in which supervisors play a crucial role, because their expertise lies there. In any case, the technical concerns students might have in terms of their theses’ size and scope (e.g., how many pages are required), the nature of supervisor feedback (i.e., expecting such feedback to be structured and conclusive), and uncritical treatment of texts (whereby they produce endless quotations and strategic citations) are concerns about “individual preference” (Biesta 2004, 76). Higher education at master’s level invariably involves questions about a student’s relationship with his or her supervisor(s) and others (critical readers, language editors, and perhaps potential examiners after the thesis has been examined), which requires that some space be established for deliberative engagement among them, since relationships are about the social and interpersonal, and not only about individual preferences (76). It is for this reason that I believe that we need to reclaim a notion of learning that can serve as an alternative to frivolous learning—one that involves relationships based on freedom, friendship, and the achievement of democratic citizenship. I now turn to a discussion of this issue.

Cultivating Pedagogy through Freedom and Friendship

I have argued that the relationship between a student and supervisor should not be understood as one between a customer and a supplier. My contention is that it ought to be constituted by freedom and friendship, which can hopefully undermine frivolous conceptions of learning. The authorship of theses and dissertations does not imply the composition of manuscripts in some space apart from interactions of students and supervisors. Authorship happens in dialogical spaces or relationships with others—both students and supervisors are engaged in dialogical relationships through which possibilities are opened up “toward what might be, should
be, is not yet” (Greene 1988, 21). They are free to pose questions to the world and to reflect on what is presented in experience—that is, in communication they imagine new initiatives, construct alternative possibilities, open more texts, and establish friendships (21–23). In this section I explore what Maxine Greene’s “dialectic of freedom” and Jacques Derrida’s “politics of friendship” have to offer relationships among students and supervisors in order to make possible the process of authentic learning.

Greene (1988, 14) cogently makes a case for freedom as a form of human consciousness whereby teachers (in this instance, supervisors) can arouse students “to go in search of their own”—that is, can provoke students to reach beyond themselves, to wonder, to imagine, and to pose their own questions. For her freedom implies that individuals (students) can be provoked to reach beyond themselves in their intersubjective space. It is through and by means of education that they may become empowered to think about what they are doing, to become mindful, to share meanings, to conceptualize, to make varied sense of their lived worlds. It is through education that preferences may be released, languages learned, intelligences developed, perspectives opened, possibilities disclosed. (12)

This “dialectic of freedom” that ought to exist between a student and his or her supervisor presupposes a critical relationship whereby a supervisor distinctively orients students in such a way that they (students) take the initiative, discover new possibilities, look at things as they could be otherwise, and move beyond with the awareness that such overcoming can never be complete (5). When students are taught to think about what they are doing and to share meanings with supervisors or their critical friends, it is unlikely that their writing will be confusing and muddled. Thus far, I have supervised more than a dozen master’s students to completion (of whom the majority were Black) since they joined our master’s program. These students started off by producing nonrigorous pieces of writing. By meeting regularly, we shared ideas that invariably had a constructive impact on the writing of their manuscripts. This often meant that they had to revise and resubmit their work, which gradually became less confusing and more theoretically rigorous. Similarly, when students are taught to conceptualize in order to search for undisclosed possibilities and alternative meanings—to look at things as they could be otherwise—students can engage scrupulously and carefully with texts and even take texts into systematic controversy. In short, freedom implies that students have developed capacities to imagine alternative possibilities and that their supervisors have succeeded in establishing spaces whereby meanings could be shared, understood, reflected on, and contested. This implies that freedom does not become a
preoccupation with self-dependence or self-regulated behavior, but rather an involvement with others—a relationship. The upshot of this “dialectic of freedom” in a relationship between a student and his or her supervisor is that students will develop a passionate desire to speak and write their own words; and a supervisor will carefully and respectfully evaluate the work of his or her students. In other words, students and supervisors are not merely functionaries in an instrumental system geared toward turning out theses (products) that meet the standards of quality control, but rather free participants in a highly esteemed academic enterprise—one in which students and supervisors mutually assert their autonomy and “prepare the ground for what is to come” (Greene 1988, 3).

Moreover, the pedagogical potential between a student and a supervisor has perhaps a better chance of coming to fruition if animated by what Derrida (1997) refers to as a “politics of friendship.” Derrida raises the question of the positive contribution friendship can make in dialogue with others. For him, friendship is the act of loving (philia) rather than letting oneself be loved or being loved—what he refers to as inducing love (8). Of course, it is possible that one can be loved without knowing it. But it is impossible to love without knowing it. Derrida (9) makes the claim that “the friend is the person who loves (and declares his or her love) before being the person who is loved.” And, if one thinks of friendship, one is to start with the “friend-who-loves” not with the “friend-who-is-loved” (9). Thus, when supervisors and students consider themselves to be friends, they willingly declare their love to one another to “the limit of its possibility” (12). I feel myself loving my students when I care for them in a way that evokes their potentialities in order that they come up with possibilities I might not even have thought of. Without being affectionate toward them, I cultivate in them the capacity to reach their own justifiable conclusions for which they are to be held accountable by others—referred to by MacIntyre (1999, 83) as the ability to evaluate, modify, or reject their own practical judgments. Only then can I consider myself as a friend-who-loves, since I do not expect being loved in return; that is, when students reach their own justifiable conclusions about educational issues, they do so without having to please me—without loving me in return. Similarly when students come up with sufficiently good reasons for acting and imagining alternative possibilities so as to be able to rationally reeducate themselves about educational issues without having to please me, they can be said to be friends-who-love. It is this idea of friendship that can go some way toward achieving authentic learning.

Why? If I supervise students, I must first declare myself a friend-who-loves since I would not want to be loved in return. In other words, loving relationships are “brotherly” (sisterly) because they invoke a sense of
responsibility, care, and respect toward others (Fromm 1957, 37). This would imply that as the supervisor I should create conditions whereby students learn authentically, which requires that the following moves are put in place: (1) encouraging students to imagine situations in and beyond the parameters of their research interests where things would be better—that is, to be caring toward students; (2) democratizing our interactions, whereby students can take the initiative to imagine possibilities not otherwise thought of—that is, to be responsible toward students; and (3) connecting with students’ storytelling with the aim to discovering untapped possibilities—that is, to be respectful toward students. On the one hand, these moves are possible if supervisors (1) meet students regularly and encourage them to give an account of their progress (both conceptually and structurally); (2) advise students to undertake journal article and book searches on issues related to their research interests and make suggestions on the availability of relevant literature, such as sharing international conference proceedings with students in order that they get some understanding of the most recent debates in the fields of study; (3) facilitate regular seminars at which master’s students can present their work in progress in the company of others (fellow students and academics); (4) offer opportunities for students to tutor or teach undergraduate or even other postgraduate students; and (5) support students to present papers at local and international conferences with the aim of improving and later publishing their papers. On the basis of acting as friends-who-love, supervisors can establish conditions that make authentic learning highly possible. On the other hand, students as friends-who-love can perhaps do the following in the quest to achieve authentic leaning: (1) provide drafts on a regular and agreed-upon basis, which would make it possible for supervisors to engage critically (and not dismissively) with their work, albeit tentative; (2) rework their earlier drafts in the light of their supervisors’ critical comments; and (3) resubmit their revised drafts. Although being friends-who-love might seem to be quite a compelling and time-consuming process that students and I have to embark on, I cannot begin to see how authentic learning would ever be achieved without invoking such an idea of friendship. Yes, becoming friends would be a matter of putting realizable conditions in place that can facilitate a critical engagement among supervisors and students with respect to their research interests and academic manuscripts. Only then would it be possible to enter a field of more possibilities—of uncovering the silences in the quest to achieve authentic learning.

But authentic learning would be difficult to unfold if such learning did not also engender a pedagogy of democratic citizenship. Why? Whereas freedom and friendship shape the interactions among teachers and students, they do not specifically address the concerns of where a society
should move toward, which is a matter of ensuring that education could result in justice and a sense of belonging for all South African citizens. This means that students ought to be taught not only to engage with others, but also about the distinct purposes or reasons for engagement. And, after decades of Apartheid rule, one cannot deny that South African society needs consolidate its fledgling democracy. By implication, students should be taught what it means to ensure that justice for every person in the society is a necessary priority. In this way, learning invariably becomes more authentic.

Toward a Pedagogy of Democratic Citizenship

Personally, in South Africa I was subjected to racial discrimination under Apartheid rule for 36 years. All the acts of human rights violations I experienced continuously led me to ask the question: how can education contribute toward minimizing or eradicating such inhumane and unjust acts against humanity? As far as I am concerned, we should constantly educate societies to inculcate in the important virtues of democratic citizenship in order to prevent such forms of injustice. If our societies can internalize the virtues of democratic citizenship, the possibility of injustices against human beings could be minimized or even eradicated. Simply put, the possibility that inhumane and unjust acts against human beings can be reduced is highly likely if people are educated to be democratic citizens. What does this entail? Important virtues of democratic citizenship include, first, the capacity to deliberate as free and equal citizens in a democratic polity, and second, conducting such deliberations so that they are about the demands of justice for all individuals (Gutmann 1996, 68–69). When we deliberate as free and equal citizens, we give an account of what we do to others, who might or might not find out reasons justified. In turn, we consider the reasons of others equally, which can lead us either to accept or to reject their reasons or their understanding of our reasons or justifications. Such justifications and concomitant actions happen in an atmosphere of free and open expression, and are hindered only when our reasons embody an injustice toward others. For instance, when students deliberate among themselves about the racial discrimination experienced by South African Blacks under Apartheid and begin to equate affirmative action with discrimination toward Whites, free expression can no longer remain unrestricted, because the majority Black South African government is unjustly being accused of racial discrimination. I am not suggesting that governments should not be questioned critically,
but rather that unjustifiable criticism should not be countenanced, because affirmative action is one way of equalizing opportunities for all South Africans, especially those previously excluded from gaining employment opportunities under Apartheid. I cannot imagine myself in an academic position today if it were not for the equalization of opportunities for all of the country’s citizens. For this reason I agree with Gutmann (2003), who claims that freedom of expression should not become “an unconstrained licence to discriminate” and that it should be practiced “within the limits of doing no injustice to others” (200). For example, when all Jews are accused of perpetrating acts of aggression against Palestinians, or when all Palestinians are branded as potential “suicide bombers,” these potentially dangerous statements should not be condoned, because not only are people unjustly repudiated, but also such irresponsible expressions could fuel the already volatile relations in the Middle East. Similarly, if a young child in a South African school decides to dress in the military-style attire worn by, say, a “suicide bomber,” this cannot be condoned, because others might find it offensive as it might venerate “suicide bombers” as heroes, yet they perpetrate heinous acts of violence against other human beings.

In essence, educating people to be democratic citizens involves inculcating in them a spirit of openness and respect for the justifications of others, a recognition that others should be listened to, and that injustices should not be done to others under the guise of equal and free expression.

Moreover, if democratic citizenship demands that people deliberate about justice for all individuals then, as aptly put by Gutmann (1996, 69), “doing what is right cannot be reduced to loyalty to, or identification with, any existing group of human beings.” Educational institutions should teach students, on the one hand, about their duties as citizens to advance justice and not to limit performance of these duties to some individuals or groups, and, on the other hand, about their responsibilities as citizens to support institutional ways to move toward better societies and a better world (71). In South Africa the Department of Education envisages that students be taught “social honor” through singing the national anthem, displaying the national flag, and saying out loud an oath of allegiance that reads as follows: “I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and do my best to promote the welfare and the wellbeing of all its citizens. I promise to show self-respect in all that I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. Let us work for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by past conflicts. And let us build a common destiny together” (DoE 2001, 59). There seems to be little wrong in educating for social honor through advancing peace, friendship, reconciliation, and the building of a collective common destiny—a matter of exercising one’s duty in doing what is right, particularly after the majority
Black population had for decades suffered racial abuse, political exclusion, and inhumane treatment at the hands of the Apartheid regime. Reconciliation and justice are conditional upon all citizens desiring to live in peace and friendship, as well as the recognition that all citizens should be respected for their human dignity. An individual or group can have a moral edge over another only if that individual or group is more just than the other.

However, it seems as if the pledge of allegiance can also open up the possibility for individuals not to enact their civic responsibilities to move toward a better society and, through that, a better world. Why is this so? Limiting one’s loyalty to one’s country and promoting the welfare of fellow citizens could potentially exclude immigrants from gaining one’s support, particularly considering that many immigrants from Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, currently fleeing their countries because of political instability and state harassment, are destined to seek refuge in South Africa. Pledging one’s support for fellow citizens, while immigrants are considered as “foreign co-citizens” or “resident aliens,” could intensify existing xenophobic prejudices toward immigrants on account of their being considered “outsiders” who do not deserve respect and civility. Often these immigrant communities are subjected to indifference, cruelty, and sometimes hatred and assault. For instance, Somali shopkeepers were gunned down in the Khayelitsha area of Cape Town, apparently for jeopardizing job opportunities for locals. Likewise, I sometimes hear my doctoral student from Malawi and tutor in the Faculty of Education complaining how he experiences moments of stigmatization and isolation. The point I am making is that educating students to promote the welfare of South African citizens only could be interpreted as not having to attend to the rights of immigrant “outsiders,” which could in turn kindle xenophobia and prejudice. Like Callan (1999, 198), I contend that students should be taught “to see their neighborhoods and the international community as arenas of civic participation.”

In essence, educating for democratic citizenship involves not only cultivating in people a sense of deliberating together freely and equally about their common and collective destiny, but also achieving justice for all, including those immigrants who are victims of religious wars (Sudanese and Somalians) and political alienation and suppression (Zimbabweans). In the words of Gutmann (1996, 69), “public education ought to cultivate in all students the skills and virtues of democratic citizenship, including the capacity to deliberate about the demands of justice for all individuals, not only for present-day citizens of the United States [or any specific country]. Deliberating about the demands of justice is a central virtue of democratic citizenship, because it is primarily (not exclusively) through our
empowerment of democratic citizens that we can further the cause of justice around the world.”

This brings me to a discussion of some of the strategies that can be used in a university classroom to educate for democratic citizenship.

First, I invited my PhD student from Malawi to teach our PGCE students who were about to become teachers in public schools the following year. He taught them “Diversity and Inclusivity in Education,” one of the 12 modules for the program. At first, I started off as a coteacher with him, but after that he taught the class entirely on his own. Because almost 50 percent of the class of about 90 students were Afrikaans speaking, it was extremely difficult for him to connect with all students in their mother tongue. So, I decided to join him occasionally to clarify concepts in Afrikaans. However, he did most of the teaching and marked the English-speaking students’ assignments, tests, and examinations. Some of the students actually started to complain to me about him, in particular (according to them) about his seemingly inadequate teaching style, lack of communication skills (in Afrikaans), and inability to clarify difficult concepts. Although some of these concerns were legitimate, especially the language issue, I found it hard to believe that he was a bad teacher, especially given the time he took to prepare his lecturers and the discussions we had prior to lectures on the concepts related to multiculturalism, deliberative democracy, and diversity. So he requested his students to communicate with him (in English) via e-mail. Quite surprisingly, many students did, but there were also some students who preferred to communicate directly with me. In the end, the complaining students completed assignments, wrote tests, and examinations and performed reasonably well. I think what was at play here was that my student was not accepted initially by most students as someone who had the right to be a participant in the same university classroom on the grounds that he came from a neighboring country and that he did not share a common language of communication with some students. Also, it seemed as if some students were unwilling to be taught by one whom they consider as a “stranger.” It could also be that some (and here, I must admit, a very small minority of students) might even have projected xenophobic attitudes. I specifically remember his encounter with one student who unjustifiably accused him of never being available after lectures; the fact was that he was the one person in the faculty who was always around to talk to students. However, as the situation turned out, especially after many students recorded good marks in their assignments, students realized that he was not going to “disappear” and that he has a legitimate right to teach them. For me, educating for democratic citizenship involves making students recognize and accept that those whom they consider as “outside strangers” have the right to participate in a university classroom.
and that we (South African students and teachers) do not have sole proprietorship of pedagogical spaces.

Second, for this particular course our mode of teaching involved deliberation. We gave an account of why we included topics such as democratic citizenship, diversity, and multiculturalism and, in turn, students could give an account of why they thought it necessary or not to discuss these topics in relation to their own understanding and experiences. In the first instance, students had to read texts and make analytical summaries and presentations to the class. The idea was that students would feel free to articulate their views in an atmosphere of mutual trust. They could relax their boundaries without being concerned that others would dismiss their interpretations. Although some students felt insecure about their presentations and did not want to be criticized by their peers, the majority of them accepted that, if their interpretations were indefensible, they would concede or even attempt to produce more persuasive arguments in defense of their views. I want to relate a specific incident that really sparked much heated debate and controversy. During a discussion about the political uncertainty in Zimbabwe, most students agreed that the crisis in Zimbabwe could be attributed to the dictatorial regime of its president and felt that the opposition was being instigated by outside forces that wanted to see the demise of Robert Mugabe. However, one Coloured student argued that the only way one could achieve political justice in Zimbabwe is for Mugabe to continue to confiscate White farmers’ land and that the same should happen in South Africa. This statement immediately led to a lot of disagreement and even resentment of the student’s claim about what ought to happen in South Africa. In line with the process of deliberative engagement it was not my task to limit debate but rather to facilitate argumentation, which I did. But then a White student remarked: “Africa is ruled by Blacks and look at the political turmoil on the continent.” This statement brought about a turning point in deliberations. Although students felt free to express themselves, others felt that controversy should be avoided. I thought that controversy should be encouraged and I asked students to produce counterarguments to this statement. For a while belligerence and distress dominated our deliberations, until one White student convinced others that the statement was an expression of injustice toward others, because Blacks were being falsely accused of bringing about political instability on the African continent, whereas colonization by White settlers brought much harm to Africa. The point about deliberation is that it can be, but the students recognized that belligerent argumentation should not lead to dismissing others unjustly and that free expression can never be unconstrained, especially if wrong is done to others.
Third, for a compulsory assignment, PGCE students had to identify a controversial issue that relates to democratic citizenship, and then had to make presentations in groups to the class. I have selected only the following three issues that three groups presented, as these issues clarify some of my claims about educating for democratic citizenship. The first group chose to write and speak about the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa; the second group introduced the inhumane treatment of people in the Darfur region in Sudan (Africa); and the third group raised the issue of America’s “war on terror.” The main argument of the first group was that forgiveness and starting anew are important to build future human relations, in particular for people to reconcile after racial mistreatment and the violation of people’s human dignity. Black and White people in South Africa should learn to live together, and share their commonalities and disagreements, if they want to live in peace and solidarity, this group stated. This is an important claim, as recognized by Benhabib (2002, 162), who argues that educating people to be democratic citizens has to take into account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and religious commonalities. The idea of finding a civil space for the sharing of different people’s commonalities is based on the understanding that people need to learn to live with the otherness of others whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to our own (30). And, in creating a civil space whereby people can enact what they have in common and at the same time make public their competing narratives and significations, people might develop a real opportunity to coexist. In this way they would establish not only a community of conversation and interdependence (i.e., they share commonalities), but also one of disagreement (i.e., they do not share commonalities) without holding in disrespect others’ life-worlds (35 and 41). Put differently, when people are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement, they engage in an educative process with a collective identity—they share commonalities. And educating people to become democratic citizens involves creating civil spaces where they can learn to share commonalities and respect the differences of others.

The second group introduced the discussion that the world and the United Nations cannot look on while a government wants to starve a section of its citizens (considered as dissidents) to death. They felt that the starvation of people and the willful destruction of the way of life of citizens who disagree with the state is a form of genocide. I agree, because ethnic cleansing (as happened during the Holocaust and in the former Yugoslavia) is a crime against humanity. Benhabib (2006, 28) considers genocide as “the supreme crime against humanity, in that it aims at the destruction of human variety, of the many and diverse ways of being human . . . it aims at the extinction of their way of life.” Thus, educating students to respect and
to do something about the preservation of human life becomes a necessary part of the agenda of educating for democratic citizenship.

The third group raised not so much the justification of war and the measure of preemptive strikes against suspected terrorists, as the harm any war against people causes to innocent civilians, in particular children and women. They felt that the war on terror should not be waged against a suspected enemy and that dialogue should always be the only means to resolve world crises. Elsewhere, I make the argument in defense of the use of limited force in curbing violence and submit that force should no longer be used when a supposed enemy has agreed to end acts of aggression (Waghid 2006). Yet, like this group, I do not imagine (at least at this stage) that suspected terrorists and proponents of the war on terror would forgo their intention of annihilating the other. So, I agree with this group that the focus ought to be more on the innocent victims of the war on terror. In other words, I would want to suggest that everything possible should be done to avoid civilians being killed. And since this is not always possible, as the latest use of precision warfare would confirm, that we do the unthinkable: initiate a dialogue with those presumed to be terror suspects. This means not just abandoning them to Guantánamo Bay, where their perceived “martyrdom” breeds more resistance to their enemy, but finding a place where people can begin to talk about their rights to live in a protected and better world for all.

Simply put, as human beings, we should begin to deepen our interconnectedness and interdependence, which requires that people be regarded “as worthy of respect as human beings, regardless of how their values differ and whether or not we disapprove of what they do” (Hill 2000, 69). The point I am making is that even those who have perpetrated acts of racial bigotry, gender oppression, cultural imperialism, and even terrorism should be respected as persons. This would at least leave open the door for reconciliation among contending parties if the opportunity arises. If there is too much hatred, anger, and resentment toward others, the possibility of reconciliation is slim. In this sense I agree with Hannah Arendt (1998, 240–241), who notes that “Forgiving…is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.” Put differently, respect opens the door for the enhancement of reconciliation; without respect, there can be no recognition of human dignity and, hence, no likelihood of reconciliation. In the words of Hill (2000, 115), “That all moral agents should be respected as human beings should stand even for perpetrators of serious crimes and moral offences. Even they should not be seen as forfeiting all respect.”
In essence, the possibility of authentic (and, should I say, imaginative) learning would be enhanced if students were taught what it means to cultivate democratic citizens. The educational project I have been engaged with over the past five years has attempted to foreground authentic (imaginative) learning and teaching in relation to freedom, friendship, and democratic citizenship.

Notes

1. Two of my master’s students (from Namibia and Lesotho) work for their respective national Ministries of Education.
2. She produced 140 pages of work that, in addition to being structurally and conceptually muddled, also required major language and technical editing.
3. I have found that most of my master’s students cite my own work without challenging or undermining my arguments. This is a serious limitation of scholarly work I have tried to address over the past three years.
4. I remember waiting for six months for feedback on a chapter I submitted during my doctoral studies. Also, a copromoter gave me discouraging feedback at times that seriously undermined my enthusiasm for doctoral studies. This person used phrases like “I don’t agree” and “I’m stopping here now,” as if he showed a form of disrespect toward my work. In such a case, I would perhaps agree with the student.
5. Over the past five years, at least six of my master’s and doctoral students have acted as research assistants in my department. I have also managed to support several students to enable them to present papers at local conferences; their papers were subsequently published in refereed journals. I also recently coedited a book with three of my doctoral students.
6. Recently in South Africa there have been several xenophobic assaults on refugees. For example, 14 Rwandan school children from the Bon Esperance refugee shelter in Phillipi were tied up and assaulted on their return from school; and a Burundian refugee who works in the country as a security guard was stabbed in the head. He later dropped charges against his attacker. Currently 35,000 asylum seekers live in the Cape Metropole alone.
7. The rationale for this course is to introduce students to pertinent theoretical concepts in deliberative democracy, citizenship, cosmopolitanism, and universal justice with the aim, first, to make sense of what it means to integrate discussions on democracy, social justice, equality, nonracism and nonsexism, ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability (responsibility), the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation into the public school curriculum—values related to the Department of Education’s Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001); and second, to introduce students to discussions about genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, in particular examining how educating for democratic citizenship and cosmopolitanism can potentially minimize and eradicate such crimes.
8. I agree that, as Hannah Arendt (in Young 2006, 80) claims in *On Violence*, “violence may sometimes be justified, but it cannot be legitimate.”

9. Iris Marion Young (2006), in discussing Arendt’s *On Violence*, says this about violence:

> Violence not only harms individuals but it makes their lives difficult to carry on as before. When rulers or resisters adopt the use of violence as a regular means of trying to elicit the cooperation of others, they tend to produce the opposite effect: flight, retreat into privacy, pre-emptive strikes, distrust of all by all. The use of violence in politics is problematic, moreover, because its consequences so easily and often escalate beyond the specific intentions its uses have. Violent acts tend to produce violent responses that radiate beyond the original acts. (91)

References


In this chapter I summarize the exchanges between the South African scholars and the panel members, organized according to the South African scholar to whom the questions were posed and the order in which his or her chapter appears in the collection. My commentary follows in Section II.

I
The Exchanges

But first we need to read each other’s work and understand it on its own terms.

—Ursula Hoadley (2007)

Crain Soudien

Macedo identifies two “central points” in Soudien’s paper, the first being modernity, which, she notes (after Garcia Canclini), never “completely arrived in Latin America,” and, in fact, combined with “traditional cultures” to produce a “hybridism” that bypassed modernity and instantiated postmodernity. The movement in Brazil was, then, from premodernity to
postmodernity, without a fully realized modernity in-between. Macedo wonders if that is also the case in South Africa: modernity was never fully realized but, instead, “hybridized with local traditions, creating a fragmented reality.” Soudien’s second central point, Macedo suggests, concerns “the formal curriculum as an image of the Enlightenment.” She wonders to what extent that can be true if modernity was “hybridized.” Finally, Macedo questions the link between education and citizenship, acknowledging that in Brazil there has been, after the French Revolution, a “strongly individualistic perspective.” This conception of citizenship has rendered the question of “difference” difficult in Brazil. So embedded, “difference becomes a deficiency” to be “overcome” by schooling. Macedo asks Soudien if something similar happens in South Africa: “How does the citizenship live with the discrimination that is on the basis of the concept of Nation to which it seems to be inexorably linked?”

Soudien replies by suggesting that in South Africa even hybridity is framed by modernity (rather than modernity subsumed by hybridity), so that “what emerges is...a kind of modernity.” Its process of formation was “distinctive” to South Africa, typified by its “binary nature of social description.” South African curricula reinscribe this binary, he judges, even when they take on board terms such as “social construction,” precisely because curricula are “thought to be relatively coherent,” that is, as “mechanisms of order into these fields of contradiction.” In South Africa, Soudien continues, “the fictions of race become so embodied that it is virtually impossible to think beyond them.” It is out of this binary structure that the “conditions for expressing agency emerge.” He cites historical examples, including the capacity of “deeply oppressed slaves” who were able to “come to subjectivity as autonomous subjects.” This “creativity of slaves” takes contemporary forms, he suggests, in events such as the 1976 Youth Revolt. “The significance of this for the curriculum field is, I think, the need to pay much deeper attention to the sociology of the cognitive encounter.” Because our “analytic frames” have been “precoded,” they “fail to recognize the opportunities of possibility that are inherent in the encounter.” Due to lasting legacies of colonialism, then, the very concepts South African curriculum studies employs overlook opportunities present in the pedagogical encounter.

The historiographic challenge, Soudien specifies, is to “provincialize” Europe so that its African and Asian elements—present even at the “high moment of the Enlightenment”—are acknowledged, enabling a decoupling of educational achievement from whiteness. This decoupling Soudien associates with a broader set of phenomena, with a broader history, “grounded in reality.” Replying to Macedo’s second question concerning nationhood and citizenship, Soudien asserts that the South African curriculum conveys “a sense of middle-classed whiteness as constituting the ideal
citizen.” Other forms of difference become “sublimated . . . through unspoken culturalized forms of department, demeanor, address, and disposition embodied in the curriculum.” Articulating this hidden curriculum is Unauthorized because “higher cognitive processes are assumed to lie only within the logic framework of the Enlightenment.” The “nation” emerges through this hegemonic process.

Wang asks Soudien about his use of the concept of internationalization: does he regard “dominance as essential to its process”? Soudien replies that the concept has to be located in the “history of difference.” In South Africa, “internationalization . . . is about borrowing, engaging with, cultivating relationships with the ‘best’ . . . almost always defined in racial terms.” Then Wang asks Soudien if internationalization is “what the local/national needs to struggle against? Is it possible for the local/national, especially from the disadvantaged sites, to reappropriate and transform internationalization towards a more interactive and inclusive direction?” “In the long run that is possible,” Soudien replies, but even this “might carry its own unspoken and yet-to-be recognized forms of oppression.”

Searching for a site of resistance to such oppression, Wang points to Soudien’s reference to the role of the Christian Church in colonial domination. She asks about the role of religion in South African schools today, specifically, if indigenous religions play any part in the education of children. Though indigenous religions are recognized in post-Apartheid South Africa, Soudien replies, they “have little official currency.” Religion has little “visibility” in the curriculum generally. Still searching for sites of resistance, Wang focuses on Soudien’s determination to decouple whiteness from equality. She wonders if there are “native resources” upon which educators can draw to participate in this process. In reply, Soudien underscores the pervasiveness of colonization, so that the “recuperation of tradition [is] always a fragile gesture.” Because “tradition has already gone through such incredible hybridization . . . new forms of indigenity need to be recognized.” He offers “the powerful idea of nonracialism” as one example of a “modern-indigenity” would might serve as a “launch pad for a new curriculum.” This assertion reiterates Soudien’s earlier affirmation of relative autonomy (including among slaves), suggesting that he thinks that the oppression of the present—while even more totalizing than past colonial power—can still be countermanded.

Wayne Hugo

Macedo asserts her interest in establishing a “dialogue” between the Brazilian and South African fields. She begins by pointing to certain
similarities, albeit inflected with the distinctive national history and culture of each nation. The first is the relationship between disciplinary and integrated curricula: in Brazil, she reports, many university professors and teachers accept a discourse favoring curricular integration. And “something similar” has occurred in Portugal, she adds. (In recent years there have been a series of curriculum conferences held, alternately, in Portugal and Brazil to encourage exchanges among curriculum studies scholars.) In Brazil, curricular integration has been rationalized by drawing on Deleuze (also referenced in Hugo’s chapter). Hugo links curricular integration with racial integration; Macedo wonders if there is, as well, an international element to the acceptance of the idea. Acknowledging Hugo’s Bernsteinian disposition and his argument for strengthening curricular boundaries, Macedo expresses skepticism that Deleuze’s work supports such a move. She asks: “how do you articulate this [sharpening curricular boundaries] with Deleuze’s work?” She expresses her skepticism “that a disciplinary curriculum, strongly verticalized, could diminish social inequalities.” Finally, Macedo links Hugo’s argument—that an integrated curricular “reinforces inequalities”—with those of Brazilian Marxists who share his skepticism toward progressivism.

Hugo replies that he reads Deleuze “as the great articulator of how hierarchical systems work.” In response to the capacity of a disciplinary curriculum to reduce social inequality, Hugo acknowledges that “disciplinarity is not a panacea.” Underscoring the significance of context and historical moment in curriculum policy, his advocacy of disciplinarity seems situational: “take it only here, at this time, for so long.” Dwelling on Macedo’s challenge, Hugo endorses a “hybrid model… precisely [because it] allows for complex mixtures of variables that vary flexibly depending on the situation.” It is because “high school subjects like history, English, science, geography, biology can now be passed almost without any disciplinary knowledge” that he aligns himself with disciplinarity. Moreover, his version of disciplinarity does not require “lockstep sequences strictly paced that are disengaged from learners. The pacing could be slow, the sequencing flexible, even the assessment open, but in the end, specialization into these powerful knowledge structures must be kept as an overriding goal.” He concludes: “So I agree with you: a strongly verticalized disciplinary curriculum in no way answers the issue of the reproduction of inequality, there are many other variables, flows, shifts, alterations and combinations at play and integration plays a crucial role.”

In the interviews with South African scholars preceding the composition of their chapters, I asked each about his or her intellectual life history (see Introduction). An interest in the relations among intellectual life history, national history, and curriculum studies surfaced in the exchanges, as Wang,
too, asks Hugo how his definition of curriculum studies—as “the critical investigation of the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning”—derives from his intellectual and experiential history. Specifically, she wonders what in Hugo’s life history made Bernstein and Muller’s (see 2000) works “so appealing.”

In reply, Hugo recalls his ongoing engagement with mysticism, from which he has learned that “at the beginning of the road to radical freedom were the most limiting and hierarchical of practices.” In these practices designed to reach “high mystical states” one found that “the curriculum structure was directed at working more and more intensely with the knower. So knowledge in its own right was kind of subordinated.” Bernstein and Muller’s emphasis upon “knowledge forms” enabled Hugo to appreciate knowledge as ordered according to its “capabilities and effects…in the knower.” During his PhD study at Rhodes University, Hugo continues, he went into “something like a hibernation.” That is, he studied so intensely that “he [Descartes] took me into very high states of consciousness.” But it was Dante, who “still by far [is] the person who holds the most influence over me, [and] my imaginal world exploded.” Dante’s “intention was for every scene to carry pedagogic effect, and I opened myself out to this.” Other figures influenced him as well, so that when he emerged in 2003 he was “somewhat pared of contemporary influence.” Hugo reentered the present fray through intellectual friendships with Ursula Hoadley, Joe Muller, Ken Harley, and Volker Wedekind. Each had “strong Bernsteinian roots.”

Wang finds Hugo’s intellectual self-portrait, and specifically his encounter with mysticism, “fascinating,” in part due to her own ongoing study of Chinese philosophy and spirituality, and her reading of Chinese martial arts novels. She reports that the “masters” of these arts did not follow “hierarchical structures,” and those who did reached “only a limited level.” The masters followed individual routes, ones “adopted to achieve the union between the person and the spirit of the sword or another instrument.” By this means they became “undefeatable.” She questions an exclusive reliance upon curriculum hierarchies, preferring “multiple pathways.” Hugo replied by endorsing “multiple pathways” but within hierarchy. Wang is undeterred: why must the curriculum be hierarchical? Does Hugo think “epistemological hierarchy can be sharply separated from social, economic, and political hierarchy? Why not use another notion, for instance, “complexity” or “spiral”? She finds the political implications of “hierarchy” to be “unsettling.”

Also undeterred, Hugo replies that he chooses hierarchy because “it catches a basic move from lower to higher.” He continues: “If you don’t have this move, then no matter what else you do you have taken out the basal logic and direction of what it means to learn.” Within complexity is “a hierarchical principle… but it comes with so much else (postmodernism
chaos, etc.) that hierarchy gets lost within the flux.” “Spiral” is closer but “it does not catch in a technical way the transcendent movement of hierarchy.” Hugo acknowledges that “the world of curriculum studies is certainly far more complex than what hierarchy can capture, and holds many other fruitful logics, but these seem to me to spin out of a fundamental drive to move a student upwards through an organized knowledge structure.” Indeed, Hugo asserts “the universal nature of hierarchy across different knowledge structures, practices and subjects.” He allows that the “basic line between everyday and school knowledge holds an infinity of variety and crossings between the two.”

Macedo asks Hugo to address the influence within South Africa of the international movement toward an integrated curriculum. Hugo acknowledges that one can place “too much causal weight to the Apartheid context when trying to understand the shift towards an integrated curriculum,” precisely due to the influence of “international forces.” Hugo wonders why scholarly critiques of integrated curricular and of outcomes-based education were not “imported.” No “simple” answer to these questions is possible, he acknowledges, “but the centrifuge of all this was circulating within was our Apartheid past.” It appears that importation inflects the global with the local.

Labby Ramrathan

In reply to questions concerning outcomes-based education, Ramrathan reports that approximately one-third of South African teachers were unprepared to participate in this “reform.” In higher education, the scheme “influenced the system through modularization and competences, making exit-level outcomes…the driving force in shaping curriculum construction.” With understatement Ramrathan acknowledges that “the transition to outcomes-based education, both at the school level as well as in higher education, has not been a smooth process.” Adding to this “confusion” was the Audit conducted in 1994, declaring that there was an oversupply of teachers, which led to the closure of colleges of education. With “this negative image of teaching as a career,” enrollments dropped and a “near crisis in teacher supply” followed. “Acute shortages of teachers” exist still (2007) in mathematics, science, technology, language, and commerce. The government has responded with a “national campaign” to encourage entry in the profession. He wonders how successful such a campaign can be with the simultaneous promotion of “quality assurance systems.” These—Ramrathan cites the Development Appraisal System (DAS) introduced in
schools in the late 1990s—brought “strong resistance” from teachers and teacher unions. Government responded by offering to increase teacher pay according to appraisals conducted under the scheme. More recently, Whole School Evaluation (WSE) has been introduced, about which Ramrathan is also skeptical. Finally, an integrated quality management system (IQMS) has been introduced to coordinate the three existing evaluation systems mentioned above (DAS, pay progression, and WSE). After the global financial crisis of late 2008—underscoring that “business” is not always capable of quality, efficiency, or transparency—one wonders how long the “business model” of school reform can retain its political currency.

In part due to uncertainty over the job market, South African universities have refocused their academic offerings “towards a more academic study on education.” Academicians have begun to influence policy; Ramrathan cites both the Norms and Standards for Teacher Education (2000) and the National Teacher Education Framework (2007) as examples. He regards the latter as “shifting teacher education to an argued dialogue between theory and practice.” Ramrathan reports his discomfort with modularization, with the Norms and Standards for Educators (NSE), and with the National Teacher Education Audit’s findings. The first forced curriculum planning into nonintellectual units, the second undermined program development, and the third provided a false sense of teacher supply and demand. Ramrathan invokes a “force-field” conceptualization of curriculum that includes within it the “potential to resist or shape the forces that are acting on it.” Acknowledging history but emphasizing the opportunity of the present, Ramrathan suggests: “The next steps, I would imagine, would be to theorize from contextual understanding of curriculum studies in South Africa.” Indeed, “issues of power and agency will come to bear in what we know and how we theorize.”

Ursula Hoadley

If Afrikaner universities reproduced official ideology during the Apartheid era, Wang asks Hoadley, do they also reproduce the official ideology of the post-Apartheid era? Do public schools also remain ideologically reproductive? Are they now more integrated? In their relationship to the state, Hoadley replies, the Afrikaans universities have not changed. The gender and race of staff profiles have been slow to change and the integration of schools has proceeded slowly.

Regarding the distinction between “knowledge mode” and “knower mode,” Wang wonders if schools could “be open to both.” She asks why
indigenous knowledge is subsumed in the “knower mode”: it would seem to her to be “knowledge.” Which aspects of indigenous knowledge should be included in the school curriculum? Hoadley acknowledges that the distinction between “indigenous” and “Western” is not useful; she prefers universal to local, or embedded versus disembedded. One of the problems with indigenous knowledge proposals is a “preoccupation with whose knowledge, rather than what knowledge.” (This resembles the problem posed by identity politics in the United States. There the classic curriculum question—what knowledge is of most worth?—is sometimes replaced by “whose knowledge is of most worth?”). Focusing on Waghid’s chapter, Wang wonders again about the relationship between the knower and the known. For Wang, it is the relationship that is key, not the knowledge (including whose knowledge it is, the preoccupation of identity politics) or what knowledge it is.

Macedo wonders how curriculum studies can be defined given that hybridism is its main feature. Referring to the Brazilian situation, Macedo is unable to ascertain clear links between disciplinary communities and ways of conceiving curriculum. Hoadley acknowledges that hybridism does imply ambiguity within and across categories of curriculum scholarship, but that, in the main, “disciplinary communities…do largely operate in silos.” Macedo cites what appears to be “almost absent dialogue among scholars,” evidenced by “the lack of cross-references in the papers [chapters].” Brazilian scholars, she adds, also focus more on foreign scholarship than on their own. Macedo finds this “one of the major obstacles for the construction of a field.” She reports that Brazilian curriculum scholars reference South African scholarship; the image of South African curriculum studies within Brazil is one wherein Bernstein’s ideas and the “knowledge mode” are dominant. Macedo confessed she was surprised to learn of constructivism’s strength in South Africa. Hoadley points to the “proliferation of theoretical languages” (in contrast to empirical research) as defining curriculum studies and as constituting its complexity. Hoadley adds that terms such as “learner-centeredness” are loosely defined, appropriated by government bureaucrats whose careers become associated with these educational slogans.

Lesley Le Grange

To Macedo’s question concerning ambiguity within Apartheid, Le Grange replies that the oppressed did “resist, subvert, tactically appropriate” as well as “comply.” In reply to her question concerning the utility of French
post-structuralism in South African curriculum studies, Le Grange confirms he finds Deleuze’s “rhizoanalysis . . . particularly useful in relation to curriculum policy analysis and teachers’ work.” Such analysis subverts any linear reading of policy-practice and enables understanding of teachers’ multiple relationships to policy, that is, how teachers comply, subvert, and appropriate policy prescriptions, providing theoretical elaboration of the “ambiguity” both Macedo and Le Grange discern in the South African situation.

Cultivating complexity requires agency, as Le Grange confirms in his reply to Wang’s question concerning deterritorialization. “The conditions for deterritorialization,” Le Grange asserts, “include an intellectual climate of robust critical engagement . . . and a recognition of the politics of translation,” the capacity to read “existing events” as “the bearers of alternative possibilities.” In his acknowledgment of South Africa’s dual developments—entering the external global economy as the nation democratizes internally—Le Grange underscores the tension between the two, as neoliberalism “is thwarting the democratic project.” Because teachers have been forced to attend to “performativity-related matters,” the “space for critical participation . . . inside classrooms” shrinks. Teachers’ critical engagement with the curriculum—enabling them, as he has pointed out earlier, to read “existing events as bearers of alternative possibilities”—disappears.

Yusef Waghid

Macedo points to the centrality of dialogue in Waghid’s exposition. In Brazil, she points out, dialogue is sometimes criticized as a “romantic proposal,” idealized and sentimentalized without critical examination, without “address[ing] the conditions necessary to make a dialogue possible.” Among those conditions is consumerism, about which Waghid is critical. But, Macedo asks, “is it possible to establish a dialogue if we cannot understand and accept Others’ perspectives?” If we transpose the question to the internationalization of curriculum studies, is the very idea of meaningful exchange possible without attending to the conditions that render it possible? What would those conditions be? Understanding and acceptance cannot constitute prerequisites, as the former names the very aspiration of internationalization, and the latter is rarely more than provisionally obtained in academic exchange. What then are the conditions that render dialogue possible among scholars in nationally distinctive fields? Perhaps “citizenship” in a worldwide field of curriculum studies is the first condition, membership that, like the more common kind, involves obligations
as well as rights, including the obligation to study scholarship produced in countries not one’s own, and the right to have it read.

Citizenship is central to curriculum discourses in Brazil, Macedo points out, where it is a hybrid concept containing Marxist and liberal perspectives. She asks Waghid: “What does education for citizenship mean in South Africa?” If citizenship is linked—through the concept of nation—to Europe, what can it mean in racially diverse societies “like ours”? If disciplinary affiliation implies an intellectual form of citizenship, the basic condition of dialogue may be met. Because we “occupy” this “land”—a discursive terrain—we become obligated to understand each other’s position. How are intellectual differences to be accommodated within one “nation,” one worldwide field of curriculum, so that difference remains distinctive and dynamically present within the collective? Does our capacity for “reason” provide the means to acknowledge difference and work in a shared terrain?

Given Waghid’s emphasis upon “reasoning together with others,” Wang asks about the role of emotions and feelings. Wang wonders how the differential power between the two positions affects teacher-student friendship, and, specifically, how friendship interrupts the “consumer-oriented” expectations of students. Can friendship repair the legacies of Apartheid, specifically Black-student distrust of White teachers? How do emotions structure “reasoning together with others”? Waghid acknowledges that “freedom, friendship, and citizenship are not just rational forms of human engagement but highly emotive as well.” While it is true that teachers and students are in unequal relationships, friendship between them is still possible. Teachers may have to take the initiative and accept that pedagogical friendship may not be required. These seem to be crucial points as well for the internationalization of curriculum studies, itself inevitably a “highly emotive” undertaking, as profound feelings of national affiliation risk being activated by colleagues working in countries in political tension with one’s own. That basic challenge—for scholars to stress the solidarity of “citizenship” in a worldwide field of curriculum studies over citizenship in one’s nation of birth and/or present affiliation—is supplemented by the tension associated with the stress of grappling with the politics of one’s own work setting, including the specific stress Waghid hopes to heal through friendship.

In the post-Apartheid era, it appears to Wang that the promotion of social justice has been undertaken more by the South African state than by the universities. In her experience in China and the United States, Wang notes the situation has been the reverse: universities have been more interested in social justice than have states. In particular, Wang asks about the educational consequences of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Waghid replies that social justice is a more prominent concern at the former
Black universities than at the former White universities, but that, overall, the South African state has indeed been more assertive than the universities in seeking social justice. In the United States there is a reduced expectation regarding the extent to which schools and universities can achieve social justice, given the absence of political conditions (especially during the Bush administration) that could make academic interventions meaningful. I wonder if the overall political situation in South Africa—and, in particular, if the apparently more activist role of the state—usurps (and perhaps in a welcomed way) the social activism of the schools and universities.

Not only can the “nation” provide the impetus for social justice—and for curriculum reform presumably in the service of social justice—it does provide the distinctive setting in which social justice and curriculum reform have meaning and meet their fate. Not only a key marker for domestic developments, the nation can also intervene in macroprocesses of globalization, if sometimes coordinated with other nation-states, as during the global financial crisis of late 2008. Citing Kristeva’s conception of “nation without nationalism,” Wang acknowledges that the “nation” can function as a “marker for difference from globalization.” However, if it becomes “fixed” and “centralized,” “it loses its ability to respond to the global and also fails to respond to differences within the national.” While associated with ethnicity, “nation” is not racialized in China, she notes. Macedo emphasizes the primacy of pluralism in nationhood, wondering if conceptions of citizenship—necessarily constructed by exclusion—can accommodate different cultures living together. It is precisely this aspiration that structures, according to me at least, the present project.

II
Commentary

Understanding one another may be hard; it can certainly be interesting. But it doesn’t require that we come to agreement.

—Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006, 78)

In these exchanges, situating-the-self seems the first step in building bridges from self to other. Panel members’ questions often began in reference to the Brazilian situation (in Macedo’s case) or the situation in China or the United States (in Wang’s case). Situating-the-self located questions requesting clarification that were then followed by replies of explanation. Comprehension was followed, on occasion, by skepticism, even
disagreement, as in the case of Hugo’s endorsement of “hierarchy.” The
discursive sequence was self-situating questions and precipitated explana-
tion resulting in reaffirmation of understanding, if now enlarged and pos-
sibly deepened by the exchange. Indeed, there was one occasion on which
reconsideration followed understanding. My identification of the discurs-
ive movements of these exchanges demonstrates less the recursive quality
of this international exchange than it does the limits of a discourse analysis
that privileges process over content. If we “bring knowledge back in”
(Young 2008), the picture becomes clearer.

What knowledge did these exchanges emphasize? Among the concepts
around which these discursive movements were organized were (1) dis-
cliplinarity (specifically, the relation of disciplinary boundaries to social
structure and the state’s political agenda); (2) dialogue (including discus-
sions of prerequisite conditions); (3) agency (including subaltern agency, a
capacity extended from slaves to teachers); and (4) translation (specifically
teachers’ reinterpretation of curriculum policy). Uniquely inflected if not
constituted, these concepts are, I submit, major contributions to under-
standing curriculum, and not only in South Africa. These interrelated con-
cepts also point to next steps in South African curriculum studies.

While the discursive movements of internationalization may begin (and
end) in situating-the-self, their “middle” is understanding, grounded in
the specificity of setting but stretched like a bridge that is not a bridge
(Aoki 2003 [1995], 318). Arc-like, familiar ideas extend across difference,
enabling us to comprehend them anew. Discussing disciplinary structures,
for instance, Macedo characterizes the theme of “disciplinary” versus
“integrated” curriculum as an “old” one in Brazil. Since the 1990s the pref-
erence has been for the “integrated” curriculum, rationalized using
Deleuze, and evident, she notes (replying to Ramrathan) in “less disciplin-
ary discussion in [Brazilian] elementary schools.” While she appreciates
the association of “integrated” curriculum in South Africa with its racial
politics, Macedo points out it is also an “international movement.” Hugo
acknowledges the latter point, but he underscores that the origins of this
import were New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States,
not Brazil or Cuba, for instance. Moreover, the concept of “integrated cur-
riculum” was translated into the South African context in nationally dis-
tinctive ways by multiple stakeholders, among them unions, government,
academicians. What becomes clear is that the same concepts convey differ-
ent meanings in different countries at different historical moments among
different constituencies. Understanding curriculum internationally is
served less by the comparative study of institutional statistics than by
studying the thought of scholars working within specific if shifting na-
tional histories and cultures.
Given the primacy of the particular, there were, inevitably, points of disagreement. Macedo wondered how Hugo squares his endorsement of sharper disciplinary boundaries in the school curriculum with Deleuze’s work (which she understands as undermining “polarizations” by “blurring boundaries”). Hugo countered that Deleuze works (playfully) with binaries. Hugo’s preference for sharper disciplinary boundaries constitutes a “diagnosis” based on an “understanding of the whole field.” Macedo becomes even more openly skeptical when she challenges Hugo’s idea that a “strongly verticalized . . . disciplinary curriculum . . . could diminish social inequalities.” Wang shares Macedo’s skepticism, questioning the concept of “hierarchy” by referring (as noted earlier) to Chinese martial arts novels. She suggests the concept of “spiral” instead. (In so doing, it seems to me she is both testing his commitment to disciplinary boundaries and trying to be helpful.) Hugo acknowledges that a range of curricular structures—including hybrid models—may be appropriate for specific settings. It was the “massiveness of the impulse towards integration and the negative effects this had on our students [that] lies behind my call, and others’, to strengthen disciplinary boundaries.” That conceded, Hugo reaffirms that “powerful knowledge structures must be kept as an overriding goal.” He allows for variety but insists that curriculum “structure will always have routes down, up, and across.” Hugo acknowledges: “I am refusing to step back from hierarchy, preferring to sophisticate it from within.”

There was instance of understanding stretched across distinctive national locations that resulted not in disagreement but in reconsideration. This occurred during exchanges concerning knower and knowledge modes. “It seems to me,” Wang writes, that the “knowledge mode has an implicit assumption of knower while knower mode is oriented to a different kind of knowledge.” Hoadley concurs that “for the knowledge mode, knowledge is still social, but it has an internal logic—it is not just about power relations external to it. For the knower mode, the emphasis is the latter.” Hoadley adds: “I need to think about this more.” In the Hoadley-Macedo-Wang exchanges the questions and replies seem closest to becoming “dialogue,” disclosing “give-and-take” on specific points, constant efforts to understand the other, even to revise one’s own position in light of questions and comments, all expressed during very specific and focused conversation.

While the significance of dialogue may seem self-evident, it is, within curriculum studies, a contested notion. Macedo reports that the concept of dialogue—central to Waghid’s exposition—is also central in Brazilian curriculum studies: “the idea of a dialogue among different cultures is an important curriculum goal.” Macedo’s question concerned the conditions prerequisite to dialogue. If cultures are incommensurable, she asks, how is
a common language possible? And if dialogue becomes compulsory is it not, then, exclusionary? Wang also focused on conditions prerequisite to dialogue. She found Ramrathan’s promotion of “a dialogical relationship between practice and theory” appealing, but if teaching means socialization into existing practices (as it often does in the United States), Wang wonders:

Especially now, under the current pressure to increase test scores, there is much less space for students to use their critical thinking to successfully negotiate between official demands and educational meanings. So I wonder what teacher education programs can do—and I assume that there are multiple possibilities and modes—to truly promote “a dialogical relationship between practice and theory.”

Here situating-the-self (the “current pressure” to which she refers is occurring in the United States) and historicization (beginning with “now” underscores the historical specificity of the “pressure”) provide the context for the endorsement of “critical thinking” in the “negotiation” (“translation” in Le Grange’s lexicon) “between” demands and meaning.

In dialogue the issue of agency seems paramount. Agency is a prerequisite for dialogue; dialogue provides occasions for agency’s enactment. Like Soudien, Le Grange points out that during Apartheid the subjugated made “opportunities for resistance and liberation.” Le Grange cites in-service work “for teachers by teachers” as one example of agency enacted during Apartheid. In the exchanges concerning the concept of a rhizomatic curriculum, Le Grange reports that he finds the concept of “rhizoanalysis . . . particularly useful” as it underlines the “policy-practice gap,” a space wherein teachers can reinterpret policy texts, can “tactically appropriate policy, comply, or subvert prescriptions.” In such gaps, then, agency can be enacted. Also (his comments are in reply to Macedo), in new “lines of flight” (associated with the Deleuze’s concept of rhizome), teachers can incorporate what has before been excluded from the school curriculum: Le Grange mentions “sexual orientation” and “Africanization of knowledge.” If we associate the former concept with modernity (accepting Foucault’s argument that the conflation of sexual practice and social identity did not occur until the nineteenth century), and the latter with the indigenous (recalling, possibly, the precolonial), their juxtaposition would seem to me to qualify as examples of what Soudien terms “modern-indigeneity.”

Acknowledging that “deterritorialization does not happen automatically,” Wang points to the “conditions” necessary for it. Le Grange appears to agree with Wang’s emphasis, citing the following prerequisite
condition: “an intellectual climate of robust critical engagement” (which, I suggest, includes “dialogue”). Such a condition underscores the significance of teachers’ practices. Le Grange posits what he terms “the politics of translation” to theorize how “existing events can be the bearers of alternative possibilities.”9 In acts of translation—between origin and enactment, in what Wang (2004) terms a third space—are opportunities for agency. The examples cited here reflect the present preference for acknowledging collective rather than individual action, but one does not need to invoke Mandela’s name to remind that collective action has embedded within it, is stimulated and, later, reconstructed by heroic individuals. Certainly agency—collective and individual, as each is imbricated in the other—is key.

It is through agency that hybridity is created and enacted, but, again, the question of conditions underscores the complexity of the undertaking. Soudien argues that in South Africa “the hybrid that emerges takes its most expressive form in everyday culture.” Curricula function as “mechanisms of order in these fields of contradiction,” requiring scholars to “pay much deeper attention to the sociology of the cognitive encounter,” to be part of a larger project of deuniversalizing (indeed provincializing) the European experience. In so doing, whiteness and educational achievement decouple. Wang wonders “what native resources can South African education draw upon to initiate this uncoupling.” Soudien points out that “the pervasiveness of modernity makes the recuperation of tradition always a fragile gesture,” rendering unlikely, perhaps, recognition of “new forms of indigeneity . . . which are developing in front of our eyes.” It is this modern indigeneity [that], is a possible launch pad for a new curriculum.” It is within this historical field of determination that agency occurs.10

The Task for the Age

Internationalization does not mean blind adoption of foreign concepts. It means international discussion among scholars who are historically self-aware of their own traditions, not in order to defend them, but—on the contrary—to allow different or foreign arguments to be understood.

Daniel Tröhler (2003, 778)

When Wang asks whether curriculum studies began in South Africa, Le Grange replies that the curriculum “first” became an object of study in the early 1980s. A decade later specialists gathered to deliberate curriculum policy options. Le Grange finds the field “fragmented and weakly developed.” It “requires an association with a journal on South African
WILLIAM F. PINAR

curriculum studies, which will also arrange conferences.” While eschewing consensus regarding the field’s future and present agenda, Wang asks how scholars might support a “dynamic and independent field of study”? Regarding the importation of scholarship from other countries, Wang points out that European and North American scholarship is widely read in China. In China the importation of curriculum concepts has, in recent years, functioned to “diversify” (Wang’s verb) curriculum control and enliven curriculum scholarship. It appears that the issue is less the importation of ideas (although it matters which ideas are imported, obviously) than how they function (including how they are translated) after they have arrived.

Among the most eloquent—and searing—analyses of curriculum studies in South Africa is the one offered by Crain Soudien. “The question for us in the curriculum field,” Soudien asserts, “has to be that of how we might understand, and engage with, and perhaps even intervene, in the process of developing full human subjects who are able to manage their full histories.” This reverberating question requires (it seems to me) historical understanding, informing analyses of present circumstances (both are discussed in Soudien’s chapter), animated by a moral sense of educational responsibility to the students in our charge. Soudien points out that such an undertaking—he terms it “deep” education—“will make us feel not warm and cozy but which will reveal the full scale of the uncertainty that confronts us as human beings and helps us realize how much we need each other right now is unavoidably the task for the age.” The task for the age—in Jane Addams’ phrase, the test of our generation—underscores the historicity and subjectivity of the challenge not only South African scholars face. In Ramrathan’s terms, these are “contextual” challenges, one that forefront “power” and “agency.” Ramrathan judges the field “largely consequential,” but Soudien is not sanguine:

The state of the field is wholly unequal to the challenge it confronts. The field is, without sounding self-righteous, an accomplice in the process of leading our society towards identities that are not equal to the challenge of our times. In South Africa, it is, by and large, an almost irrelevant field. It has a mountain to climb . . . To build a stronger community is going to take several decades. Needed are strong sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers and historians who will make the field of education their own.

How does one make the field one’s own?

The cultivation of disciplinarity is, I suggest, one place to start. Disciplinarity means acknowledging the disciplinary conversation in which one’s present undertakings are situated, however focused on history
and society one’s research is. Without returning to the conversation that provides the concepts we employ to comprehend history and society, I do not see how we can improve upon them. Without understanding our intellectual history (situating-the-self), we cannot attune our concepts (such as agency and dialogue) to the nuances of the next moment, especially if that next moment is an unprecedented, hybrid time in which, for instance, indigenous cultures reassemble and reassert themselves in light of new understandings, opportunities, and demands. Disciplinarity is no panacea, but it is our profession. If, as Wayne Hugo suggests, “curriculum studies is the critical investigation of the processes involved in engaging with knowledge structures that have been designed for systematic learning,” are not we—its practitioners—obliged to engage in an ongoing self-reflexive investigation of our own processes of learning? Are we not obligated to critically examine knowledge structures, explicating their genesis, their functions, their meanings? Is not that obligation the expression of disciplinarity, key to the practice of our profession?

The concepts that have emerged in these brief exchanges—a photographic “blow-up” of one brief moment of internationalization—testify to the sophistication of South African curriculum studies as the field is practiced by these scholars. South African in their formulation, worldwide in their significance, these concepts—disciplinarity, dialogue, agency, and translation—comprise knowledge upon which South African scholars and their colleagues worldwide can draw as they face their respective situations. Concepts are not only resources informing our answers to the problems at hand; they also provoke questions, questions that reverberate in various venues. Among these are the following: how do acts of translation enable dialogue among teachers, students, and the texts upon which their conversation is focused? In the subjectification of historical determination can individuals reconstruct the present through the academic disciplines? How can the moral demand—instantiated historically, made pressing politically, indeed deafening, by the suffering of our contemporaries and their children—inspire scholarly inquiry commensurate with “the task of the age”?

This volume contributes, I trust, to the disciplinarity of South African curriculum studies. Despite its youthfulness, it seems to me that curriculum studies in South Africa is a sophisticated academic discipline, displaying a maturity marked, in part, by the severity of its self-critique. Defensiveness, which is a sign of weakness, is absent here. These scholars criticize sharply the lack of dialogue, the polarization, and the uncritical importation of concepts that typify the field’s present circumstances. These problems are not unique to the South African field, but identifying them so candidly and specifying them so precisely provide opportunities
for next steps. One step, as I have implied, may be self-reflexive: looking inward, cultivating a hybridity that follows from the distinctiveness of the South African experience.

Such a field requires the cultivation of South African curriculum theory as well as history. Once again Soudien speaks to the issue: “Hardly alone in this, “ Soudien begins (protectively), [curriculum studies in South Africa], he judges, is “relatively weak,”…characterized by poor theory. The theory that is evident is uncritically borrowed and poorly worked with.” Soudien is not alone in identifying what one might characterize as a neocolonialism of concepts. The uncritical importation of concepts—especially by government bureaucrats and politicians—obfuscates the task scholars face as it blurs the specificity of the present situation. The critical importation of concepts by scholars themselves—such as Bernstein’s emphasis upon disciplinary boundaries—may clarify present circumstances (as in Hugo’s analysis), although there is clearly no consensus on this point (as Hoadley’s map testifies). Translation seems paramount. Add to these issues others—such as citizenship, friendship, and freedom—associated with the post-Apartheid democratic state, and the present circumstances of curriculum studies in South Africa are complex indeed. As Ramrathan acknowledges,

the South African academic field of curriculum studies is largely shaped by contextual issues of transformation, redress, rationalization, outcomes approached to curriculum change and societal change…[C]urriculum is a highly contested terrain…at the intersection of a multitude of forces that are driving it and shaping it.

While being positioned at this complex “intersection” affords multiple perspectives, it makes, too, for multiple obligations, primary among the demand to contribute to the political and economic progress of post-Apartheid South Africa.

Because this moral imperative is profound, its demand is expressed so intensely (it seems to me, from a great distance) as to frustrate its realization. While national history and culture provide the context in which curriculum studies occurs, to position the latter exclusively (or even primarily) in the service of the former disables academicians from undertaking that independent research that is antecedent, indeed prerequisite, to understanding the task of the age. Such independent research is structured by scholars’—not the public’s—questions, although these no doubt intersect (if in different form). The uncritical importation of concepts combined with the demands of citizens (and their representatives in government) can create a sense of emergency that dissolves the conditions for dialogue as it
instantiates instrumentality. An ongoing sense of emergency undermines ongoing study of the intellectual history of the field. Without such study and dialogue, how is intellectual advancement possible?

Especially as politicians understate their responsibility (and, specifically, their failure) to address the emergency emergency of the present, scholars (and our colleagues in the schools) scramble to find solutions to the pressing problems at hand. By ignoring the field’s past and ongoing conversation, pressed to speak in language accessible to the public (or, at least, to bureaucrats), inquiry gets conducted too quickly, becomes too tied to governments’ agendas, and devolves into oversimplified solutions that create the only problems that might have been avoided. In such circumstances, one cannot be surprised by Soudien’s observation:

There is, and this reflects the general weakness of the field, the predilection for the sound-bite rather than the argument…. Much of the discussion in the field operates at a simplistic and journalistic level of analysis. Deep analysis of the sociology of learning and education and the role of the curriculum inside of this is not attractive to many working in the field.

Does not the press of the public disable scholars from replying with the sophistication independent research allows?

Being an outsider is no privileged position, but neither is it a position of disadvantage. I submit these questions and comments to encourage continuing dialogue. If it is to resist reinscribing global hierarchies—as Soudien pointedly depicts—the internationalization of curriculum studies must be an ongoing critical conversation among colleagues, even “friends.”

Through our disagreements, reaffirmations, and reconsiderations, can we contribute to the creation of that historically informed, theoretically sophisticated academic discipline our constituents—first among them teachers and the students they teach—deserve? Studying curriculum studies in South African inclines me to answer in the affirmative.

Notes

1. *Exchange* is defined as not only “the act of giving or taking one thing in return for another,” but also “a) the act or process of substituting one thing for another and b) reciprocal giving and receiving.” Generosity and openness make dialogue possible; it is the ongoing act of agency and reciprocity during which understanding is altered both by the process and by the information it generates, including, on one occasion, reconsideration of a distinction, and, more typically, the reaffirmation of existing intellectual commitments. Both these
discursive movements were evident in these exchanges, which occurred via e-mail over a three-month period during 2007 and early 2008. They are available online. See “The Exchanges (South Africa)” at: http://csics.educ.ubc.ca/projects.html

Quoted passages are taken from these exchanges.

2. Pier Paolo Pasolini distinguished between what he called the “old” fascism of Hitler and Mussolini and the “new” fascism of contemporary neocapitalism. The former, according to him, was a fashion (however horrific) and the latter was the one that penetrates the soul, establishing a totalizing regime from which there is no escape (Pinar 2009).

3. In his discussion of epistemological issues associated with the representation of reality, the Austrian novelist and essayist Robert Musil, relying on this graduate training in physics, invoked a similar notion, namely “field[s] of force, which are charged with meaning based on the unique constellation of factors within which they are inscribed” (McBride 2006, 143). His contemporary (and fellow member of the “Generation of 1905”) Walter Benjamin invoked the concept to designate the association between past and present (see Jay 1993, 1). Adorno, too, employed it to suggest, in Jay’s (2) paraphrase, “a nontotalized juxtaposition of changing elements, a dynamic interlay of attractions and aversion, without a generative first principle, common denominator, or inherent essence.” Ramrathan’s invocation of the concept suggests, then, not only resistance but also the tension between past and present enacted through resistance.

4. “In relation to curriculum research,” Hoadley (this volume) points out, “the knower mode would be concerned with relations to gender, class, race, disability, in other words, categories of ‘knowers,’ in the knowledge mode the interest would crucially be in the intrinsic features and structuring of the knowledge itself.”

5. Situating-the-self—or explaining “where I’m coming from” (see Simpson 2002)—was a regular discursive move in these exchanges, as when Macedo refers to Brazil and Wang to China and the United States. Situating-the-self functioned not as self-enclosure, but, rather, as “ramps” onto “bridges” to elsewhere. Wang, for instance, refers to unequal practice-teaching power relationships in Oklahoma (in the United States) when commenting on Ramrathan’s discussion of university-school tensions in South African teacher education. Macedo associates Hugo’s suggestion (that curricular integration in South Africa “reinforces inequalities”) with Marxian/Gramscian scholarship in Brazil. Wang asks Hugo how his characterization of curriculum studies derives from his life history. (Hugo replied autobiographically.) Wang referred to China when asking Le Grange about the importation of curriculum studies scholarship from abroad, noting that “translated” scholarship is more widely read in China than is Chinese work. Speaking with Hoadley about the knowledge/knower mode distinction, Wang begins “I don’t know to what degree such an equation is applicable to the South African situation, but in China, for instance.” Focused on South African curriculum studies, these exchanges often began by situating-the-self.
6. Momentarily I will be employing “disciplinarity” in quite a different sense than Hugo’s. In my definition (see preface, note 1), disciplinarity refers to the practice of our profession as curriculum studies scholars, practice that contributes to the field’s intellectual advancement by strengthening the disciplinary structures of verticality (intellectual life history) and horizontality (analyses of present circumstances). For rationale and details see Pinar (2007).

7. Dialogue is key, but not necessarily initially, I think. Initially what seems key is scholars’ study of their own and their field’s intellectual life histories and present circumstances.

8. For me, the cultivation of individuality—one’s originality, independence, indeed, one’s willingness to act in the public sphere—are among the conditions prerequisite to agency. As noted in the preface, on occasion I employ the adjective “heroic” to acknowledge the courage individuality requires.

9. Translation has been an important concept in U.S. curriculum studies as well: see Edgerton (1996). “An effort of translation,” Duncan (2006, 118) notes, “is required in order to avoid confusing difference with lack, and to avoid the smug attribution of blame in what should be simply an acknowledgement of difference.”

10. Questions of determination hovered over this exchange. Wang writes: “I share Elizabeth’s skepticism about how pervasive the impact of Western modernity has been.” Wang contests other elements of Soudien’s analysis, pointing out that (after Foucault) “indigenous” cannot be defined because the “original” cannot be traced. She writes: “I read the notion of the indigenous, though, as a post-colonial gesture to counteract the legacy of colonization.” She adds: “Hegemony, [then], can never be complete.”

11. As I did in Understanding Curriculum, I use “text” broadly to include written text (as in textbooks) and culture as well, including student experience as social text.

12. Waghid’s conception of friendship is highly suggestive for conceptions of colleagueship across national borders. The concept of internationalism emphasizes the possible solidarity of scholars; the concept of friendship privileges individual relationships, hardly stripped of political significance but emphasizing intellectual and emotive bonds that enable a visceral solidarity, no doubt the intersubjective “glue” to political solidarity. In order to overcome the alienating effects of national identification, scholars may well want to privilege individuality over nationhood, one reason why I have underscored the individuality of those participating in this project.

   We gain a glimpse of solidarity in a brief comment Macedo makes in regard to Ramrathan’s point about teacher “translation” of neoliberal initiatives. Macedo cites resistance to similar measures in Brazil, asserting that “I’m glad to hear that in South Africa such a resistance also exists.” Though “resistance” is always inflected in different ways by national history and culture, it is promising to discern the possibility of shared values focused on our common commitments, in this instance, to agency, and not only for schoolteachers, but also for ourselves.
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Epilogue

Final Word

Lesley Le Grange

Curriculum Studies in South Africa: Intellectual Histories & Present Circumstances is an important text and one, I suggest, is long overdue. I am grateful to Professor William Pinar for initiating this project, which enabled South African scholars to exchange thoughts with non–South African scholars. I wish to thank Professors Elizabeth Macedo and Hongyu Wang for their thought-provoking questions posed to South African scholars.

Pondering Pinar’s description, internationalization denotes nationally distinctive fields in complicated conversation with each other, and the questions posed by Macedo and Wang raises a key question me: in what sense might we think of South African curriculum studies as a distinctive field? Linked to this is Wang’s question: when did curriculum first become an object of study in South Africa? These questions do not have definitive answers, but this volume provides insights into these issues and an impetus for continuing the conversation. Although there has been much theorization on curriculum in South Africa over the past two decades, and more particularly since the introduction of outcomes-based education, complicated conversations on curriculum between South African scholars have been largely absent. If this project has a shortcoming, it is the absence of exchanges between South African scholars themselves. Let me hasten to say that this is no fault of the international scholars because the project offered opportunities for such complicated conversations. It could be argued that commitments and workload of South African scholars might have frustrated such conversations. However, my observation is that the education community in South Africa remains a divided one. The separate education associations
established in South Africa during Apartheid still exist, stifling much needed conversations between South Africans. Some South African academics have, for example, engaged in intense conversation with Basil Bernstein (even after his death, through his writings), as well as among themselves, to the extent they know more about Bernstein’s work than about the work of their fellow South African academics—conversations that might have showed blind spots in their work, in the way that Wang does with respect to Hugo’s chapter. I share Wang’s skepticism of Hugo’s claim that a strongly verticalized curriculum can diminish social inequalities and am also sceptical of the idea that Deleuze’s work supports his views—it is specifically arborescent thinking that Deleuze denounces. If I understand Pinar correctly, the internationalization of curriculum concerns critical reflection on one’s nationally distinctive field through conversation with those outside of one’s nationally distinctive field. I wish to add that complicated conversation between scholars within nation-states might be as important (particularly those nation-states with divided histories) and that the use of parentheses might be appropriate, that is (inter)nationalization. My hope is that this volume edited by Professor William Pinar might provide some impetus for more robust conversation between South African scholars of curriculum that transcends traditional boundaries.

In the preface of the book Professor Pinar writes about proximity, which unlike in the case of the United States, seems not to be a problem in Canadian curriculum studies or in South African curriculum studies (or at least not yet). He cites scholars who argue that they are or have been able to perform their work with relative freedom and others who argue that there is subtle pressure on academics to comply with government regulations. He concludes: “There may be, then, a problem of proximity developing in South Africa.” Pinar’s initial assertion and his conclusion are accurate. His initial assertion is correct because academics have enjoyed relative freedom over the past decades, particularly since the weakening of the Apartheid state, when its demise became inevitable. This freedom was enjoyed in the early years of South Africa’s transition to a democracy. However, in more recent years (which links to Pinar’s conclusion) we have seen the state putting in place regulatory apparatus to exercise more control over both schools and universities. This move is captured in one of my writings:

In South Africa, for example, we witnessed the post-apartheid state adopt neoliberal policies even though the governing party (the African National Congress) had predicated its political/economic manifesto on socialist and nationalist idea(l)s, during its struggle against apartheid. With respect to education, we saw the post-apartheid state introduce a plethora of policies in the years immediately following the country’s first democratic elections—even though the policies espoused radical rhetoric, they were largely underpinned
by neoliberal agendas. For example, the promulgation of the School’s Act of 1996, which devolves powers to governing bodies, the introduction of outcomes-based education (influenced by the revival of neo-classical economics), and the Higher Education Act of 1998, which legitimizes the establishment of a Higher Education Quality Committee (HEQC), responsible for monitoring and regulating the quality of all higher education programmes through a process of accreditation of such programmes/qualifications. On the neoliberal agenda is the idea of self-regulation evident in the work of the HEQC through systems and processes of peer auditing, evaluation and review, leading to what is referred to as the attainment of self-accreditation status on the part of higher education institutions. Self-regulation and self-accreditation are misleading terms because, in a sense, they imply an association with academic freedom and institutional autonomy. However, these terms do not mean the abandonment of state control but the establishment of a new form of control; what Du Gay (1996) calls “controlled de-control” and what Vidovich (2002) calls, “steering at a distance”—performativity remains the regulatory regime. (Le Grange 2006, 905–906)

Having said this, I am not convinced that South Africa will go the route of the United States. South Africa’s democracy is in some senses a fledgling one, but in other ways also a robust one. A demonstration of the latter point is the action taken by the Treatment Action Campaign (a South African AIDS activist organization), which a few years ago mounted and won a legal case against the government. The judgment obliged the government to make antiretroviral drugs available to pregnant mothers in all nine provinces in order to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. South Africans won’t simply comply with state pronouncements, and some academics, I would argue, have the savvy to invigorate vectors of escape from performativity regimes that might be debilitating.

There is one more theme that I wish to pick up briefly: Pinar’s reference to cosmopolitanism in his notes to the preface of the book. Pinar asserts: “it is now time to reconstruct a cosmopolitan humanism personified by heroic individuals.” Pinar’s emphasis on individuals might mean moving beyond dialogue and deliberation that leads to consensus, to democratic politics that embraces opposition, dissent, and disagreement. In the difficult world we currently inhabit, where conflict of all kinds is prevalent, we may have to learn to live with conflict—we might have to learn through disagreement.

Reference

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